How many errors can GIB make on one hand?

The other day, I was playing one of those 25 cent all-day tournaments on BBO (IMPs). On the last hand (none vulnerable), my GIB partner picked up the following hand: ♠5 ♥J875 ♦96 ♣AK8763. RHO dealt and passed, as did GIB. LHO opened 1♠ and partner overcalled 2♦. RHO now raised the stakes with 2♠. You have some useful looking values. What do you call?

Double (technically a "responsive" double here, but I'm treating it as just another competitive double) would suggest sufficient points for it to be our hand, four hearts and four clubs (maybe five if the suit is not headed by good honors). The other four or five cards should be one or two diamonds (else why not raise?), and two--possibly three--spades. In other words, a relatively balanced hand with both the round suits, and about 10 or more points.

Why do I say at least two spades? Because experience has taught me that when you are short in the opponents trump suit, if partner leaves it in, those little trumps that you do not have will be in declarer's (or dummy's) hand. And it's slightly more more likely that partner will have four and leave it in with the hope that the opponents are on a seven- (or at most eight-) card fit.

And why should you have the balance of power? Because whether you choose to play in a possibly poor trump fit, or to defend a doubled contract of the opponents', you need to have some reasonable expectation of making or setting them, as the case may be. This is especially true at IMPs where an injudicious contract our way can get doubled and go for quite a number, or where doubling their part-score into game could be very expensive. You should aim to have at least 22 hcp between your two hands if you're forcing partner to bid at the three level (or defend). In this case, we can assume partner has 12 hcp (he did make a 2/1 overcall) so we should have 10.

Here, we have too few hcp (eight) and too few spades (singleton). Not a hand to double, therefore.

What about 3♣? Well, if you do bid here, you should have a good honor sequence so that partner's lead of your suit (if we end up defending) isn't an instant own goal. And, you should have at least a decent five-card suit with some tolerance for partner's suit in case he has to go back to his suit. 3♣ would be the perfect bid here! You have the very best possible lead-directional suit, headed by AK. And a doubleton diamond on the side.

Eschewing the obvious 3♣ bid (you don't want to miss a 4-4 heart fit!) you double and partner, trusting your judgment, passes. It's unfortunate because 5♣ our way is cold (partner has Qxx and they split 2-2). Partner leads a trump, not his diamonds. What do you deduce from that? Possibly a broken suit, so the hand has scattered honors. After drawing trumps, declarer starts to eliminate clubs. You win and lead your ♦9 covered by ten, jack, ace. A second club comes which you win and now there's one obvious card in your hand that will set the contract--your other diamond. But being the GIB, you don't worry about partner getting endplayed and you lead a heart. Game over.

Update on cooperative doubles

It's been some time since I last wrote anything on cooperative doubles. But I haven't been idle. I've been giving the subject quite a bit of thought.

In particular, I've been thinking about why we need cooperative doubles at all. And the reason is -- still -- that we want to compete without being unilateral about it. We want to suggest bidding on, perhaps in a new suit, or in a previously bid suit, but we're also open to penalizing the opponents.

So, the basic conditions haven't changed:

• extra strength (either in our own hand or in the partnership as a whole);
• relative shortness in the enemy suit (ideally a small doubleton);
• no obvious bid presents itself (such as raising partner's suit, rebidding our own suit, a new suit, or bidding notrump).

But I'm going to add one more condition:

• we are (still) competing for the contract.

So, what do I mean by this? Think about the following auction:

1♠ (p) 2♠ (p) p (3♣) X

What does double mean here? Can it be that responder wants to compete further and is asking opener whether he has a second suit or extra spade length for the purposes of bidding on? No. The spade partnership is done in this auction. Both players narrowly limited their hands: responder by raising to 2♠ and opener by passing the raise. Neither of them is interested in playing in a higher-level contract. Therefore, the double must be for penalties. This would be the same if there were two passes after the club bid and before the double.

How about this:

1♠ (p) 2♦ (2♥) X

There is a class of player that believes that, as long as the opponents are in a game force, they may make any bid they like without fear of punishment. But in this case, although we have committed to play at the game level, we are open to the possibility of a higher score on defense. So, this isn't a competitive auction -- or at least it won't be until we bid a game-level contract.

Double, therefore, means that the heart-opponent has made a blunder. Doubler's holding in hearts is sufficiently good (and correspondingly his holding in spades and diamonds are sufficiently poor) that he is offering an alternative to partner.

I call this type of double The Tentatively Penalty Double. It's intended as penalty but, with extreme distribution, partner can of course take it out. Simply noticing that we are red and they are white is not sufficient grounds to take it out. Both partners can see the vulnerability and both know that they expect to score at least 400/600 in their own contract, whatever that is. The double says "unless you have some distribution that I don't know about, please pass".

An example of extra distribution would be a third spade (responder was planning to bid spades at his next turn showing three-card support) or a six-card diamond suit. Even with those cards, however, responder might pass the double if his hand is, generally speaking, balanced.

So, let's add the following to our list of penalty triggers (notwithstanding that it may be acceptable sometimes to pull the double when we are committed to game or with unexpectedly wild distribution):

• Our side settles in a part-score or commits to bid a higher-level contract (with or without actually bidding it).

I'll call this trigger the known-level rule: we know that we're either satisfied with a part-score or we're committed to game. A commitment to a higher level contract can arise in several ways:

• We commit to a (possibly unspecified) game because we open with 2♣ perhaps, or responder makes a 2/1 bid, fourth-suit-forcing, etc.
• We commit to at least three of our major by a cue-bid of the enemy suit, a fit-showing jump, Bergen raise, etc.

This somewhat new rule (trigger) fits perfectly with the previously defined triggers. Cue-bids, jumps, fourth-suit forcing are already penalty triggers. So too is the so-called "dead auction rule": in a competitive auction we have subsided over a bid of the enemy suit. But partner ups the stakes and one of the opponents takes one more draft from the well. Now, our double must be penalty (as explained long ago). But it is now just an example of the known-level rule.

So, really the only change that I am proposing is to switch to penalty doubles as soon as our partnership commits to game or as soon as the partnership as a whole rests in a part-score. I think this rule also better reflects normal expectations of players who haven't specifically discussed these doubles.

There's another aspect of competitive auctions which is, if anything, an anti-trigger (so far, I have not admitted to such phenomena).  Assuming that we are still in a competitive auction, when the opponents jump the bidding, or raise their partner's suit, it is even more important to double cooperatively (i.e. takeout-oriented). Take this example which came up just recently (none vulnerable):

♠9 ♥JT872 ♦AJ92 ♣873

Pd  RHO  You  LHO

1♣   p   1♥  3♠

 X   p    ?     .

Are we in a competitive auction? Yes--partner is (almost) unlimited and so are we. Do we need help in finding our spot? You bet! Does it seem likely that LHO has lost their mind and jumped with a trashy suit? Not really.

Conclusion: there haven't been any penalty triggers and the opponents jumped (or showed a fit). When the opponents jump or show a fit, we need double as cooperative even more than usual because they've used up some of our bidding room.

If partner had four hearts and extra values, he'd be bidding 4♥ on his own. He must have only three hearts then (if he only had two hearts, he'd either be bidding a second suit or awaiting our reopening double which he'll pass for penalties). So, we can safely bid 4♥.

Turns out that doubler had a rather strong hand: 13 hcp with a very good seven-card spade suit. A strange call then (why does LHO want to preempt the auction when they have the spades and a good hand?). Par on the board is 4♥X down one which we should have reached (for 5 matchpoints out of 7). Unfortunately, the holder of this hand was not familiar with my system of cooperative doubles. We ended up letting them make their doubled contract for a bottom obviously.

Nashua, NH

I don't often use this space to tell you about good results that happened at the table. Typically, I am more interested in some point of theory or maybe some problem hand that arose. But it's nice to be able to write about good results, especially when I can give most of the credit to my partner.

