The push double

A situation often arises in competitive bidding where one side pushes the other side into (usually) a game contract and then the pusher doubles.

Like many aspects of bridge logic, this one can be interpreted by looking at the scoring table. Let's take a look at an example:

South suspected that he could not defeat 3♠️ so decided to push the opponent into a game that he hoped he could defeat. If the push was successful, then plus 50 would be a much better matchpoint score than -140.  There would be absolutely no good reason to risk the double here. If the push was unsuccessful, then, without a double, -420 would probably have company. But -590 would clearly be a lot worse than the -170 that the opponents were probably going to make without the push.

So, it seems to me that the double cannot be to increase the penalty. Often going from 50 to 100 doesn't even change your matchpoints! It must be lead-directing. But to what?

Without the double, you were going to lead a club, right? If partner was happy with you leading a club, why would he double? 

So, what's the best lead here? Not a trump--that cannot be right. How about a diamond? It could be right but it doesn't look right with this holding. So, you lead your singleton heart, partner wins the ace and gives you a ruff. We will come to a spade, a heart, a heart ruff and we must score the ♦️K. +100.  Dummy is void in clubs so your trumps will be drawn before you can score a heart ruff (if you led a club).

Actually, I told a little white lie here. Partner didn't have the Ace. But declarer failed to go up with dummy's ace and partner won his King and you still got your ruff.

Sound unlikely? Well, yes. Declarer went up with dummy's ace, drew trumps and bye-bye heart ruff. Scoring -590 for 0%.  Pushing them without doubling would have scored 16%. Failing to push? Hard to know. Dummy had six spades, a club void, the ♥️A and the ♦️Q. Would they have raised to 4? Quite possibly not. So, the push strategy was misguided this time.

But the principle of the "push double" being lead-directing is eminently sound.

Substance abuse?

It's always nice when somebody reads your blog, agrees with it and acts upon it for a good result. Is it as good when you follow your own advice? What about when both you and partner are on the same page. Life is good! The principle under discussion is what I called, as if I get paid by the letter, The principle of substantive discretionary bids (PSDB).

Another late-night BBO session playing at an IMP table with a friend against random opponents (about nine months ago now, as this sat in my drafts folder for a while). I held at favorable vulnerability: J5 Q75 QJ8765 Q6. After my LHO opened 1C and partner overcalled 1H, my RHO passed. I had a problem, or at least I thought I did. Probably a bid of 2H would be fine. But it seemed odd that nobody had found the spade suit yet and I decided to make life a little harder for them with a jump to 3H. After all, I did have kind of a preempt hand, in a red suit. Different red suit admittedly, but still. At this point, we'd be down 2 against 110 if the opponents played 2S. A push.

Opener passed, presumably hoping we'd get to 4H which he could happily double. Now, partner made an interesting bid showing her real substance, just in case the opponents should end up in spades with me on lead. Only four cards, and the suit opened at her right, but still, a great call, based on the assumption that I had four decent hearts and nothing else.

Perhaps now was the time to bid diamonds. It's actually our best spot (we can make 9 tricks). But we had one good fit, a second fit of some sort (clubs). No need to go muddying the waters with 4D. After my 4H, East sprang the trap. We were headed for a loss of 6 IMPs. But good old West came to our rescue with 4S.  Maybe he's a follower of George Rosenkranz who advises that the only time it's allowable to pull a penalty double is when you have an unbid six-card suit. I don't think George advocates always doing it but maybe with a singleton trump and three cards in partner's first suit, it's acceptable.

Unfortunately for West, the one bidding like a crazy person was me, not his partner. I should really have doubled myself but I couldn't bring myself to do it! Coward. Partner doubled and this is where it gets interesting. The point about the PSDB is that when partner bids two suits, they most likely want you to lead the second suit. I obliged with a club lead. Note that a heart suit lead would result in the contract making with two overtricks and total vindication of West! 24 or 25 IMPs were awaiting my lead! Fortunately, we ended in the plus column.

There's really nothing to the rest of the play. We cashed three clubs, one diamond and then I got my trump promotion (is this technically a promotion?)

The moral of the story, apart from noting that I can be a crazy bidder at times, is that when your partner sticks their neck on the block, just asking for it to be cut off, they really want you to lead that suit, not the suit they mentioned earlier. It would be insane to bid 4C without some seriously good cards in that suit after all.

The cooperative double

I've written on this subject many times before here in this blog, see nine (currently) articles as well perhaps as some others of the articles answering to the label double.

A lot of the foregoing has concentrated on the rules and triggers for penalty doubles. That's to say what a cooperative double is not. What I want to do here is to try to explain simply and succinctly what it is and why you would use it.

A cooperative double is just another kind of double from which you are ready for partner to take out. In this sense it is no different than takeout, negative, responsive, support, snapdragon and maybe a few other types. What distinguishes a cooperative double from these other doubles is that the expectation of a takeout drops to somewhere around the 50% mark. You will have tried to find a fit with one or two suits mentioned already and so far you've been unsuccessful. The cooperative double is one last try. You invoke it because you believe you have as much right to declare this hand as the opponents, maybe more. But you fully expect that, about half the time, partner will leave your double in. You won't be surprised, as you might be when partner passes a takeout double. Instead, you'll get your defensive shoes on and prepare to take all your tricks to defeat the opponents' contract.

