Opening Two Clubs

We all love to get big hands and there's nothing like a 2♣ opening to say "I own this hand."

But how often does it really work out well? And how often do we end up saying "we were just too high when we started looking for a fit." Let's think about what usually goes wrong.

Balanced hands are no problem. We have 22 or more points and rebid 2NT over partner's usual 2♦ bid – everyone knows where we stand. Single-suited hands too, normally.

Let's take a look at a recent example: ♠KQT8742 ♥A ♦KQ7 ♣A2. Is there a danger that partner will let this hand be passed out even though we can make game? What do we need to make game, anyway? ♠Ax ♥xxxx ♦xxx ♣xxxx would be enough but maybe partner would find a response with this hand. ♠xx ♥xxxx ♦xxx ♣Kxxx would be sufficient also and partner will definitely be passing with that. Are the opponents likely to go quietly when we have a seven-card suit? They might if they are vulnerable and each have a balanced hand with 10 or 11 hcp each. When this hand came up in a robot tournament, 40% of players – including myself – with this hand chose to open 2♣ (the rest opened 1♠). As it happens, not one of us made our contract. Most went down one in 4♠. Partner's hand was ♠5 ♥T8743 ♦AJT8 ♣J86. Most of the spade openers made their 4♠ contract when LHO did not lead a club. I was in 6♦ personally after partner showed a red two-suiter. It never occurred to me that he would show his two suits with such scant values. Wasn't I already showing a good spade suit when I rebid 2♠? Wasn't I showing even longer spades when I rebid 3♠ over 3♥?

It got me thinking that there is so much ambiguity after a 2♣ opening that responder doesn't really know how good our suit is, although in this case with me bidding it twice, the message should have got across.

The biggest problems arise when we have a strong hand that is neither balanced nor single-suited. Two-suiters aren't too bad, although it's amazing how often partner is 1165 when we are 6511. There's just about room for opener to make two suit bids. And, at the slight risk of the opening bid being passed out, there's the possibility of a jump shift (or reverse) to show a big two-suited hand that doesn't quite qualify for a 2♣ opener. But three-suited hands are appallingly difficult to bid even when starting at the one-level. Let's say you pick up this nice hand: ♠AKQ8 ♥3 ♦KQ7 ♣AKQ62. You might be able to make game with as little as ♠xxx ♥QJTxx ♦Jxxx ♣Jx opposite. And the danger of being passed out now is quite significant (the opponents only have 12 points between them and probably no long suit).

So, what can we do in this situation? You could open 2♣ and rebid 3♣ over the expected 2♦. But the chances of stopping in time are not great given that we started describing our three-suited hand at the three-level!

I started thinking about using the three-level to show a self-splinter: i.e. rebid 3♥ over 2♦, to show a three-suited hand with short hearts. Sure, it prevents us from using 3♥ to show a solid heart suit but, given that we now will always be showing a goodish suit with our first rebid, there's less to be gained by showing the solid suit. We should probably insist that we have at least four of the other major. It still doesn't help however with distinguishing between one- and two-suited hands.

So, let me propose the following somewhat artificial scheme:

2♣ – 2♦ (waiting) –

2♥*: (three-suited hand) – 2♠* (artificial) –
2NT* (short spades) – responder tries to sign off with no help, else jumps
3♣* (short clubs) – ditto
3♦* (short diamonds) – ditto
3♥* (short hearts) – ditto 2♠* (two-suited hand, at least 5-5) – 2NT* (artificial) –
Opener rebids naturally but up the line (responder bids the next higher suit with xx or worse in the suit, else raises with support)2NT (22-24 balanced)
3♣, 3♦, 3♥, 3♠: single-suited hand with a good 6+ suit (not necessarily solid)
3NT (25-27 balanced)

Note that in this system, opener will normally end up as declarer, with a one- or two-suited hand as the partnership will generally not play in one of responder's suits. That is not true, however, for approximately half of the three-suited hand situations (spades, diamonds and notrump).

It is possible of course for responder to make a positive suit response to the 2♣ call. However, the price of breaking the relay is quite high (all of these follow-ups are missed) so a suit should only be bid by responder with a very good suit of his own, typically six cards with two of the top three honors and good intermediates. In the case of a two-suited hand (the 2♠ rebid), there may be a chance to show a good suit by bypassing the next higher suit, i.e. if it is the next step up. Otherwise, it is better for responder to bid the relay as this conserves most space.