Last week I got to play with my wife and favorite bridge partner, Kim—for a change—in one of the big pairs events at the Nashua, NH, summer regional. We got a few gifts in the first session, resulting in a 63% game. One of my favorite hands, and an excellent example of the efficacy of the cooperative double, is the following:

[deal rotated]

What is particularly impressive here is that most of the evidence suggested passing my double. Yet, knowing that I was a passed hand, it must have appeared very likely that 2♠ would make (it would) and so Kim sensibly bid 3♥. At the point of the 2♠ bid, we were destined for either 5 or 10.5 matchpoints (out of 25), depending on our defense. When they didn’t double 3♥, we had improved to average. When one defensive trick was mislaid, we moved up to 17.5 mps, but then they dropped another, allowing Kim to actually make her contract. That put us all the way up to 23.5.

We were about half-way through the afternoon session, struggling a bit and getting insufficient gifts, when this hand came up. As you can see there's not much to the auction—but all day we had been defending a lot and doing it quite well, this being perhaps our best effort. We were lucky that declarer went astray a little—but we did everything we could to help him along.

Kim chose the ♠8 for her opening lead which helped create the illusion that she started with AJ98. I quickly decided to duck the first high spade so I could smoothly follow low (2). Now, it must have seemed "obvious" how the spades were dividing. Declarer has no very good option at this point, the suit he wants to develop first (spades) being playable only from the other side of the table. Obviously hearts is the suit to attack, but which one? I think running the 9 stands out, but on this layout it turns out just as wrong as leading low to the king and ace, which is what declarer actually did.

Kim had noticed my ♠2 (we play upside-down carding) and so she continued with the ♠9. After some thought, declarer backed his earlier hunch and played the king which I captured with my ace. It was still far from obvious how we were setting this contract, but I chose to lead ♣2. I knew this would persuade Kim to return a club if she won the trick (we play attitude leads in the middle of the hand) but I didn't mind that too much as I did have the 9 sitting over the T8 and quite possibly the thirteenth club. But even more so, I didn't particularly want her to continue spades just yet or to switch to another suit.

Some of the plays seem a bit odd, I know. It's possible that I have the exact sequence of spots wrong—my recollection is that my hand took four tricks including the last trick with a diamond—but I couldn't make that work so I must have misremembered. But the final outcome is correct—we ended up setting the contract by two tricks. No other N/S pair managed eight tricks on defense. Our result was a shared top (23/24) because two other pairs managed to set contracts of 2NT and 3NT, each by two tricks.

This board helped us to a 55% session which was just enough to give us a creditable fourth place. Not too bad for a 27-table event with average masterpoints of almost 3500.

Using double to find out about fit (part 2)

This follow-up of the earlier Using double to find out about fit is prompted by some comments by Jeff Lehman on my last DSIP-related blog The final problem. [I apologize in advance for the inordinate length of this article, but I simply don't have the time to make it shorter—but at least I have included quite a few hand diagrams.]

Jeff maintains that in a competitive auction, after we have found a fit, we should use double to penalize the opponents, bid with an offensive hand, and pass otherwise [I hope I have this right]. And I would guess that at least 95% of active bridge players would agree with him. I recognize that I am in the minority.

So, I'd like to explain why I think my style is better. But, first, I'd better summarize it. When we find a fit at the two-level, we usually don't know whether it's a single eight-card fit, a nine-card-plus fit or some kind of double fit. I say "usually" because pairs playing Bergen raises and perhaps some other conventions actually do know. But, I am talking about the normal situation where the auction has gone, say, 1♥ (p) 2♥ or perhaps 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p) 2♥, although for simplicity I will only discuss the first of these auctions. Let's say that the last bid is immediately overcalled by 2♠. Or perhaps there is a double, taken out to 2♠. How should we proceed?

I recommend what amounts to a pass-double inversion, just like some expert pairs play at higher levels when they're in a forcing pass situation. Here, we're not in a force, of course, but I should say that we will do something probably 75% of the time or more. Pass says either "I have neither extra strength nor extra distribution" or "I have a hand which would like to defend a doubled contract if you have extra strength." Double says "I'm relatively short in their suit [usually a doubleton], and I have extra strength but no clear bid." Much of the time, therefore, we will bid on, sometimes we will "nail" the opponents and sometimes we will meekly pass and let them have the contract.

The first thing we notice is that we no longer have a good way to invite game. All of our Kokish game tries, help-suit game tries and their like are essentially out the window. We can show a second suit, bid 2NT or we can bid 3♥ (higher bids will commit our side to game anyway). But those bids can also be used simply to compete with an offensively-oriented hand. Which style makes most sense? I believe that the scoring table favors an approach which goes: declare before game before slam. I don't have the space to justify this idea here but I do talk about it some more in Two golden rules of bidding. But very briefly: if they have intervened with 2♠, and can make it while you can take ten tricks not-vulnerable in hearts, you will earn 7 imps just by bidding on to 3♥ and only a further 4 imps by actually bidding game. If you think you might be able to make game but have no good way to find out partner's opinion, just bid it. If you're right you'll gain 11 imps, if you're wrong then at least you break even over letting them play even if they do double.

Here, I'm going to make an assumption that may shock you. Once we have established that our side has approximately half the deck (that's to say the high cards) or more, we do not need much in the way of extras to compete. It's a question of pigs at the trough—if you don't get in there you will starve. The most important issue we're faced with therefore is: declare or defend? (DoD). In other words, we are now trying to determine the absolute par contract whereas, before the intervention, we were only concerned with determining our (directional) par contract, which frequently is not the same thing. At pairs, quite a few matchpoints may be riding on whether we reach par or not. At teams, there is no difference between +100 and +110 for instance. But at matchpoints, getting it right could easily swing 25% of a board. Trying for game or trying for a big penalty are also possibilities of course, but they have to take a back seat to the main issue. So, we look at the possible tools we have available and, if there are two possible uses, we choose the meaning that most helps us to decide the DoD question. If we have sufficient tools still available to help us try for game, for example, then we use them for that purpose.

What tools do we have after the auction described above: 1♥ (p) 2♥ (2♠) ? Pass, double, 2NT, 3 of a minor, 3♥ (as mentioned above). By general agreement, pass and three of our suit (3♥ here) are non-forward going. Since defending 2♠ may be the par contract, we have to include pass in our arsenal for both players in a pair.

We are therefore left with double, 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣. I hope we all agree without any further explanation that 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣  are not logical contracts. One of these bids can be used as a game try and the other two can be used as you prefer for a different kind of game try, or simply a competitive bid. Personally, I think that the lowest of the available bids should be the game try (as it leaves the most room for partner to respond with some useful information) and the higher bids should be used to further describe your hand when you have good distribution. If RHO had bid 2NT, that would obviously remove one option... and so on until a 3♦ intervention leaves us no room for a game try at all. Let me put it on record that I do not like the "maximal double" here as an artificial game try.

Trying to penalize the opponents at this low-level is generally not going to work out profitably. If we can set their contract by two tricks doubled, that will be a very nice +300. But, wait a moment, if there are 16 total tricks available (most deals have at least this many total tricks) that means we could have made ten tricks in hearts for +420. Hence doubling for penalties won't be very profitable at equal or unfavorable vulnerability. Only at favorable vulnerability will it work out well, and even then it's only at matchpoints that the result will be a triumph. So, if we rule out wanting to penalize the opponents with a direct double, it frees up that call to show extra values and relative shortness in the enemy suit. Something like a short-suit game try. If partner has an extra trump, he will take the double out automatically. Likewise if he too is short in the enemy suit. All suit bids can be used to show extra distribution, and might even help us find that magic double fit that produces game even on minimum hands.

Thus, double is the most flexible DoD invitation. It has the advantage that if partner does decide to defend—and assuming he's right and that we don't choke during the defense—we get the greatest possible consolation for our "equity" (the score we were hoping to achieve with our two-of-a-major contract). But you mustn't abuse double here or you will end up with lots of -470s and -670s. See my various other posts in this series (DSIP). Generally, you will have a balanced hand with two cards in the opponent's suit. In this context, that means 5422, 5332, or possibly 5431 shape—not 5521 or anything like that. That's what the other suit bids are for. However, you might double your singleton (or void) suit if you've already shown two suits. And, if partner has a biddable suit in response to your double (or extra length in a suit he's already shown), he should take the double out.