So, let's get a little more specific. First of all, what level do we generally find a cooperative double on? The most common is probably the three-level, but it can be found at almost any level, except the first which is more the realm of the above mentioned cousins.

Second, what about strength? There are two possibilities: the doubler himself has extras, perhaps a queen over minimum (which would normally give the doubler's side at least half the points in the deck), or the partnership taken together is known to "own" the hand (at least about 22 hcp).

Finally, and this is the key point, what sort of hand does the cooperative doubler have? Simply put, he will be one card short of a bid in each suit that hasn't been claimed by the opponents. Too few cards to support partner, too few to rebid his own suit, too few to mention a new suit (he would typically have five to mention a new suit at the three-level, for example). Let's say doubler has four of his own suit, having implied four, three of partner's suit (he having promised four), and four of another unbid suit. That leaves two in the opponents' suit. In other words, much of the time he will double with a balanced hand holding two cards in their suit. When partner leaves the double in with three or four cards in their suit, she will be counting on about two trumps in the other hand. Occasionally, as the level gets higher and you are more reluctant to introduce a new suit by bidding it directly, you might be reduced to only one card in their suit. Partner will take the auction so far into account when deciding to pull or pass the double. She will only pass when she has no extra distribution of her own beyond what she's already promised (can't rebid her suits and can't support yours) and, hopefully, she will have something usefully placed in the enemy suit.

Furthermore, if there are two unbid suits, doubler should have approximately the same length in each, perhaps one card different (5-4 or even 4-3). But two cards (6-4) is far too much disparity in my opinion. Not only might you end up in a 4-4 fit when you have a 6-3 fit available, not in and of itself a tragedy, but if partner has 3-3 in the unbid suits, you may end up defending a doubled contract despite having a nine-card fit of your own. This is not the time to be defending unless the level is high enough that you expect a substantial penalty (i.e. a sacrifice situation). Of course this applies to negative and responsive doubles too.

Now let's look at things from the other side of the table. Partner has made a cooperative double. Should you take it out or leave it in? If you have one of the distributional features (assets) that partner is looking for, bid it, even if you fancy your chances on defense. Nothing is more demoralizing than doubling the opponents in some part-score and then having it make. Sometimes it is supposed to go down but you need double-dummy defense or even a lucky defense to set it. For this reason, I believe that passing the double should be the last resort, especially at teams. The cooperative double is a way to find our own contracts more than a way of nailing the opposition. Declaring at both tables of a team game can generate a lot of swings in the 4-7 range. And at matchpoints, you will be winning a lot of boards simply by successfully outbidding the opponents. The occasional penalty will be a bonus but it should not become an end in and of itself.

The lower the level, the less willing partner should be to leave the double in and, conversely, the higher the level, the more willing partner should be to pass (but note that doubler may have fewer trumps as the level gets higher as explained above). Doubled and freely-bid suit contracts at the two level are rarely very profitable. The one exception being after an overcall is followed by a reopening double. But even that situation is usually not very profitable at the one-level. And of course, vulnerability should be factored in. Stretching to double the opponents when they aren't vulnerable is not winning bridge, especially if bidding on would give us a decent shot at a vulnerable game.

Note also that the cooperative double is part of a bidding style often called Do Something Intelligent, Partner (DSIP). But I've come to the realization that not only does DSIP suggest a more extreme (looser, more speculative) version of competitive bidding but, with a disciplined cooperative double, partner isn't required to do anything more intelligent than looking to see if he has any undeclared offensive assets and acting accordingly.

The cooperative double can also go by several different names (card-showing, action, etc.). One of the most apposite is Mel Colchamiro's "BOP" double (for balance-of-power). The BOP double is in fact a slightly more conservative version of the cooperative double and well-suited to IMP scoring. In order to use it, the partnership must have the balance of power (not just equal power) and the doubler must be sitting under the hand with most length in the suit.

Experts routinely make use of cooperative doubles below the level of game. For the expert, it is a sharp weapon. However, lesser mortals need to remember that like any other weapon, it can end up being turned against us. So, understanding the benefits and limitations of the method and being disciplined about its use is extremely important. It is easy to get carried away and double without the proper values or while holding a card that may be valuable, offensively, to our side. But, properly used, it will gain you matchpoints and IMPs in the long run.

No wonder it takes so long to learn this game - the denouement

My previous blog No wonder it takes so long to learn this game! has generated a lot of discussion both here on blogger.com and also at BridgeWinners. I really appreciate everyone's contributions. I've learned an important lesson in the complex curriculum of competitive bidding, in particular when the partnership can stop in four-of-a-minor after a game-forcing sequence (almost never).

