If I were a bridge teacher, one of the lessons I would emphasize for my students is to avoid being hoist by their own petard. Before explaining exactly what I mean by this, let me digress a little.
A petard was an early form of small bomb or grenade. Its etymology is fascinating, as is Shakespeare's coining, in Hamlet, of the phrase that forms the title of this piece. You can read all about it on Wikipedia. The essence of these forms of ordnance is that they are used at relatively close quarters, unless you have a launcher, as in an RPG. But if you're going to use it on a nearby target, there are two essential steps: arm it; throw it. If you fail to do the first, nothing happens. If you fail to do the second, everything happens, but you will know nothing about it.
If you'll forgive a further digression, my father was in the Grenadier Guards, one of Britain's elite regiments, and spent most of World War II as a small arms and weapons instructor. They were doing live ammunition training when one of the recruits pulled the pin from the grenade and then froze. My dad had to grab it and chuck it or they both would have gone poof! And I wouldn't be here writing this. He got a mention-in-dispatches for that.
In my bridge analogy, the act of thinking about bidding a suit on the next (or later) round is pulling the pin. Throwing it is when, on the next round, you realize that if the suit wasn't good enough to bid before, it isn't good enough to bid now. Being hoist by one's own petard is bidding the suit later when you know it isn't a good idea, getting doubled and going for a number.
I discussed one example of this in one of my earliest blogs called Daytime Bridge. Here's another which happened the other evening in the instant matchpoint game. An opponent held ♠ J43 ♥ KQT62 ♦ T2 ♣ AJ8 and all were white. If RHO dealt and opened 1♣ or 1♦, you'd probably bid 1♥, right? I think so. Maybe not everyone would bid 1♥ but I think most would. What if RHO opened 1♠? You have to bid at the two-level now if you want to get your suit in and you have three quick losers in RHO's suit (the "death" holding). Against that, partner might have either a good hand, three hearts, or both! In fact, you could have a game! Nevertheless, to my mind, this is not even a close decision. I would pass every time. If partner has the right hand, he may well get a chance to do something.
Now, how about this scenario? Partner deals and passes, RHO passes and you "pull the pin" by thinking that you have a nice heart suit that you'd like to mention but you decide you don't have a good enough hand to bid 1♥. LHO bids 1♠, partner passes again and RHO bids a semi-forcing 1NT. Is there any incentive in the world that could make me bid 2♥ now? A gun to my head perhaps. Bidding 2♥ now is the military equivalent of forgetting to throw the damn grenade! If the hand was not good enough to bid in third seat and now, with the opponents advertising no fit, and partner showing nothing, how could it possibly be good enough to bid as an overcall at the two level?
The result was somewhat predictable. The spade bidder doubled with ♠ AKT962 ♥ J75 ♦ AK8 ♣ 5 and the 1NT bidder passed with ♥ Axx. The result was down 3 for -500. This score wasn't even mentioned among the instant matchpoints so was scored as 0/100. Maybe it would have been OK if the opponents were vulnerable. They do have a game, after all, either 3NT or 4♠. They can even make 6♦ from RHO's side (but only 4♦ from the other side). The point is that with no fit and only 24hcp, only one pair bid and made a game, so -500 was still going to be almost a bottom.
All the experts tell us that, if we're going to make an overcall or other tactical bid, get in and get out early. Preferably, before the opponents have had a chance to exchange useful information.
Is it the fault of the intermediate players when they make these bad overcalls? No, I strongly suspect the bridge teachers. I often hear beginning players use the expression "... only an overcall" as if the requirements for an overcall are so much less stringent than for an opening bid. They must be getting this notion from somewhere, and I'm sure it's not in any books. Of course many hands qualify for both and many qualify as neither. The difference is not just a question of strength: it's a question of suit quality, offensive orientation, preemption and several other factors. In many respects, the requirements to qualify as an overcall are a lot more exacting than they are for an opening bid!
