The Granovetter Principle

 I recently played in the NAOBC teams tournament (0-5000). We reached the quarter-final but, sadly, our luck ran out there.

Along the way, there were some interesting slam hands. This one was an exemplar for what I call the "Granovetter Principle." It's common sense, of course, but it was drilled into me on a similar hand by Pam Granovetter during an online bidding practice session.

Here is the hand on which, surprisingly, we gained 17 IMPs when my counterpart received a less favorable lead and went down in the same contract:

The essence of the principle is that, when you are in a control-bidding sequence, as soon as you know that slam is safe, bid it. Don't pass the buck to partner, however enthusiastic he may have seemed so far. Because, if he simply signs off in a game contract, you won't know what to do any more than you know now. In fact, you may think he's showing doubt and so pass, when all he's saying is that he has nothing more to say that you haven't already heard.

In this case, after Dan bid 5♣, I had an "obvious" 5♦ bid. But if I bid 5♦ and Dan bid 5♥, I wouldn't know any more than I already did. So, with Pam's advice swimming in my head, I just bid 6♥. 

Elementary, my dear reader.

A tale of three slams – or: better lucky than good

Like most bridge players, I love slams. They take some skill in bidding but are generally easy to play. Since the opponents will be on lead a maximum of twice (if all goes well), their options for complicating your plan are limited. If you are going down, it usually happens fast.

A recent 12-board robot tournament gave me three possible slam auctions! On the first board, I decided that partner's 2♣ call, when he wasn't obliged to bid at all, was worth a slam try. But how to go about it? I settled on the obvious: 4NT.



On the lead of ♠Q, the dummy that came down was a slight disappointment in terms of high card points. But fit-wise it's a magnificent dummy. Life would have been a lot easier on a diamond lead as there would have been 11 top tricks and some, admittedly remote, squeeze possibilities. But even now there were good chances – if I could bring the hearts in. If lefty had ♥Qxxx, I would have to get back to my hand twice after running the clubs so I kept the ♠A intact. Once RHO pitched two hearts on the clubs [discarding isn't the robots' strong suit], I was pretty sure I was making (even if he'd kept Qxx I'd have him, as it happens, in a red-suit squeeze after cashing the top spade). Perhaps cashing the ♠A earlier and tightening the position would have been better, I'm not sure.

Surprisingly perhaps, most of the other pairs were in slam and this was worth only 3 IMPs.

On board 3, I hadn't any thoughts of slam myself but apparently my 4♦ call showed a rather better hand than I had. Well, as they say in bridge, it's better to be lucky than good. The lead of the ♠A would have scuppered my contract right away. But, I had some possibilities in the heart suit which fortunately got me to twelve tricks.



This was worth 12.5 IMPs. There were plenty of other pairs in 6♦, but I was the only one to make it, despite all getting the ♣K lead.

The third slam was a relatively normal (and sane) contract and only produced a 6 IMP swing. Even so, there are two possible trump losers. I wonder what he would have done if I had been so incautious as to advance the ♦J?



Despite some significant losses on four other boards, I managed to finish with almost 29 IMPs, largely due to these three slams. That was good enough for first place.

A surprising outcome

Here's a curious hand that came up today playing in a Speedball on BBO with Barmar.

Let's say you pick up ♠J643 ♥985 ♦AQ4 ♣QT7 at matchpoints and favorable vulnerability. There are two passes to you. At this point, what odds would you give that your side can make slam? You probably wouldn't be willing to bet a lot on it. Yet it turned out so (although we didn't actually bid the slam – and neither did anyone else).



Some explanation of my initial pass is in order. No, I didn't decide to downgrade my hand. I was aiming for the 1♦ button when I discovered that I had registered a pass. It's a problem with the mouse on the Macbook – it sometimes has a mind of its own.

Fortunately, East gave me a chance to get back in by opening 1♣ in fourth seat (a questionable decision in my view). The tricky thing for me now was how to "catch up" without committing some terrible sin. I decided to start out just as I should have in the first round – with 1♦. Over 3♥, I felt that the time had come to show my spades. Barry would probably think I was 6-5 but so be it. The vulnerability was in our favor. Naturally, he decided to take the push to 4♠ over 4♥. I'm certainly glad he did. For one thing, they are only down one in 4♥ and we probably wouldn't be doubling. For another thing, I wouldn't have a story.

I managed to avoid any great blunders during the play and surprised all, not least myself, by making two overtricks. I was then slightly disappointed that I hadn't been doubled as +790 would have been worth 99%. Another declarer was doubled but only made one overtrick. As it was, we managed a nice 88%.

What's interesting about this unusual circumstance (well, not so very unusual on BBO where there are no undos) is that had I opened as I should, we would have found our spade fit immediately via a negative double. But advancing an overcall is rather different than responding to an opening, especially when the opening is in a minor. Is there really any chance we'd have found slam? Not on the evidence of the other tables in play.

You can imagine the chagrin of my poor RHO. All she had to do was pass the hand out for a 93% board (in fact, there was one pass-out). That decision represents a negative swing of 81%!