Although I was clearly in a minority of one in my thinking about my partner's 4♣ call, I wasn't ready to give up on what seemed to me to be bridge logic until I heard back from my competitive bidding guru Andrew Robson. Thanks, Andrew.

In my own defense, I will point out that this notion of "game-forcing" being forcing only to 3NT or the four-level wasn't my own idea. I've read it in several places (although frustratingly now I don't remember where exactly). But I think I've got clarification now. In particular, in a non-competitive auction we can stop in four-of-a-minor only when we lack controls in the unbid suit and neither partner has sufficient extras to go to the five-level. If the opponents are silly enough to blunder into such an auction, we will of course take the opportunity to punish them. So, once the auction gets competitive, we will either double them or bid our game. No stopping in four-of-a-minor!

So, with the help of all the input, including the votes from the BridgeWinners polls, I've formulated some competitive bidding "rules" (I don't claim these as being in any way original). These rules revolve around the concept of a "committed" contract or level. A specific committed contract arises when one partner makes a call which forces the partnership to reach a particular higher-ranking contract. Examples include Bergen raises, Inverted Minor raises, Jacoby 2NT, Truscott/Jordan 2NT, cue-bids of the enemy suit, fit-showing jumps, etc. Some of these calls may include an "or better" clause which suggests that the bidder himself plans to keep on bidding beyond the committed contract if he has extras. In all cases of a committed contract, there is at least some element of fit, although in the case of an "or better" call, the bidder may be planning on or hoping for some other strain, such as no-trump.

When only a level, typically game, has been committed, it implies that no suit has been agreed and thus the partnership is committed to any contract that satisfies the level requirement. In such a case, the number one priority is to determine the strain of our game contract. Thus, showing support below game is 100% forcing to game – yes, even if it four-of-a-minor! [This is why, in the auction in the first post on this subject, 4♣ was forcing – and actually more encouraging than 5♣]. Denying support (by passing) and then pulling double (or 3NT) to 4♣ might be non-forcing – it seems to say "partner, I have a really bad hand, but I think you might be better off playing 4♣ than anything else." This probably requires some prior thought (but isn't likely to occur with much frequency).

In general, where this is a commitment, the partnership is said to be "in a force." This has the following implication:

• the opponents may not play a contract below the commitment unless it is doubled.

And this further implies that:

• a direct pass over intervention below the commitment is 100% forcing.

The other key question about the commitment is its level: are we committed to game? or only to a part-score? This matters when the opponents intervene with a bid above our commitment. If we are committed to game, then the force is still in effect. There are some possible exceptions to this blanket statement, but these are beyond the scope of this article. See, for example, Robson and Segal: Partnership Bidding – The Contested Auction.

At all other times in a competitive auction, i.e. when there is no commitment, we are back to "normal bridge." Thus, bidding shows something extra and passing says you have nothing to say. Double means whatever you and your partner have agreed to. But, based on all of the recent polls and articles I've seen on BridgeWinners, any time we have not yet found a fit and the most recent bid is below game, double is almost always takeout-oriented or "cards" where there is no explicit pre-agreement.

So, let me try to summarize these rules (where intervention is always a bid – doubles are out of scope for this discussion):

• Intervention below committed contract: when a partnership is committed to a particular contract, any opponent's intervention of a bid which ranks below the committed contract imposes the following rules on direct bids:
• bidding the committed contract shows no interest in defending or probing for a higher-scoring contract (i.e. it is a minimum hand, both defensively and offensively) and is therefore the only non-forcing call available (other than double) – this can be thought of as a form of fast arrival if you like;
• for the sake of argument, double is assumed here to be penalty-oriented but note that the question of employing "pass-double inversion" is according to partnership agreement (and not in scope for this discussion);
• all other calls are 100% forcing:
• pass tends to show extra high cards without extra distribution and suggests at least the possibility of a penalty;
• all other bids below the committed contract are trial bids for a higher-scoring contract (just as they would be if there had been no intervention);
• bids above the committed contract show extras and, obviously, raise the level of commitment (again, we're essentially ignoring the intervention).
• Intervention below committed level: similar to the above, but:
• showing support is the first priority:
• if this is still below the commitment, this is obviously forcing and more encouraging than supporting directly at the committed level;
• otherwise, our support bid is not forcing because we have reached our committed level;
• pass is forcing and denies support;
• double is again the subject of partnership agreement.
• Intervention above committed part-score contract: normal bridge logic:
• bidding shows extras;
• passing shows nothing to say;
• double is penalty (since pass is non-forcing, if you have the hand for penalizing them, you have to do it).
• Intervention above committed game contract:
• subject to possible exceptions (see discussion above), we are in a "force":
• pass is forcing;
• double and pass are subject to pass-double inversion if agreed;
• pass-and-pull is slam-invitational;
• bidding on is "to play."
• Intervention above committed level: this situation is a little more complex because the intervention may have precluded supporting at the committed level in one strain, but not in another:
• pass (forcing) denies the ability to support at the committed level (i.e. we might still be able to support but it would require going beyond our committed level);

Some example sequences:

1. 1♥ p 2NT 3♦: the partnership will play either 4♥ or a heart/no-trump slam – unless defending the opponents' doubled contract looks better; therefore pass is forcing and suggests that you wouldn't at all mind if partner decides to make a penalty double; any other bid below 4♥ is control-showing; of course, an immediate bid of 4♥ says you have a bare minimum (as it would without the interference) and furthermore that you would not welcome partner's penalty double.
2. 1♥ 1♠ 2♠ 3♦: the partnership will play at least 3♥ but partner may have higher ambitions of course – pass is forcing and suggests a relatively balanced hand with at least a little extra – if partner can make a penalty double you won't pull it; an immediate call of 3♥ (the committed contract) says you have no extra strength or distribution and have no interest in penalizing the opponents or of bidding beyond 3♥.
3. 1♥ X 2NT 3♣: the partnership will play at least 3♥ as before (assuming that 2NT is Truscott/Jordan); 3♦ suggests extra distribution (but implies no extra strength) which you hope will help partner decide how high to go if there is more competition.
4. 1♥ X 2NT 3♠: they have bid beyond our committed part-score contract so all "normal" bidding notions are back in force – bidding shows extras (either high cards, distribution or both); 4♦ suggests extra distribution and no extra strength and forces our side to at least 4♥. You hope the diamond bid will help partner decide how high to go if there is yet more competition.
5. 1♥ p 2♣ 2♦: the partnership is committed to game, but we don't know which game yet; in this situation (there have been no jumps or cue-bids yet by our side), I do recommend pass-double inversion (as my regular readers know) so that pass keeps open (and suggests) the possibility of defending 2♦X while denying support for clubs; double therefore shows a hand which is relatively short in diamonds (and clubs) and therefore likely to have four spades – this could be happily converted to penalty in appropriate circumstances (rare). With two stoppers in diamonds one partner or the other is likely to bid no-trump (unless perhaps we are at favorable vulnerability in which case double becomes more tempting).
6. 1♥ p 1♠ p 3♣ 3♦ (the original problem auction): 4♣ is forcing and showing some slam interest; 5♣ is not forcing; pass denies club or heart support (and suggests no great ability to stop diamonds).

No wonder it takes so long to learn this game!

Kim and I went over to England for Easter for some family time. The weather was unusually cold and dreary but we had a lot of fun. On our last couple of days, we went up to London to see Les Miserables on the stage (fabulous) and then, on the way to the airport, so to speak, we played bridge at the Andrew Robson Bridge Club close to where I grew up in Fulham. For various reasons, we've wanted to play at that club for quite a long time now. It was a relatively small game (seven tables) and we received sufficient gifts along the way to win our direction. Our own game wasn't exactly error free though. We doubled a part-score and then mis-defended allowing them to make it.

Then this hand came up (rotated) with nobody vulnerable:

I opened 1♥ in fourth seat; Kim responded 1♠ and I rebid 3♣. So far, so good. We are in a "game force" but still need to determine the right strain. At this point, West decided to throw a monkey wrench into the proceedings with 3♦. I thought we had pretty good understandings of how to deal with interference – but I was wrong.

Here are the options that I thought Kim had:

• pass (forcing) to await developments [if I double and she then pulls it, that shows extra strength and an interest in slam];
• double (penalty because I jumped at my second turn – see my rules for doubles);
• 3♥ (forcing) which I would take as delayed support with ♥xxx (and about 9+ hcp since she didn't simply raise initially) or ♥Hx (probably 10+ hcp);
• 3♠ (forcing) extra length in spades, nothing about strength;
• 3NT ("to play");
• 4♣ (non-forcing, competitive);
• 4♦ (forcing) though with no pre-discussed meaning;
• 5♣ (fast arrival);
• 4♥ (fast arrival) likely based on ♥Hx and a minimum (6-9) response.

Unfortunately, Kim felt that an immediate 4♣ was forward-going and 100% forcing. I passed, given that my hand lost quite a bit of its lustre as the auction unfolded. I was able to wrap up twelve tricks without breathing hard.

How can two decent players, who have discussed these situations so often, be on such completely different wavelengths?

I decided to put the question to BridgeWinners. However, because I wanted to understand general principles, I created two polls to try and separate what I thought were the two different issues. Here are the links:

• Forcing sequences in competitive situations (part-one);
• Forcing sequences in competitive situations (part-two).

In the first, I tried to get an answer in general terms of direct seat options when an intervening bid was made below a specific "committed" contract. There are of course several different ways to "commit" our partnership to, say, 3 of a major. Another common sequence might be: 1♠ (2♦) 3♦. If the next player doubles or bids 3♥, opener will have choices, including a forcing pass. My understanding of standard "expert" bridge was that 3♠ is the only non-forcing call (other than double/redouble which could be left in if appropriate).

But, so far, the votes (and especially the comments) on BridgeWinners have not been unanimous, although at this point, my scheme is the majority opinion (23/33 votes). How can something so fundamental (and quotidian) have such divergent opinions?