So, does that mean that our opponents can enter into our auctions with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they can never be caught speeding? Not at all. Often they will escape relatively unscathed when we bid on to a successful contract or we let them play undoubled when we have nothing extra. But when the trap does close, they will find that the player with the most high-card points has the short holding in trumps. His partner will have the longer holding and these conditions are perfectly suited to extracting the largest possible penalty.

Sometimes, even when we do "catch them speeding," they can wriggle out into a better contract. So, give up on waiting for juicy doubles of low-level intervention after we've found a fit—it's better to use double as an essentially constructive tool and get the occasional penalty as a bonus.

Here's a typical layout from a recent instant tournament on BBO. At the table, all were vulnerable and West made a poor decision to reopen with double. Perhaps he should have considered the board number first. All looked good at first when East bid 2♠ and N/S passed, but things went rapidly downhill thereafter, resulting in -300, a very poor matchpoint score.

Declarer could have played it a bit better and saved a trick. Perhaps North should have redoubled over the first double to show a balanced hand with maximum points. South might then feel able to double the contract for a gain of 800 to N/S. But that's being a little greedy. N/S took no risk of anything bad happening and ended up with better than an 80% board.

Now let's look at some other variations and see how they might play out using the ideas described above. We leave the E/W hands to distribute themselves as they see fit and bid as before.

In the first example on the left, South is the one with extra strength, a balanced hand and a doubleton spade: hence double. The final contract is 2♠X for +100 (assuming an unchanged E/W layout). This loses an IMP to the par contract of +140 for 3♥.

In the second variation (right) neither North nor South can bid on over 2♠ and the opponents "escape". Nevertheless, they go down two for +200 to N/S. Surprisingly, again assuming E/W remain the same, N/S can actually make 4♥ on this layout. But is it reasonable to expect anyone to bid it? +200 is therefore likely to win at least average if not better.

And, in fairness, here's a hand that appears to deflate my arguments. It's from long ago (2006) on OKbridge (I found this using Stephen Pickett's wonderful program BridgeBrowser) where the players were all good. East/West were playing "standard" and the 500 they reaped was worth 7.35 IMPs.

Playing my recommended system, the result would almost surely be only 200 (no double) for only 0.75 IMPs. This is exactly what happened at another good table but this time, the defenders did even better and extracted 300 for 3.27 IMPs. In any case, I dare say the actions would be the same at matchpoints and there the difference is much smaller: 49/51 matchpoints for 500, 48 for 300, and 41 for 200. That's still an 80% board! In other words, you will get a very good matchpoint result on this hand without having to double.

And here's a hand which many players got seriously wrong (from the same source)—again all good players at the table shown.

Par on this board is +100 for N/S for 2♠X-1. The only reasonable way to get that result is for N/S to be playing according to my system and have South double with his extras and spade shortness. North will have no reason to take it out and par will be achieved. In practice many Easts took fewer than their allotted seven tricks and at those tables 2♠X would have done very nicely for N/S. Note that although this N/S did get a fine 300, it was only because West made a dreadful bid in my opinion. They were almost surely going to escape for -50 until then.

Now for a board where N/S use double to win the declaration:

Note that in almost every real-life playing of this hand, after the first six calls, South made a very undisciplined raise to 3♥. He has no shape and could have been summarily punished an a bad day. The safe way to show your extras is with a double as shown here. North, with four hearts and a doubleton spade will take it out to 3♥ and all will be well. If E/W bid on they will be -200 or, even worse, if N/S decide to take the push to 4♥ on their 21 hcp they will be extraordinarily lucky, given their lack of useful shape, and score game.

The final problem

No, this isn't my final blog. I hope not anyway. But I would like to wrap up some loose ends on the subject of doubles. Devotees of Sherlock Holmes will of course recognize the title as that of one of the adventures.

First, I want to stress something about doubles which I haven't really emphasized before. Cooperative doubles are always a last resort. This comes from the definition that you have no other possible bid yet you have too much strength to pass.

I have mentioned previously the "three strikes you're out" rule which comes into play whenever our side makes a total of three doubles (see Three strikes - you're out). But there are other flavors of the three strikes rule. 

For example, suppose that I open 1♠, partner raises to 2♠ (with or without competition) and then later,  one of us bids 3♠. Each partner has clearly limited his hand, there's no doubt about our best strain, and nobody is prepared to bid game. By bridge logic, if the opponents continue on to the four level, a double by one of us must be for penalties.

For some time, I've been trying to determine if there is a simple trigger that applies to these situations. Essentially, these are the criteria:

• each partner has limited his hand by making a non-forcing bid;
• we have found a fit or we have settled into a quasi-fit.

Let me try some examples:

1. ♠KJ4 ♥75 ♦KQT962 ♣AQ opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQJ63 ♦J ♣J63: 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p); 2♦ (p) p (2♠); p (p) X: in this case, opener has bid and rebid diamonds -- responder was content to sit there in a quasi-fit -- until the opponents decided to balance. We know we cannot find a fit at a safe level and weren't thrilled about having to make eight tricks in diamonds. Opponent's 2♠ call is music to our ears: Double!
2. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦KQ62 ♣A7 opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQ62 ♦J3 ♣J63: 1♠ (2♣) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) 3♠ (p) p (4♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (three spade bids altogether), neither player has made any attempt to bid game (thus each is limited in strength). Double!

But is it necessary for both partners to have limited their hands? What if the one partner who has limited his hand, with a pass or a non-forcing bid, doubles? Is that always for penalty?

The case where one of us passes is covered in The dead auction rule. But I'm not sure that covers all of the cases. Doesn't it also apply when one of us makes a non-forcing bid and then doubles?

More situations:

1. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦K2 ♣AJ67 opposite ♠QT6 ♥KQ63 ♦JT43 ♣82: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), but opener is still unlimited while responder has limited his hand. Is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? It's relatively unlikely so that I have always defined this situation as being a cooperative double. How good are your spades, clubs? For many pairs, double is always penalty once we've found a fit.
2. ♠KJ942 ♥72 ♦AKJ2 ♣72 opposite ♠QT6 ♥JT65 ♦T3 ♣AJ83: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (x); p (3♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), opener and responder are limited. Now, is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? Absolutely, he's sitting over the club bidder and he has a maximum balanced raise.

The conclusion, for me at least, is that as soon as both partners have limited their hands, then penalty doubles go into effect. But should penalty doubles only be in the direct seat? No, I think that's unworkable. We need to have both partners using the same meaning for double, otherwise it's possible that the fish can wriggle out of the net.

And now for a real hand, this one taken from the World Wide Pairs (hands rotated).

The bidding by the opponents is a little "forward" as the Abbot might say, yet this is the kind of thing that happens in club games. It's obviously important to be on the same wavelength as to the meaning of my final double. Given that my first double was essentially a bid of spades, our side had bid spades three times. Add to that the fact that I had passed over 2♠ showing no interest in going further, then it was clear that my final double was for business. [Editor's note: I have edited the bidding a little to suit my story better, although the first four bids are real, as is the final contract.]

Our result (+500 when we managed to get an extra trick on defense) was a local top and worth 99% worldwide. Note that 4♠ cannot be made legitimately, although there were quite a few making game (420) our way so we needed that extra trick. 

So, my question to my readers is this: is it a workable scheme to turn penalty doubles on whenever both partners are limited? Is it sufficiently obvious? I'm sure that it's correct to do it this way, but is it going to be usable in practice?

The Hitchhiker’s Guide - part 4: the Tiger wraps it up

I have just finished reading a really excellent book on defense called Tiger and Fly by Krzysztof Martens. There are two parts, each with examples of the style of defensive play of one of the eponymous characters. The bulk of the book is devoted to the Tiger. He (or she) is a bold defender with a predator’s eye for deception and camouflage. He will cunningly ambush declarer by drawing a false picture of the deal then pounce at the last moment just as declarer is, he thinks, about to wrap up a successful contract.