I would really appreciate your comments on this scheme. Is it workable? Is it legal (ACBL rules are so arbitrary)? Is it too complicated to remember?

Wielding the axe

I've probably spent far too many words in this blog on the subject of using double as a flexible call looking for a fit with the general expectation of partner taking the double out if he can. I know that some of you are thinking "but I like to penalize the enemy." Believe me, so do I – but I happen to think that that is often the route to getting the juiciest penalties.

So, using the system I've described (just look for the label "double" or "DSIP"), there are only a few ways you can penalize the opponents. Perhaps the most common is when an ostensibly takeout-oriented double is passed for penalties. This usually has the advantage that the extra strength and the extra trumps are in different hands. The other situations arise when double occurs (1) after one of us jumps, thus making a relatively clear statement about the distribution; or (2) after a redouble; or (3) after we make a cue bid, and (4) subsequent to several circumstances having to do with having told your story sufficiently often or having previously shown that you didn't want to compete further.

And then there's the easiest of all contracts to double for penalties: a notrump bid which is "to play." My definition of to play is when it's natural and (1) at the two-level or higher and/or (2) when it's in competition.

Here's a nice example of a low-level double of a competitive notrump bid which was easy to apply and quite profitable (9 imps). It's from an IMP table on BBO (I have redacted the names, although I don't think anyone really did much wrong*):

Those N/S pairs who played in notrump made either 8 or 9 tricks (best defense holds it to 8). But all other contracts were destined to go down. So the important thing here was to maximize the penalty. There was nothing particularly difficult in finding the red card but I will make a couple of observations. First, one of the most important factors in a penalty double is a lack of fit with partner. The worse the fit, the fewer total tricks there are likely to be and the more we want to defend a doubled contract if we can. Second, my hand had something in all the other suits so it would not be easy for them to wriggle out of it. And third, I trusted my partner to have a real overcall. It wasn't what I would call a great overcall, especially vulnerable, but it had solid opening values. Partner was not particularly interested in a spade lead, and he wasn't taking away any bids from the opponents, so therefore he was competing for the contract. And, given his outside strength, there was even a decent chance that, if I had a spade fit, we might even be able to make game.

Of sixteen tables that played this board, there were two others at which the first round of bidding was identical. But in one case North passed, in the other he bid 2♣. A few Wests chose to make a negative double instead of the 1NT call. To my mind this is equally dangerous because North has an easy redouble. But that never happened in practice. Instead, those Norths chose to bid notrump, which predictably did reasonably well.

The moral of the story is simply this: While it's nice to be able to diagnose a likely penalty, both partners must be on the same page regarding the meaning of the double in order for the trap to be successfully sprung.

* There may be some arguments that both East and West slightly overbid their hands, especially considering the vulnerability.  But these were not particularly unusual actions. 11/16 Easts opened one heart. 3/10 Wests hearing one heart and one spade then bid 1NT. Really, I think they were just a little unlucky.

Prepared Bids (part 2)

I don't really like the name "prepared bid" because it doesn't have much intrinsic meaning. But it is a well-known term for what amounts to a "temporizing bid." I wrote some thoughts on this topic (and the nomenclature) in Prepared bids (part 1).

The essence of a prepared bid is that you know that it is going to temporarily confuse partner, but you mean to clarify the description of your hand at your next turn. Perhaps the most common instance is when you pick up a hand of 4=3=3=3 (or similar) shape and it doesn't fit your range for 1NT.  You open 1♣, preparing for a rebid of 1NT. The only thing that's going to change your mind is if partner responds 1♠ - you will raise to 2♠. I realize that some of you are going to rebid 1♠ after partner responds 1♥ but if you do that, your partners will never know if you have real clubs or not.

But here's another, less typical, prepared bid situation: ♠KT9 ♥AKQ865 ♦KQ5 ♣3. You decide to open 1♥, partner responds 1♠, and you rebid 3♦. Of course, you do not really intend to play in diamonds at all, you are simply using that bid as a game force. You expect to play either in hearts, spades or notrump, depending on what partner does next. If partner doesn't raise hearts, or bid notrump, you plan to clarify your hand by making a delayed (three-card) raise to spades. You might even do so if partner does bid notrump. What you don't really want to hear is 4♦, because if partner has a good hand with four-four in the pointed suits, you might end up in a diamond slam on a Moyseian fit.