In the second poll, I tried to ascertain what exactly was meant by being in a "game force," especially as it relates to the minor suits. My own understanding was that a jump shift by opener (as in this case) was only forcing to four of the minor. If the responder had bid with a bare minimum and 3NT is missing a stopper, then the partnership can play in four of the minor.

Again, I was somewhat surprised by the votes and comments on the poll. The majority opinion was that this is something that must be agreed in advance by the partnership (although of the others most thought that game meant just that – game).

So, I would be very interested in your comments. But, at the risk of being repetitive, I will reiterate that it amazes me that these are not the subject of clear-cut rules. No wonder it takes so long to learn this game!

Non-forcing competitive bids

Last time, I suggested that in a competitive auction, winning the declaration is the top priority, followed by trying for the right game.  However, I didn't really justify that position, tacitly assuming that it was self-evident.  Still, it wouldn't hurt to go over an example.

Nobody is vulnerable at teams.  Let's say that partner opens 1♣, RHO overcalls 1♥ and you bid 1♠ showing five spades holding ♠KQJT7 ♥9 ♦Q9754 ♣97.  LHO ups the ante to 2♥ and there are two passes to you.  I hope you're not thinking of passing!  Whether or not you play support doubles here (I don't), it seems that partner has fewer than three spades.  

Given that we have at least half the high cards in the deck, our side has a right to compete (conceivably we might have only 19 but the exact number of high-card points really doesn't matter providing it's in the vicinity of 20).  Let's just take as a working assumption that they can make 2♥ while we can make 2♠, 3♣ or 3♦.  That's 17 total tricks which is typical.  And, for a further assumption, let's assume that the other table has played it in 3♠ down 1.  Right now, we are pegged for a 2-imp loss.

The problem is how exactly should we compete? One possibility is double.  Nobody would play this for penalties, I trust!  The opponents have a fit and they are going to be playing it at the two-level.  I would certainly choose double with this hand: ♠KJT73 ♥95 ♦Q974 ♣K7.  Such a double suggests a doubleton in the enemy suit (not guaranteed obviously), four cards in the unbid suit and tolerance for partner's suit.  Let's say that we double and partner bids 3♣.  We will pass, obviously, whatever RHO does.  There's no way that we will be getting overboard on this hand.  In our example, we are now headed for a 4-imp gain.

Now, let's go back to the first hand.  Partner might have 2-3-3-5 shape, in which case, 3♦ is probably our best spot.  But partner will never bid 3♦ over our double – we already know that he's going to bid 3♣. How about bidding 3♦ instead of doubling?  There's no guarantee that this will work of course but we have a reasonable shot of landing on our feet.  With the 2-3-3-5 hand, partner will pass and we'll be in our best strain.  Or will he?  What if he thinks that 3♦ is forcing, as many players would?  He's going to ruin everything by bidding 3NT (or something even worse). If this gets doubled and things are not sitting well, we could easily end up losing 6 or 10 imps.

Do I hear a vote for Larry Cohen's Good/Bad 2NT?  It might be OK if you play it in the pass-out seat like this.  But why not simplify the whole thing by making 3♦ non-forcing?  Let's make all bidding after an opponent intervenes non-forcing-constructive (not just advances of overcalls).  Any time we wish to force partner to bid because we think we have game, we can cue-bid.  If the cue-bid is no longer available, then new suits would be forcing.  Alternatively, we might make 2NT the forcing bid (if available) which leaves a little more room for showing distribution.

Now we see why declaring should be our first priority.  If we land in a making spot (3♣ or 3♦ or even 2♠), we will be +4 on the board.  If we end up in a making game, such as 3NT, we will be +10.  So, we gain the first 6 by being able to bid without forcing and a further 6 if we can get to game.  But we will always get to our game if our hand is good enough and partner has a heart stopper or two because 3♥ is available.  In any case, the probability of us being able to make a game, given that both opponents are bidding constructively, is probably only about half the probability that pertains when we alone are in a constructive auction.  It's really more likely that we can only make a part-score. Note that I'm not talking about situations where the opponents are preemptively taking away our bidding room with their fit.  In those situations, it's actually more likely that we can make game or even slam.  In such cases however, the 3-level cue-bid will never be available and we will have to rely more on bridge judgment.

Here's a real-life example: you pick up this hand at pairs (at favorable vulnerability): ♠KQJT7 ♥9 ♦Q9754 ♣97.  Partner deals and opens 1♣ and after pass from righty, we bid 1♠.  Lefty now enters with 2♥ after which there are two passes.  We are playing support doubles so we know that partner has fewer than three spades.  But we know little about partner's strength.  This is admittedly one of the disadvantages of Eric Rodwell's convention.  Especially at this vulnerability, partner might be making what he hopes is a trap pass, with a fistful of hearts.

This is a similar situation to the one we started with.  Again, with a slightly better, more balanced hand, I would reopen with a double. ♠KJT73 ♥95 ♦Q974 ♣K7, for instance.  Partner is now charged with doing something intelligent.  And if he does decide to convert to penalties, his trumps will be well-placed and we will have the balance of power (if he opened light with xx AQx xx KJTxxx, he should probably take the double out to 3♣).