Naturally, I was keen to show my feline mettle at my next club game. Here is the setting. I was sitting East, dealer, at favorable vulnerability and holding the following nice collection against one of the best pairs in the room:

♠ AK97 ♥ QJT62 ♦ K9 ♣ 85.
I opened 1♥ and partner raised to 2♥. We play Bergen raises so this bid showed only three hearts or a very flat hand. Unfortunately, this being the first round, I had momentarily forgotten that and was thinking we were playing constructive raises. Anyway, this was passed around to my LHO who doubled. Partner passed and RHO bid 3♣ which was alerted as showing five clubs. I only have thirteen points, but I am certainly better than a minimum opener so I doubled. By agreement, this is cooperative asking partner’s opinion about defending or bidding on. I usually have one or two clubs and will have something in each of the unbid suits. Partner passed and it was my lead. I do think I was a little over-aggressive in this action (especially given that we play Bergen) but this story isn’t about the bidding. It’s about the defense.

It seemed natural to lead a high spade and get a look at the dummy. Dummy came down with:

♠ QT2 ♥ A95 ♦ J85 ♣ AJ72
and the first trick was made up of A-2-8-4. We play UDCA so the 8 is probably a suggestion to switch. Now is the time to heed the usual warning for defending doubled contracts: DON’T PANIC!

I panicked. I led a heart and that was that: -670 and obviously a bottom.

Tigers don’t panic however. They own their territory and they know it. People don’t wander in with their reopening doubles and expect to get out alive. The tiger laid down the ♦K, continued to partner’s ace and received a diamond ruff. Five tricks in for the magic 200 and a clear top.

Why did the Tiger succeed when I failed? Mainly because he didn’t panic, of course. But he carefully analyzed the hand, too. It looks like we have three sure tricks in spades and diamonds. We need two more. Based on the auction, we can count on partner for two of the missing honors. What could these be, practically speaking? The ♥K, the ♦AQ and the ♣K are the relevant missing cards, although the ♦Q is a slow trick and will likely come too late to do us much good. Assuming that declarer really does have five clubs, the ♣Q cannot be a factor. If partner has the ♦A, we should be able to get a diamond ruff, providing our trumps don't get drawn first. Let’s consider what pairs of cards will get us the five tricks we need:

♥K ♦A

Down one if we cash second spade (2S, 2D, ruff); down two if we switch to ♦K immediately (♥K scores).

♥K ♦Q

Cannot defeat the contract (2S, 1H, 1D).

♥K ♣K

Down one provided we switch to hearts before the ♠Q is established (2S, 1H, 1D, 1C).

♦A ♦Q

Down one provided we switch to ♦K before losing the lead (2S, 2D, ruff); most probably down two.

♦A ♣K

Always down one (2S, 2D, 1C); down two if we switch to ♦K before losing the lead (2S, 2D, 1C, ruff).

♦Q ♣K

Cannot defeat the contract (2S, 1D, 1C)

Ignoring the sequences which result in down two (or making), we are left with a decision. If partner has the ♦A (three cases out of four), the contract is always going down provided that we switch to diamonds before losing the lead. The only time this would be fatal would be when partner has the two round-suit kings (the remaining case) without the diamond queen too. That's to say that any time partner has three of the four honors, the contract is going down anyway when we lay down the ♦K.

What if partner has only one of the honors? Well, obviously, if it's the ♦A and we switch to the king, it will be going down. As Martens points out, this is an application of Occam's Razor. If we can defeat the contract by assuming only one honor, then that's the way to go.

Wouldn't it have been better to cash the ♠K to see what would come next? Partner would play the trey, suit preference for diamonds, the lower-ranking suit. Was there any risk that declarer would show out on the second round of spades and draw trumps? If declarer only had a singleton spade, partner would have had five. Given that my double guaranteed at least three spades, we would then have had a double major suit fit of 16 cards. Far too much offense to risk passing for penalties.

But while it would be safe to cash the king and get the happy news that a diamond shift was right, in the one case where diamonds was wrong, we would now have given up the possibility of getting a heart trick. So, since the Tiger was planning to play on diamonds anyway, there was no need to continue spades.

In fact, partner didn't have two "cards." She had only the ♦A! This, together with the spade jack, made up her entire hand. Was it right, then to pass the double? In the long run, probably not. In 3♥, most pairs were making 140 although they should be down one. But minus 50 would be preferable to minus 110 of course (and much better than minus 670.

But partner actually got us to the theoretical top spot: all set for 200. Now, if only she'd been playing with the Tiger!

Reviewing the situation

My regular readers may have noticed that I haven't written much about doubles lately. Well, in light of the recent articles in the Bridge Bulletin by Karen Walker, I cannot let that state of affairs continue much longer.

I am very fortunate to be heading to Phoenix for the NABC soon. I wasn't expecting to be there, but guess what – I have to go there for work so will add a few days at the start. I will play in the LM pairs with my friend Barry Margolin. For our previous exploits in a national event, see The Little Gremlin. So, in preparation for our bridge date I wanted us to be on the same page regarding doubles.

Barry says he's the kind of player who responds better to general principles than rules and/or triggers. I think there are probably a lot of people who would say the same thing. Therefore I tried to put together one general principle which I hope will keep us on the same page for our upcoming sessions.

Before I get to that, however, let me give praise to my biggest fan regarding doubles, Bruce Downing, co-author of the Downhill notrump system. He has independently done a review and/or comparison between my triggers and Karen's bridge bulletin articles and found much similarity (though he prefers my "traffic light" analogy and triggers). I quote his opening remarks in a personal email:


There are two unwritten books that I hope to someday have on my shelf. One is 'Gariepy on Redoubles'. Larry Gariepy, a Dartmouth grad student in my early days of bridge in the Upper Valley, believed that the blue card was hugely under-utilized...

The other volume will be 'Hillyard on Doubles'. Robin has put extensive thought into when doubles should be takeout or cooperative or penalty. He has traffic light analogies. It's complicated but it's simple. He has blogged extensively with examples and cautionary tales. On the rare, but always enjoyable, occasions when I play with Robin, I always have to study the list of 'triggers'. Triggers are auction types which make a double penalty in Robin's methods.

So, with all appropriate preambles, here I have tried to formulate my doubles rules into a single guiding principle (with optional rider):

Provided that the hand hasn't shown itself to be a misfit and we are still seeking a fit, then double is for takeout or is cooperative, i.e. showing a hand with an expectation of owning or sharing the hand but no clear course of action. The level of the auction, in and of itself, does not affect the meaning of double – but if we could have doubled cooperatively at a lower level, then logically double is now penalty. Of course, once penalty doubles are on, we can never go back to cooperative doubles.

Any frequent partnership needs to discuss a few more details to be completely on the same page, but I think that this description should suffice for most partnerships that play only occasionally (like ours). Here’s the optional rider (essentially similar to some of Mel Colchamiro’s “BOP” double situations):

Even when we have found a fit, if an intervention finds us wanting to compete to an uncomfortable (unlawful) level, double is cooperative, unless our distribution/fit is already well known.

Some clarifications (I wish everything was already so clear that these were not necessary):

A misfit declares itself (or at least suggests itself for our purposes) when somebody bids a natural notrump in competition. It says "this is our hand but we don't appear to have a fit". Similarly, a redouble normally implies no fit (although some pairs may not use it that way). One of us rebidding his suit in the face of no support tends to proclaim (or suggest) a misfit also.

Owning the hand means we have about 23 hcp or more. Sharing the hand means that we have at least 20 hcp and sufficient distribution (especially spades) to give us a little safety. Either way, we are entitled to a seat at the (competitive) table.

No clear course of action usually means that we are one card short of a bid, whether it be a raise, a rebid or a new suit. An analogous situation arises in constructive auctions where one partner bids the fourth suit.

A well-known fit pertains when either partner has shown (or denied) a ninth card in our agreed suit. If it exists, this ninth card “entitles" us to bid to the three-level (similarly, denial of a ninth card would suggest not going to the three-level). Note that a cue-bid by us may hide whether the hand has a ninth card or is looking for a stopper (in which case maybe doesn’t even have an eighth card). Either way, subsequent doubles are penalty because so much is known already about the strength and distribution. Of course, it’s less likely that we will want to penalize the opponents when we have a nine-card fit but when it does happen, we need to be on the same page.

