Papa the Greek outdoes himself--or Greed can be a very bad thing

A robot tournament hand that came up the other day on BBO reminded me of several similar situations from Victor Mollo's wonderful Bridge in the Menagerie series. In these stories, Papa the Greek plays the role of S. J. Simon's "Unlucky Expert" while his frequent partner, Karapet Djoulikyan, we are told, is the unluckiest player in both hemispheres. 

So, please forgive me if I put names to the robot characters in my story. Since no great masterstroke was required to make this hand (just normal careful play), I assigned myself the role of Colin the Corgi, the facetious young man from Oxbridge. My partner was that inveterate point-counter, Walter the Walrus. 

As Karapet would surely have said after the hand, "If you're going to double based on your two aces, at least have the decency to cash them!"

+1680 was worth 96.5%, tying with two others and losing to one brave soul who "sent it back."

Believe partner, not the opponents

Here's an ordinary hand: ♠J765 ♥A3 ♦T864 ♣J93. It's an IMP pairs and no-one is vulnerable. You are playing vanilla 2/1. Partner is the dealer and starts proceedings with 1♣. After a pass, you bid 1♠. LHO doubles this and partner redoubles.  This is a support redouble so it says nothing about strength, simply that partner has exactly three spades. A support double mostly shows a balanced hand, but with the redouble, it's a little less clear since the opponents have claimed the other two suits.

The bidding continues with 1NT on your right over which you, naturally, pass, as does LHO.  Partner now doubles. What do you think is going on?

First, of all, you have to decide whether this is penalty or takeout. If it's takeout, what exactly would it be taking out into? LHO has both red suits apparently. Partner could be asking you to take a preference between the black suits, I suppose.

But, if you've been reading my stuff on penalty triggers, you will be in no doubt. Redouble is a penalty trigger. All subsequent doubles are for penalty. Added to that, RHO just made a competitive notrump bid and that's a trigger, too.

However, let's say that you've been reading lately that there's a kind of double called "intended-as-penalty." Partner expects you to leave it in unless you have an unbalanced hand. Would 5-5 in the pointed suits be sufficiently unbalanced? Maybe. It is IMPs. But the opponents are not vulnerable so, even in our worst nightmare, they might make an overtrick for 380.

There's another consideration. Partner opened 1♣ so either he has an unbalanced hand with 16+ and clubs, or a balanced hand with 18-19. Either way, I think we have a pretty good idea what to lead: a club!

You decide to show a weak, distributional hand, by bidding 2♦ and we end up in 2♠ making 170 for an average board. It's a shame though because we could have had 800 in 1NTX, 420 in 4♠, 430 in 3NT, or 920 in 6♣.

Here's the whole hand:

The moral of the story? Believe partner, not the opponents.

POD: Penalty-oriented double

Back in the early days of bridge there was the penalty double. However, people began to realize that it wasn't much use at low levels because you could rarely get rich even if they were psyching--they would just run to the real suit or otherwise escape justice. Thus the penalty double evolved into two clades: the penalty double and the informatory double (nowadays this is universally known as a takeout double).

It didn't take long for the takeout clade to further evolve into two sub-clades: pure takeout and "cooperative" doubles. The latter include all sorts of strangely named beasts: action, cooperative, competitive, etc.  The general rule (not very well described in the literature) is that the higher the level, the more tempted partner will be to leave it in. This latter form is at its most useful in matchpoint bridge because, if you can catch them speeding and get them down one doubled and vulnerable, it will beat any part-score you might be able to have made. 

I believe there are, however, two sub-clades of the penalty double:

1. pure penalty:  "don't take it out if you ever want to play with me again;"
2. penalty-oriented: "you're expected to leave it in if you have normal distribution, nothing that partner doesn't know about."

Actually, this latter type is perhaps more common than you think. It occurs any time you bid a game, the opponents sacrifice and the player in direct seat doubles. That player can never be sure that defending a doubled contract is the par result. What he means by the double is this: "From where I'm sitting, it looks like doubling is our best shot. Feel free to pull if your hand is more offensively oriented than I think it is."

But it might not be a clear sacrifice. Such situations may be somewhat rarer, but they are not unknown. An example came up just the other day in a pairs event. I will give you my partner's hand and the auction first: ♠KQJ8432 ♥T3 ♦Q ♣K53.

Both sides are vulnerable. Admittedly, not everyone will open 1♠ but I think it's the right bid, provided that you're willing to be a bit flexible later on in the auction. LHO overcalled 2♥ and partner raised to 2♠. RHO upped the ante with 3♥ and you made a preemptive raise to 3♠, showing six or more spades and presumably a hand that is on the weak side for an opening bid. LHO doesn't go quietly and bids 4♥. Partner doubles and it's back to you. Your call?

What do we know about the auction? The opponents are a self-described pickup pair and their profiles suggest intermediate. Do you think they have their bids? They might have stretched a bit, but nobody bids this way without something pretty good. What about partner's double? Is it a penalty double? I think it is. One of the "rules" that I like to go by is that once we've bid our suit three times, any double is for penalty. What could we be taking out into, realistically speaking?

So, what to do? Partner has 8-10 hcp and exactly three spades. He will never try to get a penalty in this situation knowing that our side has 10 spades. It's likely that partner has a relatively balanced hand, too, because with a singleton anywhere, he's going to bid 4♠ if he's at the max end of his box (5-10).

How many hearts do they have? Almost certainly nine. With a stiff (as noted), partner would have bid 4 himself (or passed). 

How many tricks to we have cashing? At most one spade and maybe a club. Partner should have a couple of sure tricks and maybe a third if he has AJ in, say, diamonds. Are we getting rich? At the very most, we might get 500 but 200 is more likely. Can we make game our way? Does partner have the spade ace? I think it's doubtful. With that card, and six points on the outside, I think double is an unlikely call. The spade ace will, essentially, be a bit of a waste, defensively speaking, given our own strong bidding in spades. 

What about "the law?" The strength appears to be well balanced between the two sides which is important for the law. We don't have a pure hand with good shortness (can't count the diamond queen for both), so it's possible that the law will be off a bit. Maybe 18 tricks instead of 19? If this is the case, and if it turns out that both sides can make exactly nine tricks, we should defend. What are the other possibilities (using my guesses for the probabilities)?