So, what to do?  I took a deep breath and bid 3♦, hoping that partner had better than a minimum club hand but also hoping that my bid wasn't forcing.  Did it work out as I hoped?  Not at all.  Partner ruined everything by bidding 3NT and went three down for -150.

Par on the board was +110 for 2♠.  Even -100 for 3♠X-1 would have been about average (and in fact several pairs our way made 3♠).  Not very surprisingly, passing would have achieved almost as bad a score as our actual result.  On a top of 15, -150 was worth 2.5, -100: 8, -50: 10, 100: 12, 110: 13, 140: 14.5.

My partner thought that with such good spades I should rebid 2♠ and presumably this was the action at several tables.  All those pairs achieved at least an average board, some a top.

Notwithstanding that 2♠ might have worked well on this particular board, there are many cases where the quality of the spades would not be so good and the hand is more of a genuine two-suiter.  For such hands I suggest that, when a cuebid is available below the level of 3NT, new suits in a competitive auction should not be forcing.  Partner is expected to pass with a minimum (or give preference) otherwise do something sensible.

This is actually very consistent with the idea of playing "negative free bids," possibly the worst-named convention in the books.  Whether acting directly over an overcall, where the one-level is still forcing and, by agreement, the top half of the three-level, or acting after the opponents have overcalled and raised, it seems prudent to agree that new suits are forcing if they jumped.

I await your comments with interest.

Two golden rules of bidding

It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a bridge player with a good hand who makes a forcing bid below 3NT must be in want of a game (but not necessarily slam).  This is the well-known principle of "game before slam," expressed as Jane Austen might have put it.  This rule is typically invoked when the partnership hasn't yet determined which strain they will play in at game. Because games are so valuable and so common in bridge, getting to the right one takes precedence over the more remote possibility of slam. In other words, if a bid could be construed as either a probe for the right game, or a cuebid in search of slam, assume the first meaning.

What is not so firmly established in the bridge player's compendium, but which is no less significant in my view, is the following rule which applies to competitive auctions: "declare before game."  This recognizes that it is more important in competitive auctions to play the hand than it is to get to a game.  Or, if a bid could be construed as either a competitive bid, i.e. to play, or a cuebid in search of game, assume the first meaning.  It goes without saying that slams take a distant back seat in competitive auctions.

Here's an example from this week's Swiss team event at the club.  You are South holding ♠ AQ ♥ J74 ♦ A653 ♣ K976 (nobody is vulnerable). Partner deals and opens 1♣.  RHO comes in with 2♣ (Michaels) and you bid 2♥, showing a limit raise or better in clubs.  LHO now bids 3♠!  Before I tell you what partner does next, let's think about the possible continuations.  What would it mean if she bids 4♣?  Apply the rule of declare-before-game.  4♣ would therefore say: "I have extra length in clubs (presumably five or more), a minimum hand and I want to play 4♣ unless you have enough to bid 5♣."  What would double mean?  Well, this obviously depends on your agreements, but we've already established that it's "our hand" and that we have a fit in clubs.  My preference would be for penalties (because of the 2♥ cuebid) but, given that you are sitting under the spade length, a good alternative is "BOP" (balance-of-power) asking for your opinion as to whether to bid on or defend.  [Do you know what double would be in your partnerships?]  3NT would obviously be "to play."  Any other bid at this level would, I believe, be a cuebid in search of slam committing our side to at least 5♣.  Pass covers every other possibility.  In this case, your side is committed only to 3♣ so partner's pass would not be forcing, even though she's hoping you'll be able to do something. From her side of the table it's possible, though perhaps unlikely, that the best your side can do is to defend 3♠ undoubled.

As an aside, if LHO had bid 2♠ only, a couple of things would change.  Pass in the direct seat would now be 100% forcing because we are committed to try for at least 110.  Three-level cuebids would show stoppers in search of game, not slam.

In fact, partner bids 4♣.  I think it's a toss-up whether you should pass or bid on to 5♣.  You have a lot of losers outside the trump suit.  It turns out that on this board, you can take nine tricks in notrump or eleven in clubs (partner has AQJxx of clubs, AT9x of hearts, and two small doubletons).  But from partner's side of the table, where spades can be profitably led, one trick fewer in each strain is possible.  To give credit to the opponents, the 3♠ call gave our side a real problem.  It was now unrealistic (my opinion) to bid 3NT and so 4♣ is in fact the best that we can do, practically speaking.

So, what happened?  Our side ended up in 5♣ from the wrong side for –50, losing 6 imps (and consequently one VP).  At the other table, where your scribe was playing, the auction was quite different.  North did not open, and South opened 1♦ in third seat.  After a heart response, the bidding died out in 1NT from the right side.  We didn't take all of our tricks and so we were –180.  Obviously, the swing could have been much greater (10 imps and another two VPs).