This was a big tournament with 102 pairs playing this board. This hand helped us score a 71% game for 5th overall.

Suit quality in slam bidding (part 2)

This is the second part of the topic: Suit quality in slam bidding (see part 1). We will go into a little more detail about the issues raised there. Our first example illustrates the danger of taking the strong route to a contract versus the weaker route. As always we must recognize that the more (forcing) bids you take to get to a bid that you could have reached via a shorter route, the stronger your hand. When two sequences are equal in their numbers of steps, the one which more precisely describes your hand is the weaker sequence because it limits the possible hands the bidder can hold.

You pick up this hand and hear partner open 1♥: ♠A75 ♥KJ5 ♦T9852 ♣A5. You already know what contract you are going to play in, unless partner has significant extras (and they will have to be quite significant). That pre-ordained contract is 4♥. What's the quickest (and most limiting) way to get there in 2/1? It's to start with a forcing 1NT (essentially just a relay bid to keep the auction alive) and then jump to 4♥ over partner's rebid. He will now know you have game-forcing values with three hearts and no slam aspirations of your own. Isn't that exactly what you have?

What will happen if you bid 2♦? Nothing bad will happen if partner rebids 3♣, 2♥, 2♠ or 2NT. Over all of those continuations, you will now jump to 4♥ (fast arrival). No damage done!

But what if partner actually likes diamonds. There are several ways the auction might continue and most of them are awkward. The simplest thing is partner bids 3♦ and you bid 4♥. You will probably get away with this because it's generally understood that a raise of your minor is overruled by a delayed major suit raise. It's a jump so it can't really be a control-showing bid. Additionally, we don't bid splinters in partner's suit so it can't be a splinter for diamonds.

What if partner gets excited and bids 4♣ or 3♠ (splinters in support of diamonds)? How will you recover from that? A bid of 4♥ now will be ambiguous at best. Is it a control-showing-bid in search of a diamond slam? Is it an attempt to sign off in 4♥ (in which case how is your hand different from the one above where you went through 1NT?).

Even worse is when 4♥ happens to be your key-card asking bid for a diamond slam. Now, it can get really ugly. Maybe the best thing here is to simply bid 5♦ (at teams) in the hopes of arriving quickly in the diamond game.

This sequence actually occurred at a regional earlier this year. Kim and I were playing a very pleasant match against the eventual winners of the KOs. At our table were Pamela and Matthew Granovetter. We knew we were somewhat behind (actually we were a lot behind but we didn't realize that at the time). I opened 1♥ with ♠QT8 ♥AT972 ♦AJ76 ♣8. After Kim bid 2♦ with the hand shown above, I took a very optimistic view of my hand. In retrospect, I was clearly trying for a "swing." So much so that I bid 4♣. Now, Kim continued with 4♥. Hmm! Was that "keycard" for diamonds (we play "kickback")? Or was it a sign-off in 4♥? Well, if it was the latter, at least we had a double fit. And, although we had never specifically discussed the principle described in this blog, Kim's hand should be better than a minimum game force and have a good suit. Maybe slam wouldn't be such a bad prospect. In these ambiguous circumstances, our rule is generally to keep bidding if we think the bid might be forcing. It's usually more fun to play a tough slam in a good fit rather than play game in a suit where there's no fit at all. The predictable result was down 2 in 6♦.

So, here is the relevant principle: avoid bidding a suit in a 2/1 auction that you would be unhappy to see as the trump suit, unless you have no choice. You have some safety if the suit you really like out-ranks the one you are bidding. But, as we've seen, even that has its possible snags. Another example situation might be when you hold the following hand: ♠AKQ92 ♥– ♦AQJ6 ♣8642. You open 1♠ and partner responds 2♥, game-forcing. You have sufficient strength to bid a minor at the three-level, but do you really want to suggest clubs as trumps? Here, you do have an alternative rebid: 3♦. You might miss a good 6♣ slam. But you might also stay out of a bad 6♣ slam when partner's support is only ♣KJ92 or something similar – a holding that partner will consider to be magnificent support.

I have also observed that many players will bid a bad four-card minor suit rather than a forcing 1NT. At least Kim's suit had five cards in it! While 1NT typically denies the ability to bid game in a different strain, it certainly does not deny a hand which can raise to game in opener's suit. But, since it is forcing, it could also be used for those rare hands that already know where they plan to play, five-of-a-minor for example.

I'm happy to be the "goat" in the story because I obviously overbid. But it got me thinking about this topic and I think I now understand the concept behind "Picture Bids". A picture bid is the 2/1 version of the principle of fast arrival. See for example a good discussion of this topic by Eric Rodwell. Although Eric doesn't put it this way, it seems logical to me – based on everything we've discussed here – that since responder could, with a minimum balanced hand, bid 1NT followed by a jump to game in partner's suit then a 2/1 followed by a game bid shows a different type of minimum. What type? Well, since responder doesn't have much enthusiasm for game, it suggests that he doesn't have much in the way of values, certainly not controls, in the other suits. He's basically saying that I don't think we have slam unless a) you have significant extras of your own or b) we have a good double fit and you, opener, have control of the other suits.