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Thursday, September 16, 2010
When to bid a slam
I often hear players saying something like "if it were IMPs, I'd bid the slam" or "if it were matchpoints, I'd bid it". In fact, Marty Bergen's September column in the Bridge Bulletin quotes people saying the former sentiment. This reasoning doesn't directly follow from the scoring table, but I think I can understand the logic behind it. Let's do the math.
In theory at matchpoints, that's to say when you are playing against your peers, making any bid will be right if it gains 51% or more of the time and wrong if it gains in 49% or fewer cases. If you make the bid and the resulting contract is on a pure finesse, then you'll break even in the long run. Therefore, you want your slam to be better than 50% to be right.
At IMPs, again assuming you are playing against your peers, a slam is theoretically also a 50-50 proposition. If you're right (bidding/not bidding as appropriate), you gain 11 imps not vulnerable and 13 imps vulnerable. If you're wrong, you lose 11 or 13 imps respectively.
So there's no difference in the form of scoring as far as bidding slams, right?
Well, not quite. If you're not playing against your peers (let's say you're a good player at a daytime bridge game), you may get a good board just by making 12 tricks when the others only gather 10 or 11 tricks. You don't need to risk going down in slam under such circumstances. Let's say you're contemplating bidding 6NT (no good fit having been found). Weaker players are notoriously bad at taking all their tricks in notrump contracts, so just making 12 tricks is likely to get you 8 (or 9) out of 11 points. That's a decent result. Thus bidding the slam risks 8 to gain only 3. The argument is weaker when there is a good major suit fit and lots of points because many pairs are likely to bid slam and if it's there, most will make 12 tricks.
What about at IMPs? Going back to our hypothetical 6NT. You will likely gain only 1 or, at most, 2 imps by your superior declarer play. Not nearly so compelling. Thus there's a little more incentive to actually bid the slam. Even so, against weaker declarers, you are risking 11 (13) to gain only 10 (12).
And what about grand slams? At matchpoints, we theoretically need the same 50% when playing against our peers. But again, just taking 13 tricks may be good enough against weaker players. Especially since some of those players won't even be in a small slam and so bidding and making 6 with an overtrick is likely to be a very good score, perhaps 10 out of 11. In other words, you will be risking 10 mps to gain 1. Not good odds!
The gain for bidding and making a grand at IMPs is essentially the same as for a small slam: 13 or 11 imps, depending on vulnerability. However, the risks are greater. If you're wrong (and the small slam is making), you are losing 17 or 14 imps depending on vulnerability. Thus the probability you need is either 56.7% (vul) or 56% (n-v). These are the figures when you are playing your peers. The odds are even less in favor of bidding when you are playing a weaker team. They might not even get to the small slam at the other table!
In this case, by stopping in six, you were already gaining 11 or 13 imps. The extra grand slam bonus would amount to only a net gain of 3 or 4. The risk is admittedly slightly less now: 11 or 13, as in the case where you were deciding on slam versus game. So, playing the weaker team, you risk 11 (or 13) to gain 3 (or 4). Now you need cards that give you a probability of at least 78.6% (n-v) or 76.5% (vul). That's why you shouldn't bid a grand unless you can count 13 tricks. And why the late great Barry Crane expressly forbade his teammates to bid grand slams.
So, in conclusion, I suppose there are hands where, at the club, you'd bid a slam at IMPs where you wouldn't at MPs. But at the Life Master Pairs (or equivalent), the small slam odds really are 50-50 at either form of scoring.
In theory at matchpoints, that's to say when you are playing against your peers, making any bid will be right if it gains 51% or more of the time and wrong if it gains in 49% or fewer cases. If you make the bid and the resulting contract is on a pure finesse, then you'll break even in the long run. Therefore, you want your slam to be better than 50% to be right.
At IMPs, again assuming you are playing against your peers, a slam is theoretically also a 50-50 proposition. If you're right (bidding/not bidding as appropriate), you gain 11 imps not vulnerable and 13 imps vulnerable. If you're wrong, you lose 11 or 13 imps respectively.
So there's no difference in the form of scoring as far as bidding slams, right?