Our teammates were not clear on the meaning of 4♣.  In fact, North intended it as competitive, just as the rule would suggest, while South thought that it was Minorwood in search of slam.  I think it's very important to have these two golden rules of bidding well understood and agreed in a partnership, because these types of auction occur quite frequently.

A couple of difficult competitive situations

Sometimes, it seems, there just is no way to compete successfully.  You just have to give up and hope for the best.

Here's a case in point.  White on red.  You deal yourself ♠83 ♥QJ86 ♦KQJ3 ♣J75 and open 1NT (12-14).  LHO bids 2♠ (natural) and partner bids 2NT (Lebensohl).  RHO bids 3♠.  What now?  In my opinion, double stands out, saying please bid your suit (or 3NT if that's where you're heading).  Admittedly, we don't necessarily have the balance of power.  But we are at favorable vulnerability and we have good support for the other suits.  There's a danger that partner will pass and they'll make exactly 3♠, but if he has a good long suit of his own then he should bid it now.

Now, what if you pass and partner reopens with double?  He seems to be suggesting that he can support any suit, even though he's suggested a single-suited hand with the Lebensohl bid.  Or could it be that partner was planning on bidding 3NT (going via Lebensohl to show a stopper)?  In that case, he's suggesting that you pass.

Unfortunately, 3♠ would have been our top spot (-200) for an excellent score.  3♠X was almost a bottom (-1130).  It was one of those hands where although we (just) had the balance of power (21hcp), the hand categorically belongs to the opponents.  Our offensive par was only 70 (1♦).  Our defensive par (and the absolute par) was -650.  You may be wondering how anyone could score worse than -1130.  The answer is that the result at another table was 4♠X making 6 (1190).

Here's the second difficult hand: ♠A7 ♥Q87 ♦AKQ832 ♣AK.  Second to speak, you're debating whether to open 2♣ or 2NT (surely not 1♦?)  when RHO start proceedings with 1♥.  Now what?  You elect to double this and LHO passes and partner bids 2♣.  Since you have a GOSH (good one-suited hand), you have to bid 3♦ (the call that you would have made directly in the old days before weak jump overcalls took over) in order to show your strength (by agreement, 2♦ would suggest an off-shape non-minimum double with spades and diamonds but no enthusiasm for clubs).  Partner bids 3♥.  What now?  Can you be sure partner has half a stopper in hearts?  Or can you be sure that RHO has both the ace and king?

Unfortunately, I bid 3♠ to suggest a spade stop but only a tentative heart stop.  Whether that meaning is right, I'm not sure.  Surely if I wasn't interested in notrump at all, I would simply bid 4♦.

Anyway, partner with JT4 of hearts decided to bid 4♦.  This was just the holding that allowed 3NT to make and consign 4♦ to the trash bin.

Any comments?

Coping with delayed competition

One of the interesting aspects of club bridge, even local tournament bridge, is that people do unexpected things late in the auction.  There are well-thought-out systems for coping with direct overcalls, including the negative double, forcing (and also non-forcing) new suits, fit-showing jumps, cue-bids, etc.  You're not likely to do well in tournament play without having a good understanding of these methods.

Then there's the somewhat less frequent interference after opener and responder have both bid.  Intervention here needs to be more circumspect, but it happens frequently enough that we have methods to cope with it: support doubles, etc.

Once we've got through the first round of bidding and the opponents have passed, we might reasonably expect a clear field to ourselves, apart from  the occasional lead-directing double, etc.  But there are some players who, either didn't sort their hand properly the first time, or they have a death wish, or some other obscure reason to decide that now, after the opponents have exchanged copious information, would be a great time to introduce that suit that they didn't think could be bid in an earlier round.

Occasionally, this will be a good player who has decided to "await developments" with a hand that is hard to bid initially, maybe a two-suited hand with around 9 high-card points, or perhaps something like: ♠65 ♥5 ♦AQ62 ♣AT9754, as described by George Rosenkranz in his wonderful book Tips for Tops.  In this case, holding these cards fourth-in-hand at favorable vulnerability, he sat back and listened to the following auction: 2♦¹ – 2NT² – 3♦³ – 3♥⁴ – 4♥⁵ passed around to George.  ¹Flannery, ²game Forcing shape enquiry, ³4513, ⁴any extras? ⁵no.  George now bid his clubs, was doubled and played the hand for down two, thus saving 320 points.

George knew what he was doing, but most of the people who come into the auction late do not have the right hand for it at all. Here's a case in point: my hand (vulnerable vs. not): ♠AJ84 ♥T ♦A8742 ♣J52.  My partner dealt and opened 1♥, which didn't thrill me.  RHO passed and I bid 1♠, obviously.  LHO passed and partner rebid 1NT.  At this point, RHO decides to come into the auction.  Let's see, her partner obviously has nothing much, the opponents have no fit and we don't even know if my hand is going to try for game.  But she bid 2♣, notwithstanding all the good reasons not to.  So what am I to do?