Here's an amusing – for my partner and me – result from a recent club appreciation game. My hand was  ♠AKT8762 ♥A3 ♦84 ♣KT and I opened 1♠ in second position at unfavorable vulnerability. Partner bid 2♦ with ♠QJ ♥K75 ♦Q9763 ♣AQ3 and I jump-rebid my spades. I don't recall for sure what happened next but I think partner raised to 4♠. We ended up in 6♠. I was not concerned about needing a control in diamonds because my partner had bid this suit as a 2/1 bid and then supported my spades. This time, however, we got lucky. The DA was singleton and the slam is cold.

Admittedly, this is a tricky hand. With 14 hcp, the hand does seem a bit too good to make a forcing 1NT followed by 3NT. But if I had to come down on one side or the other, I would take the low road, starting with 1NT, simply because of the quality of the diamond suit.

Suit quality in slam bidding (part 1)

This is the fourth contribution of what I now realize has become a series on slam bidding. I wrote the first one three years ago: Slam Tries. Since then, there have been two more: When to bid a slam and When to bid an NT slam. And while I note that Marty Bergen, Mike Lawrence, Eddie Kantar et al have written volumes on the subject, they have not covered the stuff that I am presenting in these short articles. This topic, however, has become so long that I am going to offer it in two parts.

One of the great things about playing "Two-over-one" is that responder to an opening bid in a major is able to distinguish between those hands he expects to play in game only and other hands where he would like to suggest a slam. Of course, opener might have slam ambitions even when responder wants to stop in game. And, before I get started, let me say up front that my ideas here are controversial but, I hope, compelling.

So, let's start by looking at the types of hand an un-passed responder might hold opposite an opening bid of 1♠ where he has fewer than four cards in spades:

1. a weak hand that is not worth any response;
2. an intermediate-strength hand that cannot force to game:
1. a minimum responding hand:
1. with three spades (this hand will immediately raise to 2♠);
2. with two spades (or perhaps a really bad flat hand with three spades);
3. with fewer spades (this hand will have to exercise some judgment at rebid time);
2. an invitational hand;
3. a hand which expects to play in game but has no slam ambitions opposite a non-jump rebid:
1. responder knows where the hand will likely play (4♠ or 3NT typically);
2. responder does not yet know where the hand will play;
4. a hand that will at least make game:
1. with support for partner – and may be worth a slam;
2. without support for partner.

Clearly, hand type 1 will pass and all hands of type 2 (except for 2.1.1) will bid 1NT forcing. All of the other hands will start with a 2/1 bid, right? Wrong. I will allow that the standard 2/1 texts do not address this issue at all – all of them, as far as I can tell, limit the 1NT forcing response to 11 or at most 12 hcp – however, there would be little point in me regurgitating the standard dogma here.

Types 4 and type 3.2 will start with a 2/1 bid. But type 3.1 should start with 1NT forcing! That's why it's forcing! We won't miss game. It doesn't deny game-forcing values. It only denies a desire to play in a slam or to find the best game. Responder will clarify his hand at his next turn. I first wrote about this principle almost two years ago: The Forcing 1NT.

Let's say that opener bids 1♠ and responder bids 1NT. So far, we've ruled out hands of types 1, 4 and 3.2. Now, let's suppose opener rebids two of a new suit. Responder's rebids will now make it clear what type of hand he has:

• 2♠ (type 2.1.2)
• something else (type 2.1.3)
• 3♠ or 2NT (type 2.2)
• 4♠ or 3NT (type 3.1)

Now, let's look at the sequences that start with, let's say, 1♠ – 2♣. Suppose opener rebids 2♦, 2♥ or 2♠, 2NT or 3♣ (the most common rebids). Here are the possible rebids by responder:

• 2♠ (if available), 3♠ or 4♠ (various types of 4.1 – different partnerships might place different interpretations on these three possible ways of supporting opener's suit);
• anything else (types 3.2 or 4.2).

In the first of these, responder is making a slam try! Why make a 2/1 bid and then support partner if you didn't want to at least mildly suggest slam? You could have responded 1NT and then jumped to game (or even jumped straight to game as Precision players sometimes do) with no slam interest at all.

In the latter case (anything else), we cannot be sure where responder is heading. If responder rebids his own suit, he's interested in game or slam in his suit. We don't know which yet, but if we don't support his suit next, he's likely to give up on slam unless he has a very good hand. Incidentally, this raises the issue of whether the partnership plays strong jump shifts because if they do, then certain hand types are eliminated from a normal 2/1. However, since many 2/1 players don't see the need for SJSs, I am assuming for now that we are not playing them.

But for now, we should simply assume that the first order of business is to find a playable game, in keeping with the well-accepted principle "game before slam." Thus, we will group 3.2 and 4.2 type hands as one for now.

So, what's the point of all this? The difference between hand types 3.1 and 4.1 is ambition. Game versus slam. Now, would you seriously be suggesting slam in partner's suit if you couldn't control your own suit? Ay, there's the rub. By the process of deduction then, if responder makes a 2/1 bid and next supports partner, his suit will be a good one. Opener has a right to expect at least the A or K of the suit. This follows from the obvious inference that responder can hardly expect opener to control this suit.