Well, not quite. If you're not playing against your peers (let's say you're a good player at a daytime bridge game), you may get a good board just by making 12 tricks when the others only gather 10 or 11 tricks. You don't need to risk going down in slam under such circumstances. Let's say you're contemplating bidding 6NT (no good fit having been found). Weaker players are notoriously bad at taking all their tricks in notrump contracts, so just making 12 tricks is likely to get you 8 (or 9) out of 11 points. That's a decent result. Thus bidding the slam risks 8 to gain only 3. The argument is weaker when there is a good major suit fit and lots of points because many pairs are likely to bid slam and if it's there, most will make 12 tricks.
What about at IMPs? Going back to our hypothetical 6NT. You will likely gain only 1 or, at most, 2 imps by your superior declarer play. Not nearly so compelling. Thus there's a little more incentive to actually bid the slam. Even so, against weaker declarers, you are risking 11 (13) to gain only 10 (12).
And what about grand slams? At matchpoints, we theoretically need the same 50% when playing against our peers. But again, just taking 13 tricks may be good enough against weaker players. Especially since some of those players won't even be in a small slam and so bidding and making 6 with an overtrick is likely to be a very good score, perhaps 10 out of 11. In other words, you will be risking 10 mps to gain 1. Not good odds!
The gain for bidding and making a grand at IMPs is essentially the same as for a small slam: 13 or 11 imps, depending on vulnerability. However, the risks are greater. If you're wrong (and the small slam is making), you are losing 17 or 14 imps depending on vulnerability. Thus the probability you need is either 56.7% (vul) or 56% (n-v). These are the figures when you are playing your peers. The odds are even less in favor of bidding when you are playing a weaker team. They might not even get to the small slam at the other table!
In this case, by stopping in six, you were already gaining 11 or 13 imps. The extra grand slam bonus would amount to only a net gain of 3 or 4. The risk is admittedly slightly less now: 11 or 13, as in the case where you were deciding on slam versus game. So, playing the weaker team, you risk 11 (or 13) to gain 3 (or 4). Now you need cards that give you a probability of at least 78.6% (n-v) or 76.5% (vul). That's why you shouldn't bid a grand unless you can count 13 tricks. And why the late great Barry Crane expressly forbade his teammates to bid grand slams.
So, in conclusion, I suppose there are hands where, at the club, you'd bid a slam at IMPs where you wouldn't at MPs. But at the Life Master Pairs (or equivalent), the small slam odds really are 50-50 at either form of scoring.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
The Principle of Least Commitment
Do you know all 656 of the suit combinations in the Bridge Encyclopedia? Neither do I. Can you always visualize exactly what's out against you and evaluate every line in terms of its percentage success rate? Neither can I.
So begins the article that I've been working on for several years which might eventually make it into some bridge magazine if I can ever perfect it. This is the current state of the article. It seems to me to be a valuable principle, as much so as the principle of restricted choice, to which it is related, for example. But I've never heard anyone mention anything like it. Am I missing something? Is it so blindingly obvious that I'm the only person to think it worth writing down?
I was reminded of it last night at the bridge club because there were two PLC transgressions at our table, at least that I noticed. Here's one: you are in a 3NT contract with 24 hcp and you have the following suit to play: AQT94 in dummy opposite 65 in the closed hand. You have the tempo and sufficient entries to both hands. How do you play the suit to maximum advantage? Well, you finesse the 9/T. If the K and J are split then you are simply guessing. If they're both guarded offside you're doomed to lose two tricks in the suit regardless. But here's the case where it matters: KJx on your left and xxx on your right. By finessing the T first, you pick up the entire suit. If you finesse the Q first, you must give up a trick. Least commitment. As it happened, KJxx was on the left so it didn't matter but the declarer didn't give himself quite the best chance.