What would I have done over a pass?   Most probably, I would have passed.  I don't have five spades and 2♦ would be game-forcing check-back the way we play.  I could make a uni-lateral decision and bid 2♣, forcing 2♦ and then pass it, but that's pushing the envelope a little for a normal match-point situation.  Aha, thought I, this interference has allowed me to bid a perfectly natural 2♦ which presumably won't be considered forcing, since it is in competition.  My partner thought it was forcing, however, and bid 2NT, despite having KJx of diamonds, which went an inglorious one down (3♦ would also have been down 1 while 2NT should have been down 2).

This led me to start thinking: should it be forcing? and if so why?  I posed the question to a good player friend and he said that he thought it would not be forcing without discussion.

Let's think it through.  If I want to force, presumably because I have five spades and invitational or better values, I could cuebid 3♣.  If partner has a minimum, and three spades, he will bid 3♠, otherwise he will bid 3NT or 4♠ with a maximum.  What if he doesn't have three spades or a maximum, though?  He could bid 3♦ with tolerance for diamonds.  But that's a bit risky.  So, 3♣ is just a too pushy for a forcing bid.  Therefore, I there's a good case that 2♦ should be forcing (not to game, but for one round).  It fits with the general principle that responder's new suits are always forcing.

Far more flexible however (see the previous blogs on doubles), is the simple double.  Since we have an unbid fourth suit available, we could consider it to be an "action", "BOP" or two-way double.  But, according to my doubles rules, double must be penalty since 1NT was "to play".  Also, a BOP double tends to be made by the player sitting under the bidder.

I didn't really feel that J52 was good enough to make a penalty double.  But given that we couldn't play in 2♦, for reasons described above, it was going to give us our best possible result of +100.  As it was, we were -100 for 2NT down 1 (actually we should have been down 2).

So, what's the moral of this story?  Dealing with crazy people at the bridge table can be tricky.  But here's a suggestion:  the only forcing bid in this sequence is 3♣ and it is forcing to game.  2♦ should not be forcing.  The sequence simply doesn't admit an invitational hand, though if partner does have three spades and takes a preference to spades (he might do it with two though), and we could then invite with 3♠.

What sort of hand do you think my RHO held for her late entry into the auction? ♠T95 ♥AK752 ♦Q ♣KQ76!

Raising partner's forced response to a takeout double

I stirred up quite a controversy last week playing with Lance. Just what sort of hand do you need to raise partner's forced response to your takeout double, assuming that RHO rebids something? The rule that I've been following for many years now is that you can raise to the two-level with a non-minimum takeout double, especially if our side is non-vulnerable. Apparently, where I thought this was "expert standard", it's actually an item for partnership discussion.

Just what is a good enough hand to raise? Does it show a really good hand, as it would surely if RHO didn't bid again? Let's say that the auction has gone as follows:

RHO	You	LHO	Pd
1♥	X	p	1♠
2♥	?

Is this hand good enough to raise to 2♠: ♠A985 ♥3 ♦AK96 ♣AJT8? I suspect everyone would raise: either to the two or three level depending on partnership agreements. This hand evaluates to about 21 points assuming partner really has four or more spades. If he has something like Kxxx xxx Jxx 9xx, game is about a 50% proposition. However, if partner has xxxx xxx xxx xxx, then it will be very hard to make even 2♠ but surely in that case, the opponents can make 3♥ so unless they double (or we are vulnerable) and we go down two, we should still be OK.

What about this? ♠Q985 ♥T32 ♦AQ6 ♣AT8? I can't imagine anyone raising with this hand - it's a marginal takeout double of 1♥ in the first place.

My hand was somewhere in between: ♠Q985 ♥T3 ♦AK96 ♣AJ8 and I raised to 2♠, thinking that I was doing the "normal" thing. Lance then surprised me by doing what I thought he couldn't possibly do (given his non-jump initially) – he bid game with ♠KT642 ♥Q86 ♦74 ♣Q42 (five working points but also a fifth spade). The defense wasn't perfect and with a slightly more favorable guess in the trump suit, he could actually have made it, but in the end went down one.

Afterwards he said he expected me to have a "huge hand." What surprised me was that the GLM at our table agreed with him. Hence my interest in finding out what my bridge friends would do.

Here's what I'd like to suggest: 2♠ (in competition) shows a hand with four spades, at most two small of the enemy suit (maybe Kx) and 14-16 working points. With more hcp and/or especially good distribution, a jump to 3 would be about right. A very good hand with only three-card support and something in the enemy suit can double. A huge hand can cue bid (we wouldn't be having this discussion if their suit outranked ours), forcing us to the three-level and begging partner to bid game with any useful card. On that basis, my hand was a minimum for my action.

I'd like to suggest one final rule of a more general nature which is perhaps an extension of the Horizon principle. Let's say that you make a call which shows no interest in game (a non-jump opposite a takeout double for instance or a simple raise of partner's major suit opening). Partner later makes a non-forcing call. Even though your hand may have improved since your initial action, you cannot now bid game all on your own if there is an intermediate call available (assuming we are not sacrificing).

Comments welcome.