An uncomfortable (unlawful) level typically refers to the three-level in a competitive auction. But by extension, if the auction is jammed and we don’t yet know how good our fit is, double can be used to ask how good our fit is at a higher level.

Well-known distribution usually means that one of us has made a call that narrowly limits the distribution patterns that we might have. There are too many ways to do this to list them all.

Note that I definitely haven't given up on the traffic-light analogy (see More about doubles) or triggers (see DSIP Rule Summary). If the putative book mentioned above ever appears in print, there will be extensive discussion of those aspects because less experienced players are, I believe, more comfortable with rules. But the description given here is perhaps a little more palatable to the expert and/or intuitive player.

As always, your comments are welcome.

2013/11/05

Introducing four-card suits in high-level auctions

Have you ever found that the auction has progressed to a point where it is no longer comfortable to bid a four-card suit?  And yet it may be that you actually have a four-four fit.  Let's say partner has opened the bidding.  With a weak responding hand, we will typically simply bid a four-card major if we have one and there will be no further interest on our part in introducing a new suit.  But what if we have invitational strength (or better) and we want to bid our suits in natural order?  What if the opponent(s) intervene?  We can easily develop acrophobia as the auction gets close to or beyond the 3NT level.  The solution to this problem of course is the cooperative double.

Here's a case in point:

Some readers will say that the South hand could start with a negative double and then bid clubs.  I prefer to play so-called "negative free bids" (which, by the way, fit hand-in-glove with cooperative doubles) so that particular sequence becomes a game-force.  But even playing standard, don't you think that starting with a double distorts this hand significantly by marginalizing a good six-card suit?

Admittedly, you don't have much to spare after the sequence shown in the diagram. Yet it does appear that this hand "belongs" to us and, with an unannounced four-card heart suit why should we let them play 3♠  undoubled?  If partner doesn't have four hearts, he may be able to raise clubs, rebid diamonds or convert the double into penalties.  When they have a good fit, so have we.  Occasionally, we can catch them speeding and, as it turns out, partner is happy to pass.  Surprisingly, however, the only lead to actually set the contract is the singleton trump.  Let's hope we don't go wrong and lead a high club!

Do I hear any dissenters?  Yes, of course I do.  Some of you may feel that with such an "obvious" double, North should be able to double 3♠ for penalties?  But think about it for a moment.  How frequently is that going to come up?  At the three level, after the opponents have made a Law-of-total-tricks raise, the player sitting under the bidder will rarely have a holding that is good enough to double with confidence.  On this kind of auction, it's much more likely that it is our hand but we haven't yet found a fit.  Mel Colchamiro has a great name for a double by North here: the "balance-of-power" double.  "BOP 'em," he says.  You might argue that the 3♣ bid, which is so highly informative, should trigger penalty doubles.  That is a valid point of view.  Nevertheless, the opponents are jamming our auction and we have not yet had a good chance for either of us to show four hearts.  Transfer two of those diamonds into the heart suit and we have a decent shot at game, yet the auction so far would have proceeded just the same.

In general, it is my opinion that, playing against reasonably sane opponents who have announced a good fit, it is more useful to be able to find our best fit than to increase their penalty.  And, what if you have a great hand and a stack of trumps and are prevented from doubling?  It may be a blessing when partner is bust.  Those situations usually work better when the hand sitting over declarer has the trump stack while partner has the entries.  That avoids opening leader being end-played at every turn.

Yes, but how can you make a takeout double when there is only one suit to take out into?  I know some of you are thinking this.  The point here is that it is not a pure "takeout" double.  It's a cooperative double showing that we have the balance of power and asking partner his opinion.  One of the suits that partner might favor is the one that's already been bid and doubled – a penalty pass.

Going back to our example hand, the more observant of you may have noticed that we can make 3NT, despite having only 22 hcp.  That's another possibility that I didn't mention before – taking the double out into a notrump game.  Indeed, this is one of those fairly rare hands where notrump plays better than any suit.  Next to notrump our best fit is diamonds where we can take eight tricks.  But how much better it is to score 400 instead of 100?

For more blogs on this interesting topic, see for example Single-suit cooperative doubles or Using double to find out about fit.

Support/Cooperative Doubles

The "Support Double", developed by Eric Rodwell, is one of the most universal and useful conventions in tournament bridge.  I haven't seen the original definition but here is the basic idea:

Whenever you have opened in a suit, partner has responded at the one-level, and right-hand-opponent has bid such that you would be able to raise partner to the two level – then said raise will promise four-card (or more) support, while double will promise three-card support.

There are a number of questions that this opens up, however:

1. If you pass instead of raising or doubling, does this guarantee fewer than three-card support?
2. Do you need to have a minimum point-count?
3. What if partner already promised five cards in his suit, should you still double with three? if not, then what does double mean now?
4. While the original description precludes it, what if RHO made a jump?  Could we agree that it's still a support double?

Regarding the first point, Rodwell himself is on record as having said that if you have a weak hand, perhaps a third seat opener, and you wouldn't have made a three-card raise sans competition, then you aren't obliged to double (i.e. you can pass).  For the second point, a big factor is your 1NT range.  Support doubles are made on balanced hands probably 80% of the time.  So, if you play 12-14 notrumps, then you won't have a 12-14 balanced hand when you make a support double and thus will typically not be making a support double on a "dog".  Regarding the third point, I know many experts play that support double is still on if partner promises five cards, which can happen in the auctions 1♣ 1♥ 1♠ 2♥ X or 1♦ 1♥ 1♠ 2♥ X.  That has the advantage of simplicity.  My take on this is that it should not be a (strict) support double, but rather a cooperative double (I certainly wouldn't advocate playing penalty doubles in this situation).  I will go on to show that support doubles are essentially a particular species of cooperative double, so that there really isn't any difference in the two approaches.

My particular interest for this discussion lies in the fourth point.  I have recently come across a pair (I'm closely related to one half of this pair) that extends the range of the support double up to the three level when a jump intervenes.  Of course, it must show some extras.  Here's what it says: I'm one card short of being able to raise your suit directly, partner;  I have extra values;  I have a relatively balanced hand;  I'm relatively short in the opponent's suit.  This is precisely the definition of a cooperative (or do-something-intelligent-partner) double.  By the constraints of the game, I can hold only thirteen cards.  Let's say I already opened a suit, so that's four (or more) right there.  I've got three-card support for partner (now we're up to seven, plus).  I've only got six other cards (fewer perhaps).  If six of them were a second suit, I think I'd have no problem finding a bid.  If I had a five-card side suit, I probably wouldn't have a problem.  But what if my second suit is only four cards long and I've got, say, two cards in the enemy suit.  That's precisely when I need to be able to make a cooperative double.  Insufficient cards in our suits to have a clear call, extra points, and a couple of cards in the opponents' suit which will be helpful if partner decides to convert the double to penalties.  

East intended the double as a "support double" but this auction apparently hadn't been clearly determined in advance.  They eventually bid up to 6♣ (for 5 matchpoints out of 13) but missed the cold 7♥.  So, you see, whether you call it a support double or a cooperative (DSIP) double, it really amounts to the same thing.  At the two-level (the traditional domain of the support double), given that we might both have minimum hands, it makes sense to have the support double show exactly three.  But at a higher level, you might still make a cooperative double with only two card support for partner – but then you will have compensating strength.

Thus, the cooperative double and the support double stand together with some other conventions that deny the ability to show primary support of partner's suit and/or request partner to show secondary support.  Examples include fourth-suit-forcing, new minor forcing, the forcing notrump.

The reason for all this difficulty of course, is that, in a constructive and forward-going auction, we generally do not like to raise with three (in case partner has only four) and we tend not to rebid suits unless we have six (in case partner has only two).  This leaves the finding of a 5-3 fit one of the trickier aspects of bridge.  The support double and its more general cousin, the cooperative double, are one of the tools that can help us in this quest.