Here was the second case: You're in 3S and your trump suit is 632 in the dummy and AQT874 in the closed hand. At first sight you might say, aha, just like last time, let's finesse the T first (as the actual declarer did, losing to Jx). But here there are only four cards out, as opposed to the six in the last example. You should expect to be finessing once only (not twice as before). This despite the fact that you have an extra card in the short hand with which to finesse. In "normal" layouts of the suit (2-2 or 3-1 splits), the cards T and below are essentially irrelevant here. Correct play is to take the obvious finesse of the Q which has a 27% chance of picking up the entire suit (essentially, you need the K onside and a 2-2 split or some other fortuitous event like singleton J offside).
In this case, there were three losers outside the trump suit. Our opponents had stopped in 3S where some might have been in game. Thus, there might be something to be said for taking the safety play for five tricks. However, as is often the case when we have no sequences of our own (here, they have none either), the "least commitment" strategy is to bang down the Ace (that takes no guesswork at all!). Now, you increase your chance of taking 5 tricks to 83%.
If you can offer any suggestions for my description of the PLC, I'd appreciate it.
So begins the article that I've been working on for several years which might eventually make it into some bridge magazine if I can ever perfect it. This is the current state of the article. It seems to me to be a valuable principle, as much so as the principle of restricted choice, to which it is related, for example. But I've never heard anyone mention anything like it. Am I missing something? Is it so blindingly obvious that I'm the only person to think it worth writing down?
I was reminded of it last night at the bridge club because there were two PLC transgressions at our table, at least that I noticed. Here's one: you are in a 3NT contract with 24 hcp and you have the following suit to play: AQT94 in dummy opposite 65 in the closed hand. You have the tempo and sufficient entries to both hands. How do you play the suit to maximum advantage? Well, you finesse the 9/T. If the K and J are split then you are simply guessing. If they're both guarded offside you're doomed to lose two tricks in the suit regardless. But here's the case where it matters: KJx on your left and xxx on your right. By finessing the T first, you pick up the entire suit. If you finesse the Q first, you must give up a trick. Least commitment. As it happened, KJxx was on the left so it didn't matter but the declarer didn't give himself quite the best chance.
Here was the second case: You're in 3S and your trump suit is 632 in the dummy and AQT874 in the closed hand. At first sight you might say, aha, just like last time, let's finesse the T first (as the actual declarer did, losing to Jx). But here there are only four cards out, as opposed to the six in the last example. You should expect to be finessing once only (not twice as before). This despite the fact that you have an extra card in the short hand with which to finesse. In "normal" layouts of the suit (2-2 or 3-1 splits), the cards T and below are essentially irrelevant here. Correct play is to take the obvious finesse of the Q which has a 27% chance of picking up the entire suit (essentially, you need the K onside and a 2-2 split or some other fortuitous event like singleton J offside).
In this case, there were three losers outside the trump suit. Our opponents had stopped in 3S where some might have been in game. Thus, there might be something to be said for taking the safety play for five tricks. However, as is often the case when we have no sequences of our own (here, they have none either), the "least commitment" strategy is to bang down the Ace (that takes no guesswork at all!). Now, you increase your chance of taking 5 tricks to 83%.
If you can offer any suggestions for my description of the PLC, I'd appreciate it.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
How likely is it that NT bid has three cards in my major?
Dave, a bridge friend of mine who lives in Colorado and works for the Rockies (I imagine him, like George on Seinfeld, discussing business strategy with the Rocky equivalent of the late Mr. Steinbrenner), recently posed me a bridge probabilities problem. Dave was interested in the likelihood of an opening notrump bidder having 2, 3, 4 or 5 cards in responder's major
In principle, it's a simple problem. Let's assume that we have five hearts and therefore, after counting partner's guaranteed doubleton, there are six hearts to be distributed among the three unseen hands. Naturally, I used a method based on the principle of Vacant Places and with the starting assumption that opener has only 5 vacant places (remember, he has two cards guaranteed in each suit) and that the unseen hands have 13 vacant places each. Still, because there are six hearts to "deal out", it quickly led to quite a bit of complexity (if you were to examine every case, there are 3^5 = 243 different ways to deal those cards). Since there were eight probabilities in total he was seeking (he was also interested in the situation where we have a six-card major), I decided that a little Java programming was in order.