• 20 total tricks (15% likely):
• Both sides make game: par score +620 (pull)
• We make an overtrick, they an undertrick: +650 (pull)
• They make the overtrick: par score -650 (pull--unless we want to be -990)
• 19 total tricks (50% likely):
• We make an overtrick: par score +650 (pull)
• We make game: par score +620 (pull)
• They make game: par score -200 (pull)
• They make an overtrick: par score -650 (pull as before)
• 18 total tricks (30% likely):
• We make game: par score +620 (pull)
• Neither side makes game: par score +200 (pass)
• They make game: par score -500 (pull as before).
• 17 total tricks (5% likely):
• We make game: par score +800 (pass)
• We go down one: par score +500 (pass)
• We go down two: par score +200 (pass).

Just looking at the probabilities and following the LOTT, it looks like we want to pass 15% of the time and pull 85% of the time. 

Let's go back to partner's double. In the old days, we could distinguish between tentative penalty doubles and stand-up-on-your-chair-and-slam-the-red-card-down doubles (just kidding, of course). Is partner's double an absolute final decision? No, how can it be? The opponents have bid 4♥ strongly. They're not kidding around so they think they have a play for it. If partner has a heart trick coming, it must be available on offense, too. Why has partner doubled and not bid 4S himself? For the reasons given above: each side might have only nine tricks available, we almost certainly have to lose a spade and, likely, two hearts. Do we have the rest? Partner isn't sure. Basically, in this context, his "penalty" double simply says "I think this is our hand, I have a balanced hand, and they are probably going down." After all, it's very unlikely that opener is going to bid voluntarily again after this sequence. In other words, this is a classic POD situation.

It's decision time. Is there anything partner doesn't know about our hand that would justify pulling? Yes! We have a seventh spade! 

Partner's (my) hand: ♠T97 ♥J4 ♦AT63 ♣AT98. Leading the ♦A or underleading a club would result in down two for 500 and a 45% board. Leading our suit should have resulted in 200 and a 28% board. Neither of these would be total disasters. As it happened, we didn't set the contract, resulting in a 0% board.

So, there were 18 total tricks on the board. Not playing double-dummy defense would have resulted in 19 total tricks. 

If it's worth bidding, it's worth leading

I've always thought what a silly old adage is "If it's worth bidding, it's worth leading." It's usually said when someone has made a bid, doesn't have any more obvious lead, and resorts to leading their own suit. Not very profound!

But, playing at a casual, that's to say torture, table recently, I suffered the following indignity: 2NTXW= for -690 and a loss of 12 IMPs.

Dealer: W Vul: Both	North ♠ KT9763 ♥ K5 ♦ T93 ♣ KT
West ♠ QJ4 ♥ J7 ♦ Q842 ♣ A987		East ♠ 5 ♥ AQ986 ♦ KJ75 ♣ J52
	Phasmid ♠ A82 ♥ T432 ♦ A6 ♣ Q643
Bidding:	p p 1H p 1N 2S p p 2N p p X p p p	HTML Bridge Hand Layout Creator

My so-called partner apparently doesn't believe in getting in and out early in the auction. A 2S call by North would get the hand off the chest so to speak and make life really difficult for the opponents. And, 2S is unassailable whereas any higher contract by the opponents, except for 3D, is doomed. A contract of 3D requires East to double rather than bid 3H over the 2S, but that never happened at any of the tables where North started with 2S.

As you can see, a spade lead ("if it's worth bidding, it's worth leading") would have set the contract easily. But even with partner's DT lead which resulted in the premature knocking out of my DA (at trick 2), we were still destined to set the contract. If only partner hadn't grabbed the second spade after I played SA and 8.

So, should North have simply followed the old saw and led a spade? No, not at all. He should have listened to the bidding. I had not acted over 1H so either I had the wrong shape for a takeout double, or I simply wasn't strong enough to act. But now, after partner comes in with the enormously dangerous bid of 2S (which I passed), West bids a very inadvisable 2N. I double this and partner is on lead. I have no game ambitions therefore, so I don't have a strong off-shape hand that couldn't double. And, I certainly don't have a suit of my own. On what could I be basing my expectation of defeating 2NT? It must be a good fit for spades (with an honor) plus probably another entry.

There is another possibility. The opponents could be complete idiots and therefore it doesn't matter too much what North leads. 2N has no chance of making. But why assume this. No, although it's clear that West is a novice (you can't bid 1NT and then 2NT) but there's no reason to assume some kind of death wish. No, there's every reason to assume they have at least as many points as we do, and yet South (me) is sure of defeating the contract.

No, all inferences should tell North that 1) it matters what he leads and 2) the only sensible lead is the suit that he's promised. The failure to heed these rather obvious inferences cost him (and me) 17 IMPs.

The tentatively penalty double

I have written extensively about cooperative doubles before in this blog. Here's a situation where none of the penalty triggers had occurred but I didn't feel that my double in the West seat was purely cooperative (DISP) but certainly not purely penalty either:

Dealer: E Vul: NS	North ♠ 6 ♥ QJT76 ♦ Q862 ♣ 974
West ♠ J75 ♥ A3 ♦ T9 ♣ AKQJ83		East ♠ Q94 ♥ 95 ♦ AK543 ♣ T62
	South ♠ AKT832 ♥ K842 ♦ J7 ♣ 5
Bidding:	p 1S 2C p 2D 2S X p ?	HTML Bridge Hand Layout Creator

Clearly, East had some values for his 2D call. So, it seemed like it was our hand. But where to play it? I didn't have a spade stopper, I couldn't raise diamonds. I could take a unilateral view and rebid 3C and maybe that was best. On the other hand, this was matchpoints and +200, if it was available, would be a much better score than +110 or +130. With a decent stop in spades, partner could even take my double out into 3NT.

Had I opened 1C, heard partner bid 1D, and then heard 2S on my right, this would (for me, at any rate) clearly be a cooperative double. Yet, when we have both made bids showing decent to good suits and not been raised, the needle on the takeout to penalty meter swings over a little more towards penalty.

In my humble opinion, having more or less denied the ability to raise clubs on his previous turn, partner should have given preference to clubs (over defending 2SX). That would be a relatively easy 130. Better still would be to take out into 3NT which rolls, as it happens. What actually happened was that partner passed 2S, assuming my double was pure penalty. Deep finesse says that 2S is cold but I think we had some chances.  High club, two high diamonds followed by a diamond ruff starts us out with four tricks. The HA is still to come and, if declarer doesn't try to finesse against the queen, we would defeat the contract. But it was not to be. -670 was of course an absolute zero. The exact same zero as 2S undoubled would have been.

