Last time, I suggested that in a competitive auction, winning the declaration is the top priority, followed by trying for the right game. However, I didn't really justify that position, tacitly assuming that it was self-evident. Still, it wouldn't hurt to go over an example.
Nobody is vulnerable at teams. Let's say that partner opens 1♣, RHO overcalls 1
♥ and you bid 1♠ showing five spades holding ♠KQJT7
♥9
♦Q9754 ♣97. LHO ups the ante to 2
♥ and there are two passes to you. I hope you're not thinking of passing! Whether or not you play support doubles here (I don't), it seems that partner has fewer than three spades.
Given that we have at least half the high cards in the deck, our side has a right to compete (conceivably we might have only 19 but the exact number of high-card points really doesn't matter providing it's in the vicinity of 20). Let's just take as a working assumption that they can make 2
♥ while we can make 2♠, 3♣ or 3
♦. That's 17 total tricks which is typical. And, for a further assumption, let's assume that the other table has played it in 3♠ down 1. Right now, we are pegged for a 2-imp loss.
The problem is how exactly should we compete? One possibility is double. Nobody would play this for penalties, I trust! The opponents have a fit and they are going to be playing it at the two-level. I would certainly choose double with this hand: ♠KJT73
♥95
♦Q974 ♣K7. Such a double suggests a doubleton in the enemy suit (not guaranteed obviously), four cards in the unbid suit and tolerance for partner's suit. Let's say that we double and partner bids 3♣. We will pass, obviously, whatever RHO does. There's no way that we will be getting overboard on this hand. In our example, we are now headed for a 4-imp gain.
Now, let's go back to the first hand. Partner might have 2-3-3-5 shape, in which case, 3
♦ is probably our best spot. But partner will never bid 3
♦ over our double – we already know that he's going to bid 3♣. How about bidding 3
♦ instead of doubling? There's no guarantee that this will work of course but we have a reasonable shot of landing on our feet. With the 2-3-3-5 hand, partner will pass and we'll be in our best strain. Or will he? What if he thinks that 3
♦ is forcing, as many players would? He's going to ruin everything by bidding 3NT (or something even worse). If this gets doubled and things are not sitting well, we could easily end up losing 6 or 10 imps.
Do I hear a vote for Larry Cohen's Good/Bad 2NT? It might be OK if you play it in the pass-out seat like this. But why not simplify the whole thing by making 3
♦ non-forcing? Let's make all bidding after an opponent intervenes
non-forcing-constructive (not just advances of overcalls). Any time we wish to force partner to bid because we think we have game, we can cue-bid. If the cue-bid is no longer available, then new suits would be forcing. Alternatively, we might make 2NT the forcing bid (if available) which leaves a little more room for showing distribution.
Now we see why declaring should be our first priority. If we land in a making spot (3♣ or 3
♦ or even 2♠), we will be +4 on the board. If we end up in a making game, such as 3NT, we will be +10. So, we gain the first 6 by being able to bid without forcing and a further 6 if we can get to game. But we will
always get to our game if our hand is good enough and partner has a heart stopper or two
because 3♥ is available. In any case, the probability of us being able to
make a game, given that both opponents are bidding constructively, is probably only about half the probability that pertains when we alone are in a constructive auction.
It's really more likely that we can only make a part-score. Note that I'm not talking about situations where the opponents are preemptively taking away our bidding room with their fit. In those situations, it's actually
more likely that we can make game or even slam. In such cases however, the 3-level cue-bid will never be available and we will have to rely more on bridge judgment.
Here's a real-life example: you pick up this hand at pairs (at favorable vulnerability): ♠KQJT7
♥9
♦Q9754 ♣97. Partner deals and opens 1♣ and after pass from righty, we bid 1♠. Lefty now enters with 2
♥ after which there are two passes. We are playing support doubles so we know that partner has fewer than three spades. But we know little about partner's strength. This is admittedly one of the disadvantages of Eric Rodwell's convention. Especially at this vulnerability, partner might be making what he hopes is a trap pass, with a fistful of hearts.
This is a similar situation to the one we started with. Again, with a slightly better, more balanced hand, I would reopen with a double. ♠KJT73
♥95
♦Q974 ♣K7, for instance. Partner is now charged with doing something intelligent. And if he does decide to convert to penalties, his trumps will be well-placed and we will have the balance of power (if he opened light with xx AQx xx KJTxxx, he should probably take the double out to 3♣).
So, what to do? I took a deep breath and bid 3
♦, hoping that partner had better than a minimum club hand but also hoping that my bid wasn't forcing. Did it work out as I hoped? Not at all. Partner ruined everything by bidding 3NT and went three down for -150.
Par on the board was +110 for 2♠. Even -100 for 3♠X-1 would have been about average (and in fact several pairs our way made 3♠). Not very surprisingly, passing would have achieved almost as bad a score as our actual result. On a top of 15, -150 was worth 2.5, -100: 8, -50: 10, 100: 12, 110: 13, 140: 14.5.
My partner thought that with such good spades I should rebid 2♠ and presumably this was the action at several tables. All those pairs achieved at least an average board, some a top.
Notwithstanding that 2♠ might have worked well on this particular board, there are many cases where the quality of the spades would not be so good and the hand is more of a genuine two-suiter. For such hands I suggest that, when a cuebid is available below the level of 3NT, new suits in a competitive auction should not be forcing. Partner is expected to pass with a minimum (or give preference) otherwise do something sensible.
This is actually very consistent with the idea of playing "negative free bids," possibly the worst-named convention in the books. Whether acting directly over an overcall, where the one-level is still forcing and, by agreement, the top half of the three-level, or acting after the opponents have overcalled and raised, it seems prudent to agree that new suits are forcing
if they jumped.
I await your comments with interest.