The results are a little surprising perhaps: the most likely holding opposite is three, with a probability of 44% or so (almost 50%!), regardless of our own length. Another way of looking at it is that only roughly one third of the time will I be disappointed and find a doubleton in his hand opposite my own longish suit. I also added the figures for a four-card suit in responder's hand.
The following table shows the specific probabilities, always assuming of course that opener is "allowed" to open 1NT with a five card suit (but no longer), but is not allowed to open with any suit shorter than a doubleton:
So, now I'm well set up for doing any vacant-places calculations of any complexity. Comments welcome.
In principle, it's a simple problem. Let's assume that we have five hearts and therefore, after counting partner's guaranteed doubleton, there are six hearts to be distributed among the three unseen hands. Naturally, I used a method based on the principle of Vacant Places and with the starting assumption that opener has only 5 vacant places (remember, he has two cards guaranteed in each suit) and that the unseen hands have 13 vacant places each. Still, because there are six hearts to "deal out", it quickly led to quite a bit of complexity (if you were to examine every case, there are 3^5 = 243 different ways to deal those cards). Since there were eight probabilities in total he was seeking (he was also interested in the situation where we have a six-card major), I decided that a little Java programming was in order.
The results are a little surprising perhaps: the most likely holding opposite is three, with a probability of 44% or so (almost 50%!), regardless of our own length. Another way of looking at it is that only roughly one third of the time will I be disappointed and find a doubleton in his hand opposite my own longish suit. I also added the figures for a four-card suit in responder's hand.
The following table shows the specific probabilities, always assuming of course that opener is "allowed" to open 1NT with a five card suit (but no longer), but is not allowed to open with any suit shorter than a doubleton:
| Partner's length: | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| My length: | |||||
| 4 | 25.14% | 44.00% | 25.14% | 5.71% | |
| 5 | 31.34% | 44.77% | 20.35% | 3.54% | |
| 6 | 38.74% | 44.03% | 15.31% | 1.91% |
So, now I'm well set up for doing any vacant-places calculations of any complexity. Comments welcome.
Are there style points for going down in a hand slowly?
The answer to the question posed in the title is surely no. An exception might be made for running a squeeze or throw-in because these normally need to be performed late in the hand. If the throw-in or squeeze doesn't operate, you've usually lost nothing but at least gained some style points.
So why do I continue to try to delay a bad result simply by playing off winners? Here's a case in point. I held ♠3 ♥AK93 ♦AKT873 ♣A9 in an IMP pairs. A very nice hand by any yardstick. With opponents silent, the auction proceeded: 1♦, 1♠, 2♥, 3NT. Clearly 3NT showed enough values for game opposite a minimum reverse but otherwise a balanced hand with nothing more to say. I tried 4♦, partner bid 4♥ and I closed the proceedings with an ambitious 6♦. A club was led and dummy was reasonable, though not quite what I was hoping for: ♠AJ84 ♥J86 ♦Q6 ♣Q832. Still, he had the other Ace (not perhaps as useful as a King somewhere else) and the Q of trumps.
I tried the ♣Q without much confidence and it was covered by the K which I won with the A. Now what? The lead was very damaging. I might avoid a heart loser by leading low to the J and finding the Q on my left, but a club will be cashed immediately. What about trying for the ♥QT on my right? This is only a 24% shot and, needless to say, if one of the cards is wrong, my contract will go down in flames at trick 4 (after I've crossed to the ♦Q and run the ♥J).
Something in the back of my mind nagged at me that it was extremely ignominious to go down as early as trick 4 so guess what I did? I abandoned even my 24% shot and played for a miracle. I'm not exactly sure which miracle I was hoping for (♥QT doubleton or somebody pitching the J and T of clubs perhaps?). But suffice to say I went down with no style points whatsoever several tricks later.
As it happens of course, my execrable bidding was about to be rewarded with a very fortuitous lie of the cards, except that I didn't take the finesse at trick 3 and thereafter had only one entry to dummy (the ♠A).
So, why am I telling you this? Because just maybe I can get it into my thick skull that there's really no difference whether you go down at trick 4 or trick 13. Down is down! And a small chance is better than no chance.