So, on balance, I think that double was correct, showing that it was our hand. But the idea of the tentatively penalty double needs to be better understood.

The final problem

No, this isn't my final blog. I hope not anyway. But I would like to wrap up some loose ends on the subject of doubles. Devotees of Sherlock Holmes will of course recognize the title as that of one of the adventures.

First, I want to stress something about doubles which I haven't really emphasized before. Cooperative doubles are always a last resort. This comes from the definition that you have no other possible bid yet you have too much strength to pass.

I have mentioned previously the "three strikes you're out" rule which comes into play whenever our side makes a total of three doubles (see Three strikes - you're out). But there are other flavors of the three strikes rule. 

For example, suppose that I open 1♠, partner raises to 2♠ (with or without competition) and then later,  one of us bids 3♠. Each partner has clearly limited his hand, there's no doubt about our best strain, and nobody is prepared to bid game. By bridge logic, if the opponents continue on to the four level, a double by one of us must be for penalties.

For some time, I've been trying to determine if there is a simple trigger that applies to these situations. Essentially, these are the criteria:

• each partner has limited his hand by making a non-forcing bid;
• we have found a fit or we have settled into a quasi-fit.

Let me try some examples:

1. ♠KJ4 ♥75 ♦KQT962 ♣AQ opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQJ63 ♦J ♣J63: 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p); 2♦ (p) p (2♠); p (p) X: in this case, opener has bid and rebid diamonds -- responder was content to sit there in a quasi-fit -- until the opponents decided to balance. We know we cannot find a fit at a safe level and weren't thrilled about having to make eight tricks in diamonds. Opponent's 2♠ call is music to our ears: Double!
2. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦KQ62 ♣A7 opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQ62 ♦J3 ♣J63: 1♠ (2♣) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) 3♠ (p) p (4♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (three spade bids altogether), neither player has made any attempt to bid game (thus each is limited in strength). Double!

But is it necessary for both partners to have limited their hands? What if the one partner who has limited his hand, with a pass or a non-forcing bid, doubles? Is that always for penalty?

The case where one of us passes is covered in The dead auction rule. But I'm not sure that covers all of the cases. Doesn't it also apply when one of us makes a non-forcing bid and then doubles?

More situations:

1. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦K2 ♣AJ67 opposite ♠QT6 ♥KQ63 ♦JT43 ♣82: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), but opener is still unlimited while responder has limited his hand. Is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? It's relatively unlikely so that I have always defined this situation as being a cooperative double. How good are your spades, clubs? For many pairs, double is always penalty once we've found a fit.
2. ♠KJ942 ♥72 ♦AKJ2 ♣72 opposite ♠QT6 ♥JT65 ♦T3 ♣AJ83: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (x); p (3♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), opener and responder are limited. Now, is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? Absolutely, he's sitting over the club bidder and he has a maximum balanced raise.

The conclusion, for me at least, is that as soon as both partners have limited their hands, then penalty doubles go into effect. But should penalty doubles only be in the direct seat? No, I think that's unworkable. We need to have both partners using the same meaning for double, otherwise it's possible that the fish can wriggle out of the net.

And now for a real hand, this one taken from the World Wide Pairs (hands rotated).

The bidding by the opponents is a little "forward" as the Abbot might say, yet this is the kind of thing that happens in club games. It's obviously important to be on the same wavelength as to the meaning of my final double. Given that my first double was essentially a bid of spades, our side had bid spades three times. Add to that the fact that I had passed over 2♠ showing no interest in going further, then it was clear that my final double was for business. [Editor's note: I have edited the bidding a little to suit my story better, although the first four bids are real, as is the final contract.]

Our result (+500 when we managed to get an extra trick on defense) was a local top and worth 99% worldwide. Note that 4♠ cannot be made legitimately, although there were quite a few making game (420) our way so we needed that extra trick. 

So, my question to my readers is this: is it a workable scheme to turn penalty doubles on whenever both partners are limited? Is it sufficiently obvious? I'm sure that it's correct to do it this way, but is it going to be usable in practice?

Staying with happiness

Greed can be a tricky thing at bridge. You hold ♠87 ♥K9732 ♦AQ42 ♣J8 at unfavorable vulnerability. The opponents have a normal, uncontested auction to 4♥ and you will be on lead. Should you double? You do have tolerably nice trumps but you're also in danger of being endplayed every time you're on lead. Partner may not have much so it's possible that the opponents have close to 30 high card points.

Let's say that there are two more or less equally likely outcomes: making exactly and going down one. And let's further assume that, should you make the double, it will not help declarer make the contract (frequently it does help him). At the rubber bridge table, you are risking 170 to gain 50 (3.4 against). At IMPs, the odds are 5:2 (2.5) against (assuming your teammates are in 4♥ not doubled at the other table). These are not good odds. At matchpoints, a double in this situation will typically change your result from somewhere near average to either a top or a bottom, depending how it goes. The odds improve a bit if there's a healthy chance of a two-trick set. At IMPs (again we assume 4♥ at the other table), the outcomes are +5, +2 and -5. That's much better. But with the hand hand shown at the top, you have no expectation of five tricks at all, so why rock the boat? You're happy that they're playing the contract in your suit, right? Stay with happiness.

I've mentioned this general principle a couple of times before, especially in What makes a good penalty double? where I violated the principle myself. This time, I'd like to go into a bit more detail because there are so many ways that a double can work out badly and relatively few ways it can work out well.

Let's start by taking a rather lucrative looking example. At favorable vulnerability you hold ♠3 ♥KJT85 ♦782 ♣9753 and partner opens 1♠. RHO bids 2♥, you pass and LHO bids 3♣. Partner passes, RHO bids 3NT and LHO closes the auction with 4♥. Should you double? You have the best possible arrangement of assets -- partner has the entries and you have the trumps. Your hearts are sitting over declarer (and LHO probably doesn't have stellar hearts), they don't have more than about 24 or 25 HCP between them. You know exactly what to lead (your stiff spade). It's very unlikely that they can make the hand. If ever there was a time for a juicy penalty double, this is probably it. But is it without risk? Not at all.