Using double to find out about fit

Lately, I've been looking for a simple, unifying principle for the system of two-way (a.k.a. cooperative or DSIP) doubles which I've been promoting in these blogs.  If you're a regular reader, you'll know about my set of triggers which switch the meaning of double from takeout to cooperative and from cooperative to penalty.  A hand came up the other day which is a perfect example of using double to find out whether we have a good fit.

Playing with my GNT teammate Jay in an ACBL speedball tournament online (IMPs), I picked up this hand: ♠ – ♥ JT93 ♦ T8743 ♣ KQJT.  Everyone was vulnerable and partner opened 1♣.  This was overcalled 1♠ on my right and I made a slightly pushy negative double.  LHO now jumped to 4♠ and this was passed back to me and I had some thinking to do.  First of all it seemed that we had at least half the deck, high-card-point-wise and possibly even the balance of power.  We play a strong no trump so it was possible partner had a weakish balanced hand.  On the other hand, playing any sort of notrump, he could have a reasonably shapely hand with clubs and somewhat more than a minimum.  He doesn't know that my hand has a good club fit, after all.

I decided to get very pushy, and a bit undisciplined given the void in spades, and doubled.  This was no doubt due, to some extent, to having enjoyed a beer earlier in the evening.  Partner's hand was ♠ AJ3 ♥ AQ84 ♦ Q96 ♣ 974.  He was happy to pass and we set 4♠ by one trick for a gain of 7 imps.  Had he been dealt a hand like ♠ J4 ♥ AQ8 ♦ Q96 ♣ A9743, then he would pull to 5♣ and either they would bid on to a making 5♠ or we would be down one in 5♣X.

At least, that's what should have happened.

In reality, not having had a chance to discuss this sort of auction, I was worried that my double might be interpreted as penalty.  Of course, with partner's actual hand, everything would work out just fine.  But what if he had a small doubleton spade and five clubs to the ace?  We could easily suffer a double-game-swing.  Therefore, I bid 5♣ instead.  Partner pulled this to 5♥ and played it there.  The defense was imperfect and we ended up not only undoubled but down only two.  This was good for a 1.25 IMP loss on the board, almost a push.  Other, less fortunate pairs played 5♥, going down three doubled and losing 11 IMPs.  That's a total swing of 18 IMPs!!

Interestingly, of the 83 times the board was played, the scores ranged from -1100 to +500 with only eleven pairs actually making a contract (nine in 3♠, two in 3♥).  25 pairs played doubled contracts one way or the other, all failing.  Despite the void in my hand and 18 total trumps, there are only 17 total tricks available on this deal.

What follows is a long theoretical discussion.  Feel free to skip it :)

The basic issue is fit.  If you are considering outbidding your opponents in a competitive auction, by which I mean where each side has approximately half of the high cards, you are going to feel much more confident when your side has established a "good" fit.  While this may sound somewhat arbitrary, I'm going to define a good fit as nine cards or better (or two eight-card fits).  In the type of auction I'm talking about the "law" of total tricks is more relevant than in other situations.  And since most of these competitive decisions will involve bidding at the three or four level, a nine-card or better fit is going to give you a fighting chance of either making your contract, or at least not being penalized more than 100.

According to a pet theory of mine (actually a corollary of "the law"): if each side has exactly half the high cards, and if the deal is distributed in a reasonably "pure" and appropriately shapely manner, then each side will be able to take the number of tricks equal to their trumps.  On average!  Since this is a corollary of the LOTT it is certainly no more accurate and in practice it will be even less accurate for any particular hand.  A queen more or less will, again on average, make a difference of one trick either way. 

That's why a nine-card fit is so useful for these competitive situations.  A reasonable alternative to a nine-card fit, by the way, is a double-fit of two eight-card suits.  We're coming to the point soon, I promise.

In a perfect world, a competitive auction is won by the side which has the majority of the following assets/attributes:

1. the higher-ranking suit (asset);
2. the balance of power (attribute);
3. non-vulnerability (ditto);
4. an established good fit (ditto).

 So, let's take as an example, an auction in which the opponents have bid 3♥.  You're not sure if they have a "good fit" but that's not your concern.  You're considering your options: do we have the higher-ranking suit (in this case spades)?  This is the only "asset" on the list: it cannot apply to both sides as the others can. Do we have the balance of power?  It's hard to know this for sure but it should be possible to make a statement such as "with high probability we have at least 20 hcp."  Are we non-vulnerable?  This is as simple as looking at the board.  Do we have an established good fit?

If all of the answers are yes, then I think we can safely bid on.  In fact, we might want to consider bidding 4♠ any time we have 1, 2 and 4.  If we have 1, 3 and 4 then we can probably bid 3♠ with reasonable safety.  What if we have 2, 3 and 4.  This will involve bidding a part-score at the four-level which is not one of the choicest contracts in bridge.  We might want to consider a penalty double if we have the right holding, assuming that we really do have the balance of power.

Now we come to the crux of the matter.  What if 1, 2 and 3 pertain?  We have the spades, we think we have the balance of power and we are not vulnerable.  But we don't know if we have a good fit.  We might have a fit, but we don't know how good it is.  The vulnerability plays a big part in the decision.  If they are vulnerable, we are somewhat more predisposed to defending doubled and if we are vulnerable and they are not, especially if we're not sure we have the balance of power, then we are more prone to pass.  How can we tell if we have a good fit?

We double, cooperatively, showing shortness in the enemy suit, typically a doubleton at lower levels and a singleton at higher levels.  This shows a moderately shapely hand with support for any unbid suit and tolerance for partner's suit (if any) that we have not raised. If partner has wastage in the enemy suit and/or a very balanced hand suitable for defending, and no undisclosed length in our suit(s), then he will convert the double into penalties.  If it turns out we have a double fit or extra length in any known fit (if there is one), partner will pull the double.

Let's now consider the situation where we do have the balance of power, but not the rank advantage.  Let's say, too, that both sides are vulnerable.  If we have already established a good fit, then there is no need to use double cooperatively.  We can now use double for penalties! See the DSIP Rule Summary.  For other blogs on this topic see, for example, The Dead Auction Rule, Inferences from Two-way Doubles, Doubling Intervention After We've Found a Fit.

The "Dead Auction" rule

A very instructive hand arose at a club game this week which both illustrates and clarifies the "dead auction" rule (one of the triggers in the system of doubles which I have been describing in these blogs).

Let's start with my hand: ♠QT65 ♥8642 ♦KQ9 ♣AQ.  We are vulnerable against not, and there are three passes to me.  In this partnership, we play a 15-17 notrump so this is obviously a 1♦ opening.  I don't love my hand but it would be Quixotic in the extreme to pass this out!  LHO now decides to come in with 1♠ and partner is there with 2♥.  RHO passes as do I.  LHO isn't done: he now gives us 3♣.  Partner lets me know he has diamonds with a 3♦ call, RHO passes, and I take a preference to 3♥.  This, by the way, establishes a double fit, of sorts, for our side.  LHO still isn't done!  Despite not being able to open the bidding and despite not having heard a peep from his partner, he is determined not to be outbid on this hand.  Partner passes, as does RHO (for the fourth time), and I decide that enough is enough and double.  Partner thinks about this for a bit and pulls it to 4♥.  RHO now comes out of the woodwork and doubles, ending the auction.  -200 is good for 2.5 matchpoints out of 11 so we have not achieved a huge success here.  4♣ would have gone down 1 for +100 and 7 out of 11.  At teams, we would have lost 7 imps assuming the other table was also in 4♣X down 1.