And further, suppose you have a 4.2 type hand (no support for opener). You will be most pleased when opener supports your suit at his next turn suggesting honor-third or perhaps four small. When this happens you're likely to find yourself as declarer at the six level. How happy would you be if your suit was Qxxxx opposite Kxx? The answer is: not ecstatic – you will have to find one player with exactly Ax.

Let's look at an example of how not to bid – courtesy of my Robot partner in a recent BBO tournament:



Don't concern yourself too much with the play. I misclicked at trick 2 (I have a new trigger-happy mouse) but the damage was done during the auction – 6♠ is unmake-able!

The robot North has a minimum game-going hand with no apparent fit. I would argue that starting with 2♦ is overly optimistic with such a moderate diamond suit. After my "high reverse" of 3♣ made, admittedly on moderate "extras," my robot partner chose what is, I believe, an absolute no-no in 2/1 bidding: he showed three-card support for spades with his 3♠ call. Although I knew we were missing the ♠Q, I believed us to be in a 9 card fit with all five "key" cards, so I bid the slam.

It's better in this case to start with 1NT forcing and to see what happens next. If opener rebids clubs, then responder can confidently jump to 3NT. If opener rebids spades (promising six), then 4♠ looks right. Only red suit rebids would cause problems because we will not then be in a game-forcing situation. Do we jump to 4♥ (likely a Moyesian fit) or 5♦ (perhaps with only an eight-card fit) as appropriate? I think responder should simply bid game only unless opener makes a jump rebid, in which case responder will certainly be thinking about a slam. Poorly fitting hands are never easy to bid, regardless of system. But rest assured that the partnership will not be missing a game contract if there is one.

Not every hand is suitable for a 1NT pre-game force. You must be able to handle all of opener's rebids. Otherwise, you will have to start with a 2/1.

In the next part of this topic (coming soon), I will discuss "picture bids" and fast arrival with more example hands. As always comments are welcome.

Maine bridge

Occasionally, Kim and I are able to attend one of the Maine sectionals. For those of you who never play bridge far from a metropolitan area, you should give this kind of thing a try. The players are invariably friendly and over the years we have come to know many of them. The food is good and people are just, well, nice. And there's always a big welcome from Horace and Sonya who put on the tournaments. This weekend's tournament was in Bangor, about an hour's drive from Kim's mother's house.

This occasion was saddened by last week's death at 88 of Kim's aunt Helen, formerly a regular bridge player who sometimes played in the sectionals but mostly played in the non-sanctioned club game in Fairfield. Helen was more of a poker player than bridge player, though. She loved to go to Las Vegas whenever she got the chance, which was quite often. Invariably at these Maine tournaments, several people would ask after Aunt Helen when she wasn't there. She was a lot of fun to be around and we'll miss her a lot.

On Saturday, the cards were very much with us. It helps to be in control of the auction on a lot of hands. And, in particular, there were many opportunities for slam bidding in our direction and, because we are fairly regular partners and play quite a lot of gadgets, we usually do well in such circumstances. Of the 53 boards we played, we bid six slams and one was bid against us. We also missed a lay-down 6♠ on 23 hcp, but so did everyone else. It's true that one of our slams (6♦) didn't fare so well (down 2 for -100) but, as it turned out, 5♥ was always making the other way so we ended up with almost a top board. I will return to this board later.

Kim was also a demon, nay ruthless, defender, with the result that in the afternoon we went plus on 19 of 27 boards ending up with a personal best score of 74%.

Here's a slam from the evening session where our agreements were severely put to the test and, fortunately, were up to snuff.

Kim opened 1♦ as dealer (board one – none vulnerable) and RHO bid 1♠. My hand: ♠94 ♥J5 ♦AJT52 ♣KJ85. Although I dislike making a cue bid with two losers in the enemy suit, I chose to bid 2♠. LHO now bid 3♠. Kim bid 4♣ which, since she was going past 3♦ (our guaranteed contract in this auction) showed extras and, since it also bypassed 3NT (which I might have been able to call from my side if she had doubled), suggested at least a healthy interest in a slam. With nothing obvious to cue-bid, I had to mark time with a 4♦ call. Admittedly, I was minimum for my bidding so far, but my hand had improved significantly with the double fit and I had little wastage (the ♥J). 4♦ was forcing of course, because Kim would not suggest playing in slam and then pass in a part-score bid. I considered 5♣ but I try to make it a rule never to cue-bid a king if I'm not going to be the declarer – it's much too easy for LHO to double for a club lead, holding AQ or something else good in clubs.