The assumptions that we were using before for IMP calculations was that the other table would be playing the same contract undoubled. If RHO had dealt and opened the bidding with 1NT followed a transfer sequence carrying them to game, that would be a reasonable assumption. But that's not what happened here so there are several reasonable contracts: part-scores in hearts, notrump contracts, maybe your opponent bought the contract with a weak two spade bid. It makes the calculation of odds quite difficult. But bear in mind the following aspect of team play: if the contract is the same at both tables then the only scope for IMPs to flow is in the play and defense. But if the auction or play  at the other table is different, you may already be winning (or losing) the board. It's sometimes very hard to know. But making the wrong decision now can either add to the damage (or reward) or can cancel some of it out.

Let's say your counterpart's partner decided not to open his marginal hand and your teammates had an uncontested auction to 3NT by the hand on your left. Perfect defense would have set it one trick but the opponent on lead quite reasonably led his fourth-best spade and your teammates ended up making an overtrick for +630. In other words, you're already ahead. [Yes, I know that you may be playing the board first, but it makes no difference what the actual order of play is.] If they go down one at your table, you will win 12 IMPs (730). If they go two down doubled, you will gain 15 IMPs (1130). That's a profit of only three!

But we should always be on the lookout for a few extra IMPs, right? What's the downside? Maybe left to their own devices, they'd drift one off. But your double tips declarer off to a way of playing the contract that actually makes. Oops! You were winning 12 IMPs before the double but now you're losing 4. That's a negative swing of 16 IMPs! Another less drastic way that your double might backfire is if they decide to run to 4NT and you have the same defensive problems as their pair at the other table. You just gave back the12 IMPs that you were due.

There's another possibility. What if they "send it back" (redouble)? The hand quoted at the beginning was played by Alexander's opponent at a recent club game. This time, there were several factors why doubling was not a good idea. First, her trumps were not nearly as good as in my hypothetical example. Secondly, almost all of the partnership assets were in the one hand (and partner had passed throughout). Thirdly, with partner not having bid, it's quite possible that they have the values for slam but didn't bid it -- although in this case you might have been fixed already. Finally, the vulnerability was not going to give quite the big bonus that might be hoped for (5 instead of 7, 10 instead of 12, 12 instead of 15).

The actual result at the table? 4♥XX making by Alexander (i.e -880 and 0/11 matchpoints) instead of the possible (likely even) +50 for 7 matchpoints. In practice, of 12 declarers in hearts (9 were in game, of which four were doubled, one redoubled, 5 played the contract without comment). Of those that were doubled, 2 made 10 tricks, 1 made 9 and one 8. Of those not doubled two made it, two didn't). Of the part-scores (none were doubled) two made ten tricks, the other nine.

Although it was a match-point event, I'd like to look at it as if it were IMP pairs. Here, the datum would be -180 for the defenders and so +50 would score 6 IMPs while -420 would score -6 IMPs  The actual score for Alexander's opponent would have been -12 IMPs  It's hard to know what would have happened in the hypothetical case of no double, although I think there's a good chance declarer would have gone down without the warning of a bad split. If he was going to make anyway, then the double cost "only" 6. But if it tipped him off to the right play then it cost a whopping 18!

The moral of the story is, of course, Stay with happiness.

Wielding the axe

I've probably spent far too many words in this blog on the subject of using double as a flexible call looking for a fit with the general expectation of partner taking the double out if he can. I know that some of you are thinking "but I like to penalize the enemy." Believe me, so do I – but I happen to think that that is often the route to getting the juiciest penalties.

So, using the system I've described (just look for the label "double" or "DSIP"), there are only a few ways you can penalize the opponents. Perhaps the most common is when an ostensibly takeout-oriented double is passed for penalties. This usually has the advantage that the extra strength and the extra trumps are in different hands. The other situations arise when double occurs (1) after one of us jumps, thus making a relatively clear statement about the distribution; or (2) after a redouble; or (3) after we make a cue bid, and (4) subsequent to several circumstances having to do with having told your story sufficiently often or having previously shown that you didn't want to compete further.

And then there's the easiest of all contracts to double for penalties: a notrump bid which is "to play." My definition of to play is when it's natural and (1) at the two-level or higher and/or (2) when it's in competition.

Here's a nice example of a low-level double of a competitive notrump bid which was easy to apply and quite profitable (9 imps). It's from an IMP table on BBO (I have redacted the names, although I don't think anyone really did much wrong*):

Those N/S pairs who played in notrump made either 8 or 9 tricks (best defense holds it to 8). But all other contracts were destined to go down. So the important thing here was to maximize the penalty. There was nothing particularly difficult in finding the red card but I will make a couple of observations. First, one of the most important factors in a penalty double is a lack of fit with partner. The worse the fit, the fewer total tricks there are likely to be and the more we want to defend a doubled contract if we can. Second, my hand had something in all the other suits so it would not be easy for them to wriggle out of it. And third, I trusted my partner to have a real overcall. It wasn't what I would call a great overcall, especially vulnerable, but it had solid opening values. Partner was not particularly interested in a spade lead, and he wasn't taking away any bids from the opponents, so therefore he was competing for the contract. And, given his outside strength, there was even a decent chance that, if I had a spade fit, we might even be able to make game.

Of sixteen tables that played this board, there were two others at which the first round of bidding was identical. But in one case North passed, in the other he bid 2♣. A few Wests chose to make a negative double instead of the 1NT call. To my mind this is equally dangerous because North has an easy redouble. But that never happened in practice. Instead, those Norths chose to bid notrump, which predictably did reasonably well.

The moral of the story is simply this: While it's nice to be able to diagnose a likely penalty, both partners must be on the same page regarding the meaning of the double in order for the trap to be successfully sprung.

* There may be some arguments that both East and West slightly overbid their hands, especially considering the vulnerability.  But these were not particularly unusual actions. 11/16 Easts opened one heart. 3/10 Wests hearing one heart and one spade then bid 1NT. Really, I think they were just a little unlucky.

What makes a good penalty double?

Back in April, I wrote about different types of penalty double – the second installment was Penalty Doubles (part 2). There, I observed, that the traditional penalty double was an endangered species because in practice it doesn't come up very often. Note that I am excluding what I call "equity-preserving doubles" which cover such things as doubling sacrifices. By the "traditional" penalty double, I mean the type where you double a contract that the opponents have bid willingly (and it appears that the hand "belongs" to them). Such doubles typically occur in an auction that begins competitively and, frequently, they arise after partner of doubler has opened the bidding. And note also that I am talking here about doubles that are strictly penalty in meaning, not cooperative doubles that are converted by passing.