Still, as with all prepared bids, you know that there's a risk of partner getting the wrong idea -- it's just that you believe that said risk is less than the inherent risks of any other action. In our case, you might also rebid 3♥ but that could easily get passed out when game is possible in spades or notrump. Similarly, you could jump to 3♠ but partner is likely to be extremely disappointed in your trump holding.

So, it's essential when making a prepared bid, not only to have a plan for all likely responses but also to ensure that your sequence will describe your hand as accurately as possible. So, what will you do if partner raises diamonds? You have a great hand with unannounced support for partner's suit and a fantastic suit of your own. The decision is going to be further complicated if you're using 4♥ as kickback (keycard ask) for diamonds.

It's a tough one, but I think that the bid you should be planning after a diamond raise is 4♠. Partner will know that you have only three spades and some sort of red two-suiter (and therefore at most one club). How likely is it that partner has only four spades? What if he's got two hearts and that would be the best strain.

First, we need to consider what his strength is. Could he have a bare minimum? I don't think so. We created a game force and a minimum hand would bid either 3♥ (with two hearts), 3♠ (with five spades and fewer than two hearts), 3NT (with a balanced hand with two hearts and a club card), or 5♦. Furthermore, a minimum hand has fewer than three hearts (else partner would have raised hearts to begin with). So, in this context, 4♦ implies that slam is possible, unequivocally denies three hearts, six spades and probably denies much in the club suit. So, we know partner has at least four spades, four diamonds and at most two hearts.

What are the relative lengths of the pointed suits in partner's hand? Is it possible that he has more diamonds than spades. Yes, it's possible. He certainly doesn't have a game-forcing hand with more diamonds than spades. Nevertheless, I think the evidence is for partner having five spades, at most two hearts, at least four diamonds and some number of clubs. It's not guaranteed that he has five spades, but I think the odds favor that. At least if you do end up with only seven trumps, partner will be able to ruff clubs in the short hand, and your holding is rather good for ruffing.

I'm told that the auction, between two good flight A players, went a little off the rails after the prepared bid of 3♦. But it wasn't entirely obvious to me at first where to assign the blame (if any). The player with the hand shown thought that denied 4♦ five spades; responder didn't. Undoubtedly a difficult hand and one that I think requires quite a bit of care and thought to get just right (if there is such a thing as right in this context). Incidentally, if you're wondering what the other hand looked like, take a look at this bidding poll on Bridge Winners.

How to be a lucky player

This is the title of the new book by Matthew Thomson, Australian professional bridge player. As mentioned previously here, Matthew is the best player I've partnered – totally by lucky chance (for me, that is, not for him).

The book is basically an extreme version of the hand evaluation techniques I've always tried to follow (I learned a lot that day). Here it is in a nutshell:

• aces are good;
• more aces are better (any hand with two aces is a good hand);
• intermediates in your long suit are important;
• honors in partner's suit are golden;
• the 5431 shape is magic, especially when you have a 4-4 fit with partner;
• when all your cards are working, bid more, and you will likely get lucky [no, not that kind of lucky].

OK, that was a pretty trashy summary. You'll have to buy the book. On the other hand, I can't recommend the book. Not at all. If all my opponents were armed with the wisdom that he dispenses for lucky players, I'd never win anything.

Here's an example of me trying to bid the lucky way with the robots (dealer, not-vul vs. vul): ♠KQ53 ♥AK9432 ♦982 ♣–. I opened 1♥ and partner responded 1♠. The moment of truth. On the plus side, although I didn't have 5431 with four spades, I did have 6430 with four spades. Surely that was even better. On the minus side, my intermediates in hearts weren't terrific. Nothing daunted, I splintered into 4♣. Partner cue'd in diamonds as I did in hearts. Partner had heard enough to launch Blackwood. I answered 5NT showing two key cards with a void somewhere (guess!). Partner bid 6♠.