Kim now made the key call of the auction: 4NT. I admit that it took me quite a little while to interpret this, although we've discussed it many times in the past. Since 4♥ would have been asking for key-cards (we play "Kickback"), 4NT now does duty as showing a heart control. Knowing Kim as well as I do, she couldn't possibly be still thinking about slam if she didn't have both clubs and spades controlled. But she still didn't have quite enough to be sure twelve tricks would be there (indeed, slam can't make in our other nine-card fit, clubs). So, with my surfeit of working cards, I was able to confidently bid 6♦. Twelve tricks were easy on any lead, but we were the only pair of 13 to bid the slam. Kim's hand: ♠7 ♥A92 ♦KQ43 ♣AQ732. Note that our opponents could have bid a quasi-profitable sacrifice in 6♠ for a loss of 500 instead of 920. But in that field, they'd have scored the same zero.

Here's an amusing auction from the evening session: 4♣¹ p 4♦² p 4♠³ p 4NT⁴ p 5♦⁵ p 6NT all pass. (1) "Namyats" showing a good hand with eight or more hearts (could be seven if solid) with typically an ace or a couple of kings on the side; (2) I think we probably have a slam; (3) I have the ace of spades; (4) how many key cards (for hearts) do you have altogether? (5) three. 6NT made exactly (on any lead) for a top shared with one other pair. Why do I think it amusing? Despite us having 11 hearts between us, neither of us ever put a heart bid on the table.

I think our only mix-up of the day was the slam that went down but which turned out to be an excellent sacrifice (mentioned above). With nobody vulnerable, I dealt myself ♠AT7 ♥4 ♦KJ873 ♣QJ63, and opened 1♦. LHO overcalled 2♥. Partner bid 3♥ and RHO bid 4♥. Since 3♥ took us past 3♦, this was clearly game forcing. Whether or not it was forcing all the way to five of a minor is not entirely clear. First, let's think about the calls that partner did not make: double which, if followed by a new suit, would be game-forcing; 2♠ which would be non-forcing (as would 3♣); 3♦ (simply competitive); 3♠ or 4♣ which would be fit-showing jumps showing a good fit with a good suit; 4♥ which would be a splinter raise of diamonds.

As with most cue-bids, there are several possible meanings for 3♥:

• Partner, please bid 3NT if you have the hearts well stopped;
• I have a diamond fit and am willing to play 4♦ opposite a flat minimum;
• I have a very strong hand and right now, I'm not quite sure where we should end up so please tell me more about your hand.

After the 4♥ bid on my right, I reasoned that we were now forced to play at least at the five-level. Therefore, I felt that an immediate bid of 5♣ would show the weakest possible hand, offering clubs as a second place to play and fulfilling the third interpretation of the 3♥ call. That is therefore what I bid. 

Kim assumed that this meant I had extras (I could have passed) and so bid 6♦. No double was forthcoming (we had confidently bid this with no suggestion of sacrificing). The ♥K was led and dummy turned out to be ♠QJ3 ♥J ♦A6542 ♣KT74. After winning the first trick, LHO switched to a spade. But diamonds were 3-0 offside and I still had to lose a club for -100. As mentioned above, the opponents could make 5♥ (six if a club isn't led) and our blunder actually earned us 7 matchpoints out of 8. 

So, what's the proper treatment? I'm not sure. But I'm coming around to Kim's way of thinking for the following reasons:

• she might have wanted to play 4♠ all along but didn't want to jump straight to 4♠ because that would tend to shut out the possibility of a spade slam – still, I'm not sure about this because double followed by a spade bid would have had a similar meaning albeit perhaps with fewer spades;
• she might have wanted to bid 4NT which, I think, would be a slam try with a heart stopper all along (5NT would be pick-a-slam).

I therefore invite your comments on this subject of bids by the partner of a cue-bidder. 

However, on a day when the bridge gods are with you and you can do no wrong, even a mixup like this one can turn out to be rosy!

Swiss Gambit

The scene is a four-round club Swiss at the Newton Bridge Club with some strong teams in contention (five of the 24 teams had GLMs or Platinum LMs).  After a moderate start – we would naturally claim that we were deliberately holding back in the first match to effect the "Swiss Gambit" – we had a nice come-from-behind win.  Two of the pivotal boards were slams.

The first of these was basically as simple as choosing between two suits.  My hand was ♠ T83 ♥ K2 ♦ KQJ ♣ AQ654 and partner Len Aberbach opened the bidding: 1♠ – 2♣ – 3♣ – 3♠ – 4♥ – 4NT – 5♦ – 5♥ – 6♣.  2♣ was game-forcing and 5♦ showed 0 or 3 keycards.  Not countenancing the possibility of zero, I asked about the queen with 5♥.  6♣ showed both the ♠Q and the ♣K.  I now knew his hand to be AKQxx Ax xx Kxx plus one other card, presumably not a spade.  In clubs, it was probable, given the 3♣ call and our style, of a fourth card or perhaps a second honor.  So, at the risk of losing 2 imps, I chose what I thought was the most likely make and passed 6♣.

This turned out to be a good decision. A diamond was led to the ace and dummy came down with ♠ AKQ76 ♥ A75 ♦ 75 ♣ KJT.  Both black suits broke 4-1 but the solidity of the clubs meant there was no loser in trumps to go with the missing ace.  The spades, however, could only be brought in by twice running an intermediate card for a finesse, an unlikely play at the table.  They made 5♠ at the other table for a 12-imp gain.  Of course, it was lucky that I chose the right strain – it could easily have the been the wrong decision and I can't claim any great brilliance.