What makes a good penalty double? I think there are several factors:

1. lack of a fit for partner, otherwise a relatively balanced hand – in particular you must not hold a long suit (six-plus cards) of your own;
2. trump quality and position – your tricks are sure tricks and there's no danger of tipping off declarer as to the correct line of play – but the position of your honors in the other suits must appear to be favorable to you too;
3. an expectation of setting the contract at least two tricks – or, at match points, your judgment that the contract is normal (four or five of a minor is generally not normal at MPs) and that your peers are likely to consider doubling (if the contract isn't normal – perhaps they've clearly gone off the rails – you are almost certainly getting a good board if they go down even without a double);
4. no place for the opponents to run.

Let's look at these in turn, although we will go in reverse, starting with point four. Several years ago in a world-wide simultaneous pairs event, I was the happy holder of ♠AK on lead against 6NT. Clearly, this pair had gone off the rails and I was likely to get a very good board simply by "staying with happiness". But the temptation for that world-wide top overcame me. I doubled, even though I wasn't sure that they didn't have a place to run. They ran to 7♣ and naturally I doubled that too. It made, of course, and instead of getting the world-wide top I was hoping for, I got a well-deserved world-wide bottom!

Point three: even though our hand might look fairly normal the other hands at the table might be goulash hands, with long suits and voids. Having a safety margin is definitely worth-while. Furthermore, the penalties really don't get interesting until the second trick (again, we're not talking about equity-preserving doubles). Let's say we are playing IMPs and the contract is 4♥ (vulnerable) going down one at both tables. The opponents double at the other table but we don't. We lose 3 IMPs. Not such a big deal. Now, let's say it goes down two at both tables. If we don't double and they do, we are losing 7 IMPs. Now, that's getting more serious.

Point two: it's fairly obvious that we need trump quality because otherwise declarer will simply draw our trumps and run his winners. And, equally we need to be sitting over the trump length lest our honors be finessible. Well-placed trump tricks are tricks that can't disappear. Note that if trumps appear to be 5-5 (or even 4-4) we won't always be able to tell where our honors are in relation to declarer's honors.

Point one: perhaps the best indicator of the success of a penalty double is our fit for partner (assuming that partner has bid which is typically the case). Obviously, a void is the best, but a singleton is pretty good. Why should that be? Well, whatever the number of total tricks is on the hand (and the fewer the better from the point of view of the penalty doubler), each card that we have in our hand in partner's suit is likely to increase the total tricks by one. This presupposes that partner has a real suit (one of at least five cards in length). A good fit for partner means that we might even be better off playing our own contract than defending their contract. And it increases the chance of shortness in one of the opponents' hands.

Now for some examples to help summarize what I've said. Let's take an example from a recent club game which also happened to be a world-wide simultaneous event. You hold this hand (only we are vulnerable) ♠876 ♥T843 ♦J5 ♣QT84. Partner deals and opens 1♠. RHO doubles and you pass. LHO bids 2♣ and partner rebids 3♠. RHO now raises to 4♣. Your call?

If you chose double, it means that you haven't been paying attention! Let's look at the factors one by one:

1. we have an excellent fit for partner who appears to have a good six or seven spades;
2. our trump quality is OK though nothing to write home about – but we don't even know where the trumps honors will be found – furthermore, with honors potentially on both sides we could easily be tipping declarer off to the correct line, if there is one;
3. we don't really have an expectation of beating this two – let's say partner has 16 hcp, we have 3 – that's not even half the deck – plus we have no other surprises in store for the opponents;
4. do they have a place to run? how about diamonds? Partner's hand is spades and more spades.

When I played this hand (as LHO) we got to 5♣ and I went down. There was no double and I mistimed the play. When Kim played the hand (also as LHO) the player with the cards shown above doubled 4♣. Not only did Kim make the contract, she actually made the overtrick (playing double-dummy).

As it turns out, N/S can take eight tricks in spades with their 18 hcp, although East has to underlead the ♥A to get West a ruff to avoid the overtrick. E/W can take eleven tricks in clubs. That's nineteen total tricks – two nine card fits with a club void in the long spade hand. In fact, a diamond contract doesn't do so well thus there's no good runout there, but of course none is needed. See below for the layout.

Here's another example of a bad penalty double, which came up just the other day, although this time I was the happy recipient of the gift. My opponent held this hand: ♠T98 ♥JT82 ♦54 ♣QJ83. All are vulnerable and your RHO (the author) opens with 1♦. You pass and LHO bids 1♠. Partner bids 2♥. RHO bids 3♣ and you compete to 3♥. I don't recall for sure what happens next but, if I recall correctly, the opponents end up having the auction to themselves and bid 5♣. Do you double? This would be a true penalty double because the opponents have voluntarily bid 5♣ and it is their hand.

Let's look at the various factors: we have a very good fit with partner [full contraindication]; trump quality is good and the position appears to be good, although there is a possibility that declarer might be able to come up with a winning line [perhaps half an indication]; we really don't have a solid expectation of a two-trick set but it's conceivable (one heart, two clubs perhaps and maybe partner will contribute another trick) [half an indication]; might they have a better spot than 5♣, though – diamonds for instance [half a contraindication]?

On balance, this is not a good double. Nevertheless, the holder of this hand doubled and, even though 5♣ was cold (though not six), the opponents ran to 5♦ which partner now doubled. This made easily (although RHO – moi – neglected to redouble and make the overtrick for a clear top – another pair actually bid and made 6♦).

And now my final example for this particular chamber of horrors: I recently made a very poor decision to double a competitive 4♣ call by my RHO, holding this hand: ♠QT92 ♥3 ♦QJ9876 ♣T2. All were vulnerable and partner had opened proceedings with 1♥. RHO overcalled 2♣ and I had no good call so passed. LHO bid 3♣ and partner came back in with 3♥. RHO bid 4♣. At the time, I intended it more as a "suppressant" double (a species I apparently failed to mention in my earlier discussions). This type of double is used solely to warn partner not to bid again. Yet, it is made in the expectation of a set, even though you aren't sure that partner could have made his contract (thus it is not strictly for equity preservation). Therefore, it is a penalty double and at least some of the other rules need to be followed. One of the rules I broke here, not having really thought about it as a rule before this occurred, is the long-suit rule. Just as you might conceivably pull partner's penalty double when you have a long unbid suit of your own (see George Rosenkranz' excellent Tips for Tops), so you should not make your own penalty double with an unbid long suit. Even if partner has only three cards (a suit he will not normally bid on his own), there's a 10% chance that one of your opponents is void and only a 40% chance that two rounds of the suit will stand up.