What went wrong?  It's time to show the entire hand:

	♠ 94 ♥ K753 ♦ AJ52 ♣ 964
♠ K7 ♥ AQJT9 ♦ 8764 ♣ 83		♠ QT65 ♥ 8642 ♦ KQ9 ♣ AQ
	♠ AJ832 ♥ ♦ T3 ♣ KJT752

What went wrong is basically that partner (W) wasn't quite au fait with the "dead auction rule".  That's largely my fault because it isn't well presented in the DSIP Rule Summary.  Here it states that one of the triggers to penalty doubles is the following:


3. If we pass over a suit bid on our right in a competitive auction and subsequently double that same suit, thus exposing the pass as a trap;
What it should say is this:


3. If we pass over a suit bid on our right in a competitive auction, we are content to defend the stated contract -- if partner doubles or if we double any subsequent bid by the opponents [such doubles will be for penalties];
That would have made it a lot clearer (although it is more complex now).

I will also note that there is another missing trigger rule from the DSIP summary which would have been relevant here.


2.6. bids a new suit (showing length) or raises partner's other suit, having already found a fit [subsequent doubles will be for penalty];
As it turned out, I told a little white lie in the story above. Despite holding ♥Kxxx and ♦AJxx in our suits and hearing her partner bid three times on his own, RHO did not double the final 4♥ contract.  So we escaped the proper penalty for our transgression, earning an average (6).

New DSIP rule to cope with two-suited bids

In the DSIP rule summary, I state that doubles after a two-suited bid (by either side) are for penalties.  The one noted exception is that when partner makes a two-suited bid and one of the suits is unknown, an immediate double asks partner to bid the unknown suit.

When they make a two-suited bid, the situation is slightly different.  Whether we know both suits or not, we don't know which suit they are going to settle in.  I propose that a delayed double after they make a two-suited bid is for takeout of the suit they have now bid.  This should not be confused with a delayed double of a (known) suit, which is always for penalty.

Here's an example of a hand where a delayed double would have worked better.  Partner opened 1NT (12-14) and RHO bid 2NT for the minors.  None were vulnerable and I held the following hand: ♠xxxx ♥Kxxx ♦x ♣KQxx..  I wanted to compete and/or to suggest a possible penalty so I doubled.  Partner doubled the takeout to 3♦ and they made 5 (most probably I could have saved a trick but I thought I was squeezed).  We lost 11 imps on the board. Obviously, I didn't have enough hcp to suggest a penalty double.

What I perhaps needed to do was to pass over 2NT and then double when 3♦ came around to me.  Even then it's a questionable action because my club holding won't be very useful.  But I think we'd have done better than -670, assuming partner takes it out to his four-card major. 

DSIP rule summary

1. Unless explicitly rendered otherwise by one of the events listed below, all doubles are either pure takeout or cooperative, that is to say that you expect partner to take the double out, but you won't be unhappy if he doesn't; level is immaterial – even if the last call by the opponents is 7♥.
2. If either partner on our side does one of the following, doubles become penalty:
1. bids notrump "to play" (generally this is at the 2-level or above or at the one level when showing a stopper);
2. makes a penalty double (e.g. a lead-directing double of an artificial or cue bid) or passes partner's double, or makes the third double for our side;
3. redoubles (of any sort);
4. shows a two-suited hand (except that if one of the suits is unknown, it's best to play partner's first subsequent double as asking which is the suit);
5. makes a cuebid or bids the last remaining unbid suit (or bids the "fourth" suit as a force);
6. jumps the bidding (this last item covers the gamut of preemptive bids and fit-showing bids -- because they tell partner so much information in one bid, he/she is now in a much better position to make a penalty double -- note however that a subsequent double by jumper is not typically 100% penalty).
3. If we pass over a suit bid on our right in a competitive auction and subsequently double that same suit, thus exposing the pass as a trap;
4. If their side does any of the first four of the above actions (they can jump all they want, it's only when we jump that penalty doubles are turned on).

For more background and discussion please see my earlier post: Double!

Postscript:

The above was published April 9th 2010. It's now Oct 18th 2014 and much water has flowed under the bridge. The triggers (rules) mentioned above have not changed significantly since then, but there have been revisions. It is probably time to write up a new summary, especially rule 3 which essentially [should] cover[s] all of the exceptions. If you would like to read all of the relevant posts on this general subject, then follow this link: all DSIP posts.

DSIP when we know we have a fit

The question has recently come up: which is better when we know we have at least an eight-card fit?  Penalty doubles (as recommended by Robson-Segal and as generally played by most players) or two-way (DSIP) doubles?

You won't be surprised to hear that I believe two-way doubles are best, although generally I agree with everything that Robson-Segal say in their excellent book Partnership Bidding: the Contested Auction.  But rather than simply go on gut feel, I decided to put it to the (theoretical) test.  I developed a spreadsheet which examines the question in an objective manner (I hope).

The result is that DSIP is better by an average of about half an imp or so.  I'll try to show the pertinent results here:

Unfortunately, Google Docs can't handle the spreadsheet but let me know if you'd like a copy.  Here's the basic idea:

• Scenario: Equal vulnerability. S (dealer) has a reasonably balanced hand with five spades and opens 1♠, N responds 2♠, E bids 3♣
• South's options are: pass, or double (penalty in R-S case, two-way in DSIP case);  minimum point counts are S: 12, N: 6.
• North may or may not have four spades.  His options are pass or double (same as South).

There are several observations to make.  Firstly, we all agree that when a 9-card fit is known, doubles should be for penalty (9-card fits are frequently diagnosed with an initial jump, otherwise if a two-way double occurs, then the partner with extra length will go back to the known fit suit, and thereafter doubles will be for penalty).

Secondly, if either North or South had a distributional hand, there would be no problem (especially if the partnership is playing good-bad 2NT).

Thirdly, these doubles are not game tries per se (although the "maximal" double would be a game try if RHO had bid 3♥).  The primary purpose of these doubles is to compete, despite not having a distributional hand.  Nevertheless, since they show extras, they will result in a game being bid sometimes.  In the spreadsheet, this occurs once, where N/S are both short in clubs and both have extras.

The essential premise of the DSIP method is that you can compete or penalize when either player has both extras and shortness in the enemy suit.  I have defined extras as having a Queen over the minimum.  Shortness is typically a small doubleton.  When playing penalty doubles, either player has to have both extras and a "stack" in the enemy suit.  The player sitting over the length might be able to make a penalty double with a stack but no extras but the player under the length may not feel comfortable doubling even with extras.  In three cases (two where North makes a penalty double and one where he passes his partner's two-way double) I have adjusted for this by saying that half the time he will do something else that is not so lucrative.

Finally, an example (a minor modification of a hand from last night's IMP game).  Vulnerable vs not, you pick up in fourth seat:  ♠AQ42 ♥AQ543 ♦K8 ♣62.  After three passes, you open 1♥ and partner bids 2♥.  RHO now comes in with 3 ♣.  You have shortness in clubs, a K extra and so you double.  You weren't thinking of bidding 3♠, were you?  Partner has made a slightly conservative raise with ♠JT9 ♥JT76 ♦AQ97 ♣Q9.  Still, he has a full 8 count outside clubs (and it looks like the opponents have a 9-card fit) so he bids 4♥.  This is good for 3.86 imps.

What it comes down to is this: which is the more likely holding in the enemy suit?  Shortness or a stack?

More about doubles

If you're new to this blog or didn't see yesterday's article, take a look at Double! before you read this one.

I mentioned yesterday that "three strikes you're out" is one of the penalty double triggers.  Actually, just like in baseball, where not all strikes are counted (it's OK to foul the ball when you have two strikes against you, thus prolonging some games to interminable lengths), the rule could be restated as: the second double of our partnership is always penalty, except that pure takeout doubles don't count towards the total.

Here's a better way to think about it.  It's logical that there should only be one bidding box per partnership, right?  You can never rebid a previously used bid (unless your LHO is asleep) so we don't really need four copies of every bid.  In fact, strictly speaking, we really only need one bidding box per table.  But I digress...