Much more credit is due however to our teammates.  My wife Kim Gilman – playing with Tony Wolf – later made a very fine bit of hand evaluation and followed it up with careful and accurate play for a nice 11-imp gain.  Kim's hand was ♠ J8632  ♥ K ♦ 4 ♣ AKT654.  Tony opened 1♥ and Kim decided not to make a game-forcing bid at first.  After the helpful diamond intervention and Tony's cooperative heart cuebid, they ended up in 6♠.  This was the layout:


The first two tricks were diamonds, Kim ruffing the second trick.  She then took two rounds of trumps with the A and K, seeing that South showed out.  A club back to hand (dropping the Q) was followed by a second club and a club ruff.  A low heart to the K was followed by another club ruff.  Now all depended on getting back successfully to hand without promoting North's trump ten.  Leaving the ♥A stranded in dummy (there were no losers to throw on it), Kim was able to ruff with the 8, draw the last trump and her hand was good.  Note that the ♥A is a chimera – see what would happen if it was cashed before trying to get back to hand!  At our table, West was in 4♠ and no great care was required to make the hand (as I recall, the ♥A was in fact cashed), and they ended up making just the one overtrick.

Our gambit apparently paid off because we never did meet any of the strongest teams.  We were in fact nicely poised after three rounds in third place ready to overtake the two tough teams ahead of us.  Sometimes it's better to be lucky than good!

When to bid NT slams

This blog is an extension of my earlier entry Somehow we Landed in 6NT, inspired by David Bird's excellent book of that name.  That article reflected on the decision to bid a notrump slam rather than a suit slam.  I've now distilled my thinking into a set of simple rules:

• if it's IMP scoring, play in your best suit;
• if you're bidding a grand slam, play in your best suit;
• if your best suit is a minor, play in it;
• if you know you have a 4-4 fit, play in your suit;
• if you have fewer than, say, 30 hcp, play in your best suit.

If you're still with us, bid notrump, assuming of course that you have stopper(s) in their suit which will be protected from the opening lead.  There, it couldn't get much simpler than that!

Of course, there are always exceptions, such as you can count 13 top tricks, or you have a long running suit, but generally I think these are good guidelines.  See the previous article for more explanation of why these rules are suggested.  But the general idea is that, at matchpoints, you want to earn that extra 10 points provided that you expect to take the same total number of tricks and you expect most of the other pairs to be in the same contract.

Happy slamming!

The Forcing 1NT

I have a friend and occasional partner for whom the 1NT response to a major suit opening is unlimited and forcing even by a passed hand.  If asked we say 0-37 hcp.  That usually gets a laugh from the opponents.

But seriously, since the bid is forcing (at least by a non-passed hand for all 2/1 bidders), should it be unlimited?  I don't think so.  While it might at first sight appear arbitrary, I think that 2/1 responses should all be based on at least a healthy interest in seeking a slam while 1NT responses followed by game bids suggest no enthusiasm for slam unless opener has significant extras.  Other 1NT responses are obviously not interested in slam.  At best, they are invitational to game.  At worst they hope to find a safe haven at the two-level.

Let's assume that we have three-card support for partner's 1-of-a-major opening bid (any more and we would not be considering 1NT, and with less we'd still need to find our best strain).  Come what may, we're going to support his suit at our next turn.  If we start with 1NT, a jump to 3M will not be forcing to game (a "three-card limit raise").  If we start with a 2/1 bid, and then support partner's suit at the lowest level, that will be forcing to game with slam aspirations.  Another option is starting with a 2/1 and then jumping to game.  Some people play this simply as the principal of fast arrival (PFA) and others play it as a "picture bid" showing cards primarily in the two suits bid.

So, a forcing 1NT followed by a jump to game shows a hand with three-card support and either:

• a non-picture-bid hand (if you have the picture bid agreement mentioned above);
• a hand that is not interested in slam opposite a typical minimum opener (PFA).

Since I don't have the picture bid  agreement with any of my partners, that sequence shows the second type of hand.  Note that you can still have a pretty good hand and not want to initiate a slam try.  For example: ♠K74 ♥AJ87 ♦K86 ♣A96 or even ♠K74 ♥AQ87 ♦K86 ♣AJ96.  Much beyond that, say, ♠K74 ♥AQ87 ♦A86 ♣A96 and I think you'd want to pursue slam yourself if partner didn't beat you to it.  Of course, this will all depend on how bad your partner's opening 1M bids can be.  If partner is a really solid opener, you might initiate a slam try with any of the above hands.  As mentioned above, if your hand is good enough to initiate a slam try, you won't be starting with 1NT.

So, what should you bid with this hand ♠K74 ♥AJ87 ♦J86 ♣A96 when partner opens 1♠?  In my opinion, this is an absolutely automatic 1NT followed by 4♠, or even 3NT, (assuming partner makes a minimum rebid).  But not everyone agrees with me.