As always, I'm interested to hear comments. Have I missed some aspects of what makes a good pure penalty double? I know that I double too much in practice (although most of those are "equity preservation doubles" where the rules given above typically don't apply) so it is important for me to have some good guidelines. The long-suit exclusion is the latest enhancement to my personal checklist.

Best wishes to all of my readers for 2013.  May all your squeezes and endplays produce extra tricks.

Pat

One of the best things about playing in an invitational individual in New England is that you're likely to find yourself sitting across from some pretty good players.  I was fortunate to be paired with a few good ones in last weeks' celebration of the Grossack boys' Silver Medal at the World Youth Championships in China.  Things started out well in harness with Lew Gammerman where we managed a 75% round.

Saving the best till last, I faced arguably the region's top player, Pat McDevitt.  Not only is he a Grand Life Master and a member of the Irish Seniors team, but he is one of the nicest players around.  I've never heard a cross word from him.  A quick example of his demeanor: earlier in the evening, he was my left-hand opponent.  He opened 2♥, my partner bid 3NT and RHO doubled.  I was rather surprised to be looking at as many as six high card points together with four spades to the ten.  I fancied the latter holding might come in useful.  It did.  After losing the first three spades, my partner wrapped up the rest of the tricks for 950.  Pat made some encouraging comment to his non-expert partner such as "Well, you had to double with that."

Fast-forward to the last round and my score, as it turned out, was hovering only slightly above average.  On the first board, the table reached the par contract of 4♦X by our opponents for +100.  This was worth 78% as our cards either overbid to 4♥ or didn't double 4♦ at most other tables.

On the next hand, Pat demonstrated a tactic, a distant relative of the stripe-tailed ape double, that maybe has some affinity for the poker table.  Clearly there was an element of gambit in his bidding but Pat knew when to apply this particular strategy and it worked out very well for us.  Let's look at it from Pat's point of view (my role on this hand was pretty much limited to avoiding a revoke).

We were vulnerable versus not and he picked up this hand: ♠QT84 ♥T65 ♦A42 ♣T52.  Dealer on his left passed and partner (your scribe) bid 1♥. RHO doubled.  Pat raised to 2♥  and, after a pass, partner rebid 3♥.  This hadn't been discussed of course, but in this context it should show six hearts and perhaps shortness in spades.  Maybe, given the vulnerability, a bit extra (i.e. not a "dog") in terms of high-card points.

RHO now bid 3♠ and Pat doubled, with confidence I might add (although of course being the partner, I was not allowed to notice such things at the time).  This ran back to RHO whose hand was ♠AK9652 ♥– ♦K8 ♣AQ863. It's just possible that my memory is faulty here.  They might possibly have bid spades instead of the initial double.  But they definitely did not make a Michaels cuebid.

Back to our story.  Put yourself in RHO's shoes.  A player of some substance is doubling your spades and you haven't mentioned your other good suit yet.  Should you brazen it out (the winning move as it happens) or should you believe the GLM on your left and try clubs?  Yes, you guessed it.  The final contract was 4♣ (undoubled).  Dummy came down with a 1453 shape and one card of every rank except for ace and 9.  Double-dummy, it makes 5♣ but we ended up minus only 130.  In fact, the hand makes 4♠ and most of the other tables were in a spade game.  We shared the top on this board.

So, with Pat's help, I pulled myself back up to 55%, ending up with the same score as Lew.

But I left my favorite story about Pat until the end.  This one is from the Mixed Pairs in Memphis last spring when Pat was playing with Sheila Gabay.  Sheila had three (maybe four) second place finishes in National events and many more than 10,000 points.  They were leading the field going into the final session but somewhere during the session they had a couple of disasters.  One, as I recall, involved the opponents making a redoubled contract.  Sheila was downhearted and thought it was slipping away.  "No, don't worry," Pat said.  "We have a lot of really good boards."  Those encouraging words were all that was necessary.  Sheila and Pat went on to win and Sheila became a Grand Life Master.

Three strikes - you're out

In previous incarnations of my rules for competitive doubles, I've talked about imagining that each pair has one bidding box to share between them.  Obviously, you don't normally need two copies of each bid and the box comes with plenty green pass cards.  There's a yellowish double card, an amber double card and several red double cards.  Assuming no other penalty-triggering events have occurred, the double cards must be played in the order given.  The first is for takeout.  The second is two-way and/or cooperative.  The third is penalty.  [For more on the double rules, see DSIP rule summary and others.]

Obviously, this is just an illustrative scenario, not real life.  But the idea of the third double being for penalty is a valid one.  These days, I just call it the "three strikes" rule.  Here's an example of it in use from a recent pairs game.  With no-one vulnerable and in fourth seat, I picked up this hand: ♠ AJ7 ♥ AK3 ♦ 53 ♣ AQ654.  RHO opened 1♦ and I had to choose an action.  For better or worse, I made a takeout double (unusually, this was one of two occasions on which I doubled with 3-3 in the majors).   LHO raised to 3♦ and it came back to me.  I doubled again, this time cooperatively.  Partner pulled to 3♠ and RHO bid 4♦.  I doubled again.  This time it was pure penalties.  Yes, partner could have pulled with a very weak distributional hand.  But he sat for it.

The result was down one – +100 for our side.  This turned out to be the absolute par on the board though happily worth 60% of the matchpoints.  As it happened, the final double made no difference to our matchpoint score.  There were 19 total tricks on the deal, 10 for us in clubs, 9 for them in either red suit.  We had a 10-card club fit and they had heart/diamond fits of 8 and 9 cards respectively.  Of sixteen tables, all but four played a contract in our direction, six in their 4-3 spade fit and six in the 5-5 club fit. 

It's quite satisfying when things work as they're supposed to. We were slightly lucky perhaps that 5♣ couldn't make against normal defense (they get two fast diamonds and eventually must come to a spade). Still, that's what you might reasonably expect with two balanced hands and 24 hcp.  The bottom line is that each side did what it had to in order to reach the par result. 

Penalty Doubles (part 2)

Last time we talked about the five types of penalty double:

• Lead-directing;
• Equity-preserving;
• Penalty-increasing;
• Psyche-exposing;
• Tactical.