Imagine that between you and partner you have one light green colored double card, one amber (orange) double card, and several red double cards.  The light-green card is for pure takeout doubles.  Light green, the color of leaves in the early spring, suggests all is roses in the garden and all partner has to do is bid his/her suit and all will be well.  There's only one of these per auction.  The amber card is for cooperative (two-way, DSIP, card-showing, action, etc.) doubles.  This one says, careful, it might be better to pass than to bid a poor suit.  Again, there's only one.  The red card is the one we're familiar with.  The opponents are going down, possibly with lead-directing aspects to it.  There are lots of these.  The world record for penalty doubles, by the way, was set in the 1975 Bermuda Bowl between North America and Italy played, appropriately enough, in Bermuda.  Bobby Wolff opened 1♦ and Giorgio Belladonna made an off-shape takeout double (such tactics generally worked well for them).  Bob Hamman redoubled and Benito Garozzo bid 1♠.  Eventually, the Italians ended in 2♠X, down 3 which helped send 14 imps to the American camp.  There were seven rounds of bidding including seven doubles (six by the Hamman/Wolff) and two redoubles.  The squadra azurra went on to win of course as they usually did in that era.  But I digress still further...

Lest you think that I am suggesting a new kind of bidding box, with multi-colored double cards, please rest assured that the idea of the colors is for illustrative purposes only.

The point is that the sequence of our doubles in an auction can go takeout, cooperative, penalty, or it can go takeout, penalty, or it can go cooperative, penalty.  But there can be at most one takeout and at most one cooperative double.

Here are some possible continuations after W makes a takeout double:

• E passes for penalty: all following doubles are penalty;
• E makes a forced bid (over pass): W's subsequent double is cooperative;
• E makes a free bid (or jumps the bidding): W's subsequent double is penalty;
• E bids over a redouble: all following doubles are penalty.

You may be wondering what should happen after some other kind of double that isn't clearly a pure takeout double (i.e. a double of a natural bid when partner has only passed, or has not yet called).  Here's a summary of what should happen after such doubles (assuming no other penalty-triggering events have intervened):

• negative double: the next double should be cooperative;
• responsive doubles (this is essentially a cooperative double): all subsequent doubles are for penalty;
• conventional doubles (e.g. support, maximal, snapdragon, Rosenkranz, etc.): all subsequent doubles are for penalty [but this is a subject for partnership agreement – I'm just suggesting a simple rule, not necessarily the best rule];
• lead-directing doubles (these are essentially penalty doubles): all subsequent doubles are for penalty.

After partner makes a double that promises a single (unknown) suit, then an immediate double by you should be to enquire "which is your suit?".

You're probably saying to yourself "but that's how everyone plays!".  Well, it's true a number of experts do play this way (definitely not all), but unless you've really discussed it with your partner (or you actually are an expert), you really can't assume that he or she will be in tune with what you're doing.  Most experts, if shown a bidding sequence culminating in double, will, if there's any doubt in their minds, look at the level at which the double was made.  If it's a game contract (with the exception of an opening bid of 4 of a major, or 5 of a minor), then the double will be deemed penalty.  If below game, the expert will have to look more closely but will often consider it to be a balance-of-power (i.e. cooperative) double at the three-level if conditions are right, and will be inclined to see it as pure takeout at lower levels.  I'm generalizing a bit.  But the point is that the scheme described in these two articles is independent of the level of bidding.  That simplifies matters considerably.

OK, an example (more tomorrow):  World Pairs, 1998.  Berkowitz's hand:  ♠74 ♥KT32 ♦A94 ♣QT76.  Opponents are vulnerable.

LHO	Cohen	RHO	Berkowitz
p	1♦1	p	1♥
1♠	X2	3♠	X3
all pass

¹

11-15hcp, 2+ diamonds (i.e. nebulous precision opening)

²

support

³

cooperative (BOP)

Cohen/Berkowitz didn't feel that penalty doubles should be on immediately after a support double (I agree with them, but it's a partnership discussion issue). But nothing else had happened such as a jump by our side, or a notrump bid, etc.  So the final double was cooperative. 3♠X went down 2 (500) for a top. Cohen would not have been able to make a penalty double (assuming they would play it as penalties) because although he has something in spades, he didn't know whether Berkowitz had good defensive values or had strained to bid 1♥ with a distributional hand. Note that Berkowitz was prepared for a bid of 4♣ (Cohen might have had five of them) or for 4♦ thus showing a real diamond suit.  And he had the perfect holding for a cooperative double: two small, which would come in very useful if Cohen decided to pass, as he did.

Double!

Is there a call in all of bridge that is more prone to misuse, misunderstanding, mistakes, and several other misses?  4NT is possibly as dangerous, but it doesn't come up very often.

Yet, double is often the most flexible call and can be deadly (to the opponents) when playing with a partner who really understands its use, preferably your clone sitting across the table.  The reason why it can be so deadly is that as declarer, you rue the day you play a doubled contract with extra values on one side (usually your right) and a trump stack on the other side.  Sometimes when the stack and the extras are in the same hand you can throw that opponent in at some point to give up a trick or two.  But that won't happen when the assets are divided.

I've been working for years now on a simplification of the meaning of double which doesn't give up on juicy penalties and can be used on many hands, whatever the level of bidding. It's based on a concept that's been around for a while: Do Something Intelligent, Partner (DSIP).  The basic rules are summarized in a later blog entry DSIP rule summary.

Of course, no double is 100% takeout or 100% penalty.  A partner can take out his partner's penalty double if he has a long weak suit he hasn't mentioned, but this is a fairly rare occurrence, especially playing as above.  A traditional, low-level takeout double can be passed with sufficient length in the suit and playing strength, but again it's quite rare.

When I first started playing these kinds of doubles, we got into all kinds of trouble.  Eventually, I realized that the reason for that is that we were making DSIP doubles on hands which were too distributional and partner would pass when actually it was right to bid on.  Sometimes we did it with insufficient values when competiting in any way was wrong.  Thus, good judgment and extra values are required to make one of these DSIP doubles (and it helps to have an understanding partner too!).  You don't need extra values yourself if you know that your side has the balance of power (a BOP double is really just a special case of DSIP).  You do need a couple of cards in the enemy suit yourself though.  If you don't have those cards, there's almost surely another bid you can make (bid a new suit, support, or rebid your own suit).

Notice that the main difference between this system and "standard" bidding is that the level is not a direct factor in whether or not the double is cooperative or penalty.  Certainly, the level and the vulnerability affect whether you will make a double, but they don't affect the meaning.  But also note that our side's third double is always penalty (three strikes, you're out!).

One area that is somewhat vague is what to do after notrump is bid.  This is a matter for partnership discussion.  I like to play negative doubles after 1NT with all my partners (except when we open 10-12) at both the two- and three-levels.  So, when isn't 1NT "to play" by my definition?  When it's an opening, when it's a forcing 1NT, or when it doesn't promise specific cards.  So 1♥ p 1NT X is for takeout as normal.  But 1♥ 1♠ 1NT X is for penalty because the 1NT bidder has bid 1NT "to play", i.e. with specific stoppers in the enemy suit, and obviously we'd be raising spades if we had a fit.

I have lots of examples squirreled away for my upcoming book on this subject (might be a few years yet!) but here's a new example which occurred last night.  At the table, the double that I think was right didn't get made, but that's another story.

Playing 12-14 no trumps, matchpoints. Vulnerable vs. not. Your hand is ♠K3 ♥K7 ♦AJT87 ♣KQ98. The auction went as follows:

LHO	Ptnr	RHO	You
	p	p	1♦
3♥	3♠	4♥	?

What do you do now? Playing the system that I outlined above, double is the most flexible call and most likely to get us to our top spot of 6♣ (or 6♦).  At the table, the hand shown above bid 4♠ and the opponents pushed on to 5♥ at which point, this hand's partner made a cooperative double which this hand passed. We ended up with 500 which was a lot better than going down in 5♠ but obviously not as good as 1370. I honestly doubt whether we'd have reached the slam in any case, given the barrage of interference we suffered, but I hope you'll agree that the double here is the most flexible call assuming you and partner are on the same "page".

Note that, although we were at the four-level, where most partnerships would only have penalty doubles available, none of the trigger events that cause us to shift to penalty doubles had occurred. Neither of us had jumped, there were no earlier doubles, redoubles, cuebids, NT calls, etc. Every reason to continue playing doubles for takeout!

I will be adding more detail and examples in the next day or two: see More about doubles.