On a scale of 1 to 10, I would rate the possible responses as follows:

1. 1NT: 9
2. 3NT: 7
3. 2♣: 6
4. 2♥: 5
5. 2♦: 2
6. 2NT: 0

The only reason 1NT doesn't get a 10 is that it's possible that our best spot is 6NT with partner as declarer (given our pathetic diamond holding).  But that's unlikely.  I don't like 2♥ much because, even though we are going to support spades next, we should really have either a five-card suit or better hearts, say ♥AQxx.  2♣ is better in my opinion because, although holding only three cards, we do at least have the suit controlled.  2♦ might have some merit on the Hideous Hog principle of bidding the suit we don't want led (although partner is likely to be declarer on this hand).  2NT is simply awful because the Jacoby bid should always show four trumps and a hand that would be enthusiastic about slam if partner initiates a slam try.

Thanks to Steve for pointing out that 3NT, for those who play it as a 4x3 hand with 13-15, is almost a perfect bid here.  I generally don't play that so I didn't think of it.  The only fly in this particular ointment is that we do not have diamonds even half stopped.  Sure partner should have something, but on a bad day, partner might have only ♦Qx, they set up their diamonds then get in with the ♠A and cash for down 1.  Not too likely perhaps but possible.  He also feels that 1NT followed by 3NT should show a shapely hand, short in spades, that's actually improved by opener's rebid.  That seems sensible.

So, how did our hand turn out?  On this particular evening we were playing IMP pairs at the club and, as it transpired, we could do no wrong all evening.  Opener's hand (that's to say my hand) was ♠AQ632 ♥K ♦AQT3 ♣J82 and the auction went (opps silent): 1♠ – 2♥ – 3♦ – 3♠ – 4♦ – 4NT – 5♠ – 6♠.  3♦ (the so-called "high reverse") showed extras, as did 3♠.  4♦ showed a control in diamonds and slam interest (valuing the ♥K perhaps slightly higher than it truly deserved but expecting a decent five-card suit).  5♠ showed two key-cards with the spade Q.

I received a low heart lead and was able to wrap up 12 tricks without difficulty once the ♦K was discovered to be in its proper place (actually I'm supposed to make all the tricks because the ♥Q is doubleton) but this wasn't matchpoints.  A club lead (rather more obvious on the auction) would have been somewhat more awkward however as I would be required to unblock the ♦T, something I doubt I would have done, not knowing that the 9 was going to fall singleton.

So, I think we were both somewhat guilty of over-bidding resulting in a less-than 50% slam (I need the diamond K onside and the ability to keep finessing from dummy or a non-club lead).  If partner's response had been 1NT I think we'd have been able to rest more safely in game.  As it turned out, we'd still have won, but by a less impressive margin.

When to bid a slam

I often hear players saying something like "if it were IMPs, I'd bid the slam" or "if it were matchpoints, I'd bid it".  In fact, Marty Bergen's September column in the Bridge Bulletin quotes people saying the former sentiment.  This reasoning doesn't directly follow from the scoring table, but I think I can understand the logic behind it.  Let's do the math.

In theory at matchpoints, that's to say when you are playing against your peers, making any bid will be right if it gains 51% or more of the time and wrong if it gains in 49% or fewer cases.  If you make the bid and the resulting contract is on a pure finesse, then you'll break even in the long run.  Therefore, you want your slam to be better than 50% to be right.

At IMPs, again assuming you are playing against your peers, a slam is theoretically also a 50-50 proposition.  If you're right (bidding/not bidding as appropriate), you gain 11 imps not vulnerable and 13 imps vulnerable.  If you're wrong, you lose 11 or 13 imps respectively.

So there's no difference in the form of scoring as far as bidding slams, right?

Well, not quite.  If you're not playing against your peers (let's say you're a good player at a daytime bridge game), you may get a good board just by making 12 tricks when the others only gather 10 or 11 tricks.  You don't need to risk going down in slam under such circumstances.  Let's say you're contemplating bidding 6NT (no good fit having been found).  Weaker players are notoriously bad at taking all their tricks in notrump contracts, so just making 12 tricks is likely to get you 8 (or 9) out of 11 points.  That's a decent result.  Thus bidding the slam risks 8 to gain only 3.  The argument is weaker when there is a good major suit fit and lots of points because many pairs are likely to bid slam and if it's there, most will make 12 tricks.

What about at IMPs?  Going back to our hypothetical 6NT.  You will likely gain only 1 or, at most, 2 imps by your superior declarer play.  Not nearly so compelling.  Thus there's a little more incentive to actually bid the slam.  Even so, against weaker declarers, you are risking 11 (13) to gain only 10 (12).

And what about grand slams?  At matchpoints, we theoretically need the same 50% when playing against our peers.  But again, just taking 13 tricks may be good enough against weaker players.  Especially since some of those players won't even be in a small slam and so bidding and making 6 with an overtrick is likely to be a very good score, perhaps 10 out of 11.  In other words, you will be risking 10 mps to gain 1.  Not good odds!