With confidence, I put down the dummy. Partner struggled mightily (this was a Classic robo tourney) but went down one. How could that be? Apparently, the robots have also read Matthew's book, especially the bit about any hand with two aces is a "good hand".  He had exactly that, the aces of spades and diamonds, but no kickers. But surely that's not enough to drive to slam over a game-forcing rebid? He also had the QJxx of clubs, but those were valueless opposite shortness – the robots know that, don't they?

The club ace or the diamond king would have been the twelfth trick. Even the diamond queen would have given us a 50% chance. My lack of intermediates in hearts were not the problem. BTW, I was not the only one to force to game at my second turn and end up in slam. The others gave their robots no chance to evaluate, however, as they did not splinter. One other human even jumped straight to slam after partner's response!

Our "Individual" Regional has just ended and I'm happy to report better results from trying to get lucky. But first, which (if any) of these two hands would you be comfortable opening as dealer (playing strong no-trumps):  ♠KJ73 ♥K876 ♦Q62 ♣K2 or  ♠9653 ♥A632 ♦K ♣AT64? What about in third seat?

I opened the first one 1♦ as dealer on the grounds that I had two four card majors, and if partner bid 2♣, I would have something decent for him and if he made an inverted raise of diamonds I would be able to rebid 2NT without undue embarrassment. Otherwise, I considered this hand very marginal. Partner, with a 20-count and five hearts, bid all the way up to 7♥ and made it for a 91% board. Would we get to seven if I'd passed? Partner said no.

I also opened the second hand, although I was in third seat. Would I open it in first or second seat? I think so, based on how much luck it generated this time. The next player passed and partner bid 1♥. RHO now came in with 1♠ and I raised to 2♥, promising four trumps. Partner, with ♠T ♥QJ75 ♦AQJ5 ♣9532 now jumped to 4♥. The lead was the spade ace (a trump would have been better) and, if I recall, another spade. Partner played it very nicely for eleven tricks and a 98% board.

Now that's what I call getting lucky.

A rising star?

I haven't been saying a lot in this blog about CJ our twelve-year old bridge player who started playing  in July of last year, other than a quick reference in Teaching: the best way to learn. But now that he has hit the headlines, so to speak, it's time for some stories.

I refer to the article Meet CJ Kiepert Rising Bridge Star! which is currently featured front and center on the EMBA web site. Kim and CJ had almost 60% in the "pro-am" game a few weeks ago.

CJ still has a lot to learn in bridge (don't we all?) but he has excellent instincts. He's a bit impulsive and he tends to be a somewhat exuberant bidder but that's how you get lucky. Everyone agrees that bridge is a bidder's game. Never having been a fan of going strictly by "the rules" myself, I'm always happy to see creative bidding. It doesn't always work out, of course, but if it works out more often than not in the long run, then you end up a winner.

Here are a couple of examples of CJ's imaginative style from last week's Sunday pairs game: ♠AKT82 ♥AK5 ♦– ♣AKQ53. CJ was in fourth seat, not-vulnerable vs. vulnerable, playing against one of the best pairs in the room. After two passes, his RHO opened 3♦. Bear in mind that we don't have tools to bid this kind of hand scientifically. Even the idea of doubling then bidding a suit isn't something CJ really knows much about – and could hardly be right for this hand anyway. Maybe 4♦ would be the right start but who knows? Trusting his instincts that I would have something useful in diamonds, he bid what he thought he could make: 3NT. Perhaps a double by the next player would have prompted some other action – I don't know. In any case, I showed up with the ace and he took eleven tricks. Sadly it was not the triumph that his boldness might have deserved – eleven of sixteen pairs bid slams (one was a failing grand) but even the 4♠ bidders outscored us as there is an inevitable spade loser before all the spades can be cashed.

His other outside-the-box thinking that day was with this hand: ♠AK5 ♥2 ♦AKJ953 ♣J63. Nobody vulnerable, his LHO dealt and opened 1♠. I bid 4♥ and RHO bid 4♠. Without any hesitation, CJ bid 5♥! As he expected, the opponents pushed on to 5♠ with their 10-card fit and of course now CJ sprang the trap. We ended up with 500 for a top (other than a 550 for making 5♦X).