In particular, we discussed lead-directing doubles in general terms. I mainly want to talk about equity-preserving doubles now so let's get the other three types out of the way quickly.

We'll start with the least common type of double: the tactical double. There are probably many different types of tactical double such as doubling cuebids to sow doubt in the minds of the opponents as to the placement of key honors. But surely the best-named toy here is the Stripe-tailed Ape double whereby, as the opponents bid on their way to a slam you think they might make, you deliberately offer them the option of playing a lower-level contract doubled. When they expose your ploy by redoubling, you have to run like the proverbial ape. Several things can go wrong of course. You'd better have a good suit to run to when they redouble because you are likely to be doubled. Or, the slam might not be making because of some holding in partner's hand, and instead of going, say, +100, you are now -990. Or what happened to me several years ago at a club game playing against an expert pair. I doubled 4♠ and didn't get redoubled. The hand made 6♠ and so I was -1190. But it was a Pyrrhic victory – nobody else actually bid the slam so I got the same bottom as I would have had my opponents bid the slam (-1430). And, who knows, maybe they weren't going to.

In the early days of bridge, when psyching was very common and there were no take-out doubles, the primary reason for the double was, I would argue, to expose pyschic bids. Without the double, the opponents could just bid your suits and make it impossible to find your games or slams. Psyches are relatively uncommon these days. But because we've traded most of our penalty doubles for other kinds of double, a psyche can be hard to expose and consequently quite effective.

Hand-in-hand with that use of double, came the penalty-increase usage. Overbidding was common and double was necessary to keep everyone reasonably honest. The idea is of course that if the opponents have bid a contract (usually a game or slam) that we are pretty sure is going down at least two tricks, we should double, providing of course that our double doesn't tell declarer how to play the hand successfully. Opportunities for this kind of double don't come up all that often. The standard of bidding these days is sufficiently good that, in a non-competitive auction, if a pair bids a game, they will have a play for it unless there are very bad breaks which could not be anticipated. We need to have well-placed cards, especially trumps in a suit which, preferably, declarer has bid more or less on his own, and some sure tricks like aces. The reason for all the caution is simple arithmetic. It's madness to try to increase a penalty by 100 if there's a chance that they might still make (or, worse, make because of the double). Assuming the more favorable case where our double makes no difference to the play, we risk 170 points (for a major suit game) to gain 100. If they redouble, then we are risking 340 to gain 100. For a slam, the odds are even worse. But if the double tips declarer off to the winning line in a game contract, we are now risking 890 points for the sake of 100.

Note that there's another more subtle reason why the double might not pay off. If the trump stack and the outside high cards are all in your own hand, you are quite likely subject to repeated endplays. It's much better if the trump stack is sitting over declarer and the high cards of the partnership are in the other hand. In my partnerships where we play a two-way double scheme, most of our best penalties come from partner passing a cooperative double for penalties – precisely because now the partnership assets are likely to be split. In general, in a non-competitive auction, if the opponents get too high, it is generally going to be good for us with no need to gild the lily.

Now, we come to the equity-preserving double. Essentially, the opponents have sacrificed (deliberately or accidentally) over your contract that you were expecting to make. At the game level, the equity-preserving double is probably at least as common at IMP scoring as at matchpoints. At levels below game, it is much more common at matchpoints. Let's take an obvious example. Red on white, you pick up a balanced 15 count and open 1♥. Partner makes a limit raise of 3♥ and you bid the fourth heart. One of the opponents then bids 4♠ and you double. You were very optimistic that you were making 4♥ but both you and partner have balanced hands (he would likely have splintered with a singleton). You therefore double and hope to earn 800 which would more than make up your "equity." At IMPs, you would likely gain 4 imps and at matchpoints you will probably get close to a top. On the other hand, if you can only take 6 tricks (quite likely), you will lose 3 imps at teams (not a tragedy) but will likely be well below average at MPs. But you did what you could to preserve your equity by making the penalty double. You haven't suggested a stack of trumps or that suits will be splitting or lying badly. You are just doing what you must – "take the money."

Playing matchpoints, you have to be much more aware of possibilities for an equity-preserving double. Let's say you and your partner have bid to 3♥, a contract which you feel fairly confident of making as you have the balance of power and an eight-card fit. Your vulnerable opponents now bid 3♠. If your hands are sufficiently balanced that you don't expect much play in 4♥, you double. Assuming that you get them down 1, you will earn 200 which will more than make up your "equity," the 140 you could have scored on your own. On a 12 top, you can probably expect to earn 10 for +200, 6 for +140 and only 2 for +100. If it turns out that they (and you) can make 140 all along, you were probably getting only a few matchpoints for -140 so if you slip and they score up 530, you could say that the double (combined with bad defense) only lost a few matchpoints.

Note that the equity double doesn't work so well if the opponents are non-vulnerable. You would have to beat them two to make up your equity and if you're sufficiently strong for that, there's a reasonable chance of successfully making 420 or 620 in game. That's because the most common number of total tricks in these competitive deals is 17. If you can beat them two in a nine-trick contract, you might well be able to make your own ten-trick contract. Every hand is different, obviously, and each situation has to be evaluated on its own merits. But if they are vulnerable, you only need to double and collect a one-trick set for a result which will at least beat all other part scores.

Equity-preservation can also result from passing a two-way (or cooperative) double.

The main point is that your double in these situations is not intended merely to increase your penalty. At matchpoints, for example, when your opponents have overbid in a non-competitive auction, you will be getting a good board anyway. Doubling is unlikely to give you more than one or two matchpoints extra and there is a risk that you might lose what would otherwise be an average board if they do in fact make the hand. This is especially true when the opponents overbid to four or five of a minor. Even if they make, many of your virtual teammates might manage to make 3NT, possibly with an overtrick. If they don't make, a plus score should be good for you – you weren't in the auction to begin with.

Now, to the quiz in part one. Your hand was: ♠83 ♥QJ98 ♦62 ♣J9754, red against white. The auction proceeded, starting with partner: 1♥–2♥–p–2NT; 3♦–4♦–4♥–p; p–5♥–p–5NT; p–6♠–p–p; X–p–p–p. What did you lead? If you led a club, you are the hero! A double in such circumstances never asks for a trump so that's out. Partner has freely bid two suits and the opponents seem to be unimpressed. Double can't help distinguish between partner's two suits (without the double, my rule is always to lead the second-mentioned suit because that is generally the suit for which partner went furthest out on a limb). So, in keeping with the rule mentioned in part one, partner doesn't want you to lead either of his suits. Partner ruffs the club and cashes one diamond for +100. At the other table, it went p–2♣–p–2♦; X–2♠–p–2NT; p–4♠–p–5♠; p–6♠–p–p; X–p–p–p. Opening leader, apparently not familiar with the central concept of part one of this blog, led a diamond for -1210.