The gain for bidding and making a grand at IMPs is essentially the same as for a small slam: 13 or 11 imps, depending on vulnerability.  However, the risks are greater.  If you're wrong (and the small slam is making), you are losing 17 or 14 imps depending on vulnerability.  Thus the probability you need is either 56.7% (vul) or 56% (n-v).  These are the figures when you are playing your peers.  The odds are even less in favor of bidding when you are playing a weaker team.  They might not even get to the small slam at the other table!

In this case, by stopping in six, you were already gaining 11 or 13 imps.  The extra grand slam bonus would amount to only a net gain of 3 or 4.  The risk is admittedly slightly less now: 11 or 13, as in the case where you were deciding on slam versus game.  So, playing the weaker team, you risk 11 (or 13) to gain 3 (or 4).  Now you need cards that give you a probability of at least 78.6% (n-v) or 76.5% (vul).  That's why you shouldn't bid a grand unless you can count 13 tricks.  And why the late great Barry Crane expressly forbade his teammates to bid grand slams. 

So, in conclusion, I suppose there are hands where, at the club, you'd bid a slam at IMPs where you wouldn't at MPs.  But at the Life Master Pairs (or equivalent), the small slam odds really are 50-50 at either form of scoring.

Staying with the program

One of the best and most memorable bits of bridge advice I've ever received came from my own dear wife, Kim.  At the time, I thought I was the one that was supposed to be doling out the advice, but that's another story.

"Stay with the program," was what she said.  I had wimped out in the run up to a slam (or possibly I passed a forcing bid, the details have been blissfully erased from my memory).  But I have never forgotten the advice.

Here's an example of what I mean.  Names have been omitted but my partner understands that he didn't stay with the program on this occasion!

His hand was ♠AK86 ♥Q8 ♦A98532 ♣7, red on white at matchpoints and LHO had dealt and passed.  I opened 1NT (12-14) and partner (with hand shown) bid 2♦ (game-forcing Stayman).  I rebid 2NT (no four-card major and no five-card minor).  Partner bid 3♦.  I now bid 3♥.  This bid implicitly accepts diamonds as the trump suit (unless of course we later elect to play in NT) and shows a heart control, and by extension some interest in slam.  It was at this point that partner dropped the ball and bid 3NT.  Either of 3♠ or 4♦ ("minorwood") would have got us to the lay-down 6♦.  Instead, we languished in a contract that was destined to go down 1.  However, I was so discombobulated at missing the slam that I forgot I wasn't even in a ♦ contract at all and so "cross-ruffed" my way to down 3.

The moral of the story is this.  If you make a bid that invites a slam (or game) and then partner makes a forward-going bid, even if his hand is limited, it's your duty to cooperate.  You cannot wimp out.  In other words...

Stay with the program!

Slam tries

The Granovetters' column in the Dec 2009 issue of the Bridge bulletin affords a perfect illustration of the way I like to play control-showing slam try sequences – i.e. not the way Pam's partner did it.

Here's the hand:

	♠ J62 ♥ AKT4 ♦ J3 ♣ KT86
♠ T98 ♥ Q973 ♦ T976 ♣ J2		♠ K7 ♥ J65 ♦ Q852 ♣ 9754
	♠ AQ543 ♥ 82 ♦ AK4 ♣ AQ3

The auction went as follows:

West	North	East	South
	1♣	p	1♠
p	1NT	p	2♦ 1
p	2♥	p	2NT
p	3♠	p	4♣ 2
p	?

1) game-forcing checkback
2) control-showing slam try

What would you bid with the North hand?  Pam, who was playing South, was bemoaning the fact that her partner did not bid 4♥ in response to her own 4♣ call – and she is totally right to complain!

There are two rational methods of searching for a good slam.  One method, generally favored by experts, is the so-called "serious 3NT".  After a three-level bid, and when a major suit has been agreed, a bid of 3NT says "I'm seriously interested in slam, please show a control".  Making a different control-showing slam try says "I'm somewhat interested in slam, please show a control, but only if you are now seriously interested".

The other method, which doesn't require so much memory work and uses less of a distinction between major and minor suits, is as follows:

When the first control-showing slam try (cuebid) is made, the response depends on whether responder has already narrowly limited his hand.  If he has so limited it, then he is required to show a control (the cuebidder already knows responder's hand strength and still wants to know about controls).  If he has not narrowly limited his hand, then showing a control implies enthusiasm for slam while signing off in the trump suit denies a suitable slam for hand, but doesn't deny a showable control.  A second cuebid by asker now demands responder to show a control.

Unfortunately for Pam, they were apparently playing neither of these schemes.  North thought that he had a "bad" hand and therefore should not show any enthusiasm for slam.  But he'd already said he had a balanced 12-14 and South knew that.  Within the context of a 12-14 point hand and the auction so far, North has a terrific hand.  The ♥AK are golden (South hasn't shown shortness in hearts) as is the ♠J. Only the ♦J is of dubious value. We assume that the ♣K is useful because partner has cuebid the A and since it's in the suit we opened and partner has shown interested in slam, it's extremely unlikely that he is showing shortness.

So, somewhat unusually, I'm totally in agreement with Pam this time.  I don't buy the argument that the strong hand (South) should make another effort beyond the safe haven of the spade game.