Here he is in action at a friendly, though expert, New Year's day game with three tables, scoring by IMPs. ♠A9 ♥AT3 ♦QT953 ♣KT3, all vulnerable. CJ dealt and opened 1♦. This was overcalled 1♠ and I bid 2♥ (forcing). What would you do? Almost as if he had read Matthew Thomson's book (see next blog entry) on How to be a lucky player, CJ raised to game. He appreciated the extra value of two aces and the relatively prime king. Even the diamond suit with its good intermediates might furnish tricks with a little help from my hand. As Matthew might say, we did get lucky, making with five heart tricks (including a ruff), four spades (!) and a club. This was worth 10 imps (averaging the two comparisons).

CJ will be at the table again at this weekend's Regional, opposite partners of his age (or close). I'm looking forward to seeing how they do.

The Partnership Desk

My whole plan for the week in Phoenix was upended last Tuesday when my work meetings moved to Minneapolis. Still, I was committed to play three days with Barry (well, turned out it was only two) and could hardly back out of going down to Phoenix notwithstanding the venue change. The best flight I could get was in the afternoon so I was able to play in the side game in the morning. For that, I needed to visit the partnership desk. Given my background with the online partnership desk that I developed many years ago for the ACBL (which they chose not to use but preferred to write their own – but that's another story), and the fact that Kim and I ran the partnership desk for the 2008 NABC, you won't be surprised that I am something of a fan of the partnership desk. Over the years I have picked up partners who have ranged from brilliant to having no idea how the game should be played. But all nice people that I wouldn't have met otherwise.

The best was surely Matthew Thomson, an Australian bridge pro, who I somehow convinced to play with me in a two-session Swiss (don't ask me how) at an NABC several years ago (Denver, 2005 perhaps). I'm sure that, if he remembers me at all, it's as "that pommy bastard that couldn't follow suit."

Matthew is the fastest player I've ever played with (and I've played with Zach Grossack).  By about trick six of every hand, we was able to claim whether defending or playing the dummy. Probably he was looking for a claim even when he was the dummy. We sat down against a team and were on the seventh board of the match when the director came over and said we were playing the wrong pair. The correct pair sat down and we started over. We still finished on time, having played almost fourteen boards!

Matthew was very insistent that with 6-5 you shouldn’t bid Michaels – too much shape – partner will never guess you have that all-important extra card. And he gave me lots of other good system advice which I'm afraid I've forgotten.

I remember defending a hand where we had booked the declarer. I was on lead and couldn’t see how we could get another trick. There was a suit which would have given declarer a ruff/sluff so I completely ignored that suit. But that was the proper play. Partner would have been able to score his now bare queen of trumps en passant.

On another hand the opponents doubled for a lead while we were heading to game or maybe slam. He redoubled and I pulled to 3NT or whatever, making. But the redoubled contract would have scored considerably more.

Matthew has a new book out (his second) which is reviewed in the current ACBL Bridge Bulletin. I'm hoping to find it in my Christmas stocking as I'm sure it's going to be excellent.

Another great stroke of luck was playing with a young lady from California called Katherine Jin. At the last minute before an evening side game at the 2010 Reno NABC, as I was about to give up, she showed up. We played in a 49-table game and finished 2nd overall. Very studious and quiet, she had an uncanny knack for competitive bidding and could play the spots off the cards too.

Today, I was again fortunate. I got paired up with a retired rocket scientist (I may be embellishing a bit) called George from New Jersey. We hit it off pretty well and got lucky with a few contracts too. We weren't perfect but we still managed to get 3rd overall in a 26-table side game.

But, if you're still with me, you will finally be rewarded with a hand. This was in fact the first hand that I picked up in the side game. It was a "New Zealand Rugby" hand – all black – and a real beauty: ♠T876532 ♥– ♦– ♣AKQT62. Nobody vulnerable and the dealer on my right opened 1♥. How should I treat this hand? Whatever I do, unless I bid something like 6♠, I don't think it will be passed out. I decided to walk the dog with 1♠. LHO bid 4♥, nothing from partner and back to me. Should I bid 5♣? Clearly, if there had been any sign of life from partner, I would want to introduce the clubs. Maybe I should even so. But there are some possible drawbacks. One drawback is that I won't be able to play 4♠. Is it likely that they would let me? One of my friends playing in the same event did get to play 4♠X. And what if it turns out that a club lead might get them a ruff and my bid might tip them off? So I bid 4♠. The opponents competed to 5♥ and I bid my spades yet again and got doubled. We were off the top three spades but fortunately they fell in two tricks so, with the help of partner's ♣J (he also had the wasted ♦A), I was able to make my contract (+650) for 18 of 23 matchpoints. Par was +300 for 6♥X-2.