Penalty Doubles (part 1)

I've written a lot in these blogs about cooperative (two-way) doubles which are primarily intended to discover shape information.  Quite often, these are converted to penalty doubles by passing.  What I want to talk about here is the true penalty double.  This is the first of two parts.

I've identified five types of penalty double: (1) lead-directing, (2) equity-preserving, (3) penalty-increasing, (4) psych-exposing, and (5) tactical.  Let's start with the first type, the lead-directing double.  There are two sub-types: (a) double of an artificial bid and (b) double of the final contract.

Because the first type occurs before the natural conclusion of the auction (at least you think it's not yet over), it can serve both as a lead-director and as a proxy bid, suggesting values in the suit doubled.  Partner might use this information to sacrifice later on or, if he ends up on lead, then he will normally lead the suit doubled.  One of the advantages of this type of double is that it's "free".  But we all know that there's no such thing as a free lunch!  I learned this the hard way many years ago in my first Flight A Swiss.  Playing a pair of Grand Life Masters (yes, I should know better), I doubled a Stayman 2♣ bid for a club lead.  LGLM redoubled and RGLM passed.  There was no way to defeat 2♣ and one of those special scores got burned into memory: 760.  This was "only" a 4-imp loss as our teammates made 600.  But overtricks, if there had been any, would have been exorbitant – additionally – 7, 3, 2, etc. imps.

But I digress.  The second type of lead-directing double is when the (expected) final contract is doubled to ask for a specific lead.  First introduced back in the early days of bridge by Theodore Lightner, this double is intended to create a penalty where none existed before.  In other words, if you make an unusual lead, partner, this contract is going down, otherwise, it will be making.  Because this type of double doesn't simply increase the penalty but instead defeats a contract, it is generally the most profitable of all doubles.  Because the margin of error in slams is so small, the Lightner double was first described as a defense to slams.  Imagine the opponents have bid to 6♠ while you hold ♠A2 and a side void, you know that the slam is going down – if only you can persuade partner to lead your void suit.  It is of course just possible that declarer has a void in the same suit and your plan may go awry but that would be unfortunate to say the least.

[In a distant aside, that actually happened to my opponent in a bizarre incident that occurred just before I gave up bridge for 18 years.  The scene was the 1980 NABC in Detroit, my first tournament of any kind, soon after I'd learned the game.  I was in 7♥ which was doubled for a diamond lead.  The opening lead was a diamond and I claimed (there were approximately 15 tricks on view and I was void in diamonds).  The director was called and it was ruled that, because I didn't explicitly say in my statement that I would over-ruff my RHO, I was down one.]

Back to the present.  Again, there are dangers with lead-directing doubles.  The most likely thing to happen is that one of the opponents will pull the contract to no-trump.  Now, your precious ruff just evaporated and if they can still manage 12 tricks you will have helped them go from a failing contract to an impregnable one.  Your partner will undoubtedly point out that he was going to lead your void suit without your silly double.  The next danger is that partner won't know which of the other three suits to lead.  If he is long in dummy's suit, that should be pretty obvious.  But dummy doesn't always oblige by bidding a suit.

This is where experts invoke the following rule: if you have bid a suit during the auction (or made an earlier lead-directing double) and you subsequently make a lead-directing double of the final, freely-bid suit contract, you definitely do not want partner to lead your suit.  You were expecting that lead and there would be little point in doubling simply to increase a penalty that was already coming.

Of course, there are the usual dangers.  You might be incorrect about your ability to defeat the contract.  Partner might not recognize the difference between a lead-directing double and one of the other two types of penalty double.  One of these situations arose recently in a pairs game.  I should note in passing that the strange mechanism of scoring used in pairs games complicates the entire business of penalty doubles. I held ♠ – ♥ 952 ♦ AJ7432 ♣ AQJ5.  My LHO opened 1♥, partner passed and RHO bid 3♦ showing a four-piece constructive raise of hearts.  Assuming my opponents were bidding honestly, that left partner with at most one heart.  I wanted to show my diamonds, force the opponents to game, make a lead-directing double and hope that partner could work out to lead spades (and come up with a fourth trick).  In retrospect, I'm not at all sure why I was so optimistic!  Since we play two-way (cooperative) doubles, I had to trigger penalty doubles with either a lead-directing double of the 3♦ call, or make a bid that showed a good suit (similar to a preempt) with 4♦.  I chose the latter (which, had I bought the contract, would have been down 1).  LHO obliged with 4♥ and it came back to me.  Now to spring the trap (so I hoped).  I doubled confidently and awaited a spade lead.  I got a diamond.  There was still a chance though.  I won the ace, cashed the ♣A and led a low club to partner's ♣K.  At this point, a passive lead would have resulted in down 1.  Unfortunately, partner tried to give me a club ruff.  There was now no way to defeat the contract and so we went from a potential +800 (this would require a spade lead, plus a double-dummy defense of me leading a club to partner's T at trick 2) to -790.  Quite a swing! 

We had some friendly discussions about which would be the better club to continue at trick 3, whether it would have been better to double 3♦ or bid 4♦, and so on – but it is nevertheless an instructive hand.  The essential problem was that it wasn't clear to partner which type of penalty double I was making.  I think the only contenders, based on the auction, were types 1 and 3 (lead-directional and penalty-increasing).  Had I doubled 3♦ then I think type 2 (equity preservation) might have been possible also.

Now, here's a test to see if you've been paying attention.  This hand actually occurred today in the seventh match of a sectional Swiss.  Your hand is:  ♠ 83 ♥ QJ98 ♦ 62 ♣ J9754, red against white.  Hold on to your hat.  You won't experience this auction everyday!  Starting with partner, it goes 1♥–2♥–p–2NT; 3♦–4♦–4♥–p; p–5♥–p–5NT; p–6♠–p–p; X–p–p–p.  What do you lead?  Answer in part two.

In the next part of this series, I will try to show that, while penalty double type 3 (penalty-increasing) may be the traditional interpretation, the species is actually less common at duplicate bridge than one might expect.