And the outcomes from the partnership desk can be longer-lasting too. I've picked up several partners who became regular partners.  And occasionally you might get extraordinarily lucky and really hit the jackpot. At the logical equivalent of the partnership desk (a club director making pairings), I even met my wife Kim!

Phoenix First Day

I am here in Phoenix at the NABC having a lot of fun. Sadly, our results are not commensurate with all that fun. I have a few very minor successes to report.

In the first session of the Life Master Pairs, I picked up K8432 T QT2 KJ64, fourth seat, favorable vulnerability. After two passes, RHO opened 1C. I love to make “pressure” bids but this seemed a little bit too dangerous. Still, we weren’t having a very good session and we needed to pick up some matchpoints from somewhere! Plus, having thought about it a bit, I realized that I needed to do something. So, undaunted, I bid 2S. This was passed back to opener who, after much long thought, decided on 2NT. I led the HT which held the trick. Dummy had J965 Q74 J7653 5. Now what? A club is actually best, but I led a spade. Declarer played DA and a small diamond which partner (Barry) won with the K. To cut a long story short, after we cashed our clubs, Barry was endplayed into giving them a heart trick at the end. Still, that was +200 and worth 48.5/59.

In the second session, fellow blogger Polly Siegel came to the table (she writes a series on BridgeWinners). All were vulnerable and, in third seat, my hand was QJT975 AK53 K7 5. Barry dealt and opened 1D. Imagine my surprise when Polly overcalled 1S. I suppose I could have made a negative double but instead I passed hoping to ring up a telephone number in penalties. But Barry reopened 2C and I jumped to 3NT. I made ten tricks with the help of the singleton SK in dummy. 1SX would have been worth 1100 on proper defense. They might have scrambled into 2H which would be down only 800. But Barry’s shape was 1255 so a reopening double just wasn’t in the cards. As it was, we still did well (50/59) although I’m not quite sure why.

A little later, Zia and Dennis Bilde came to our table. On the first hand, I dealt myself QT7 J975 K983 KQ (all vulnerable). Some people I’m sure would open this hand, but not me. I never open balanced 11 counts. So I passed, as did Zia. Barry opened 1C and Dennis overcalled 1H (he had four points, BTW). I decided to consider myself having a heart stopper and bid 2NT. We were all a little shocked at the next bid - 6NT by Barry. Zia led a heart and Barry tabled the dummy: AKJ2 A A5 AT9842. Everything behaved fortunately so I was able to make all the tricks. There were a few pairs in grand slams but we still managed to get 53/59. They got us on the next board however where they bid to a heart game that most didn’t. Zia was quite voluble (and complimentary all around) and I noticed that he still has quite the British accent, more so than me anyway.

And, in the interests of full disclosure, I should point out that all three of the pairs against which we had the lucky, or at least fortunate, results mentioned above, qualified for the second day while we did not.

We adjourned to the midnight KOs and teamed up with Mike Ring (my sister-in-law Kathy’s regular partner) and another Mike from the Seattle area. We were up against some good young players (I really felt old in that crowd). I noticed that my seat at the other table was occupied by Dennis Bilde. It turned out to be a wild match. On the first board, we got a somewhat lucky 690 (or so I thought) and then an 800 on what seemed to be a part-score. Things were looking good. On the fourth board, we set 3NT and then conservatively stopped below game, making 3. Then came a board where we were red on white. LHO opened 1C, Barry bid 1H (with a 12-count) and RHO bid 1NT. What would you do with QTx xxx KQx QTx? Perhaps double would be best, but I decided to raise to 2H. LHO now doubled and this was passed our for down 2 (-500). Not quite so good! The seventh board was a part-score and a push. Our opponents bid the slam on #1 (12 imps away) and managed to get 1100 for the same contract on #2 (on reflection, we lost a trick on defense - 7 imps away). We picked up one on the third board.  We got 10 imps when our teammates made 3NT on #4, and 5 when they set the opponents on #5. They didn’t find the double on #6 so that cost 7 imps. So, from thinking we’d won, it turned out that we lost by 26-16. But they were a good team even if they weren’t taking things too seriously.