So why do I continue to try to delay a bad result simply by playing off winners? Here's a case in point. I held ♠3 ♥AK93 ♦AKT873 ♣A9 in an IMP pairs. A very nice hand by any yardstick. With opponents silent, the auction proceeded: 1♦, 1♠, 2♥, 3NT. Clearly 3NT showed enough values for game opposite a minimum reverse but otherwise a balanced hand with nothing more to say. I tried 4♦, partner bid 4♥ and I closed the proceedings with an ambitious 6♦. A club was led and dummy was reasonable, though not quite what I was hoping for: ♠AJ84 ♥J86 ♦Q6 ♣Q832. Still, he had the other Ace (not perhaps as useful as a King somewhere else) and the Q of trumps.
I tried the ♣Q without much confidence and it was covered by the K which I won with the A. Now what? The lead was very damaging. I might avoid a heart loser by leading low to the J and finding the Q on my left, but a club will be cashed immediately. What about trying for the ♥QT on my right? This is only a 24% shot and, needless to say, if one of the cards is wrong, my contract will go down in flames at trick 4 (after I've crossed to the ♦Q and run the ♥J).
Something in the back of my mind nagged at me that it was extremely ignominious to go down as early as trick 4 so guess what I did? I abandoned even my 24% shot and played for a miracle. I'm not exactly sure which miracle I was hoping for (♥QT doubleton or somebody pitching the J and T of clubs perhaps?). But suffice to say I went down with no style points whatsoever several tricks later.
As it happens of course, my execrable bidding was about to be rewarded with a very fortuitous lie of the cards, except that I didn't take the finesse at trick 3 and thereafter had only one entry to dummy (the ♠A).
So, why am I telling you this? Because just maybe I can get it into my thick skull that there's really no difference whether you go down at trick 4 or trick 13. Down is down! And a small chance is better than no chance.
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
The week of the fit-showing jump
After having played fit-showing jumps with a few partners over the last six months to a year, I've been quite disappointed in how infrequently they come up. Certainly, they are brilliant when they occur, but they seldom arise in practice.
So, I was surprised when no fewer than five arose last week. All got us at least an average board and some did quite a bit better than that. They weren't all perfect specimens, but they were good enough.
So, in case you're wondering what is a fit-showing jump, I should refer you to Robson & Segal's excellent book: Partnership Bidding at Bridge: The Contested Auction. I was so impressed by a) the advantages conferred by this treatment and b) the fact that usually such bids have no other useful meaning, that I adopted the convention with every partner I could persuade or coerce into playing FSJs.
Here's my version of the basic idea: when our side has at about half the deck (or more) and a fit, we have various different ways of supporting partner: single raise, limit raise, delayed raise, Bergen raise, Jacoby 2NT, splinter, Soloway jump shifts, etc. etc. These are all wonderful ways to describe our hand and fit. There's just one snag: at least half the time the darn opponents are in there, muddying the waters. Many of these wonderful treatments are now off and we have to fall back on cue-bids, Truscott, simple raises, preemptive raises, etc.
It's well known that a double fit will often enable a side to take one (or more) additional tricks over what might be expected otherwise. Enter the FSJ.
Let's suppose we have a hand with a fit for partner which, opposite partner's minimum, we reasonably expect will allow our side to make a three-level contract. If, in addition, we have a good side suit, we show it by jumping in that suit. If the opponents continue to interfere, partner will be well-placed to know what to do. The bid is forcing to three-of-our-suit so we can use the bid with any strength. Either partner can continue the auction appropriately, showing either a minimum or extras.
Sometimes, the jump will actually be to the four-level and this will normally show greater values, especially if a jump to the three-level was available.
The reason that we limit the FSJ to hands with a good side suit is that partner will be basing his judgment (double, pass or bid on) based on knowing that all or most of our values will be in "our" two suits. If we were to make an FSJ with, say, an empty five-card side suit, partner will devalue his hand for offensive purposes with a singleton or void in that suit, when in fact, he will have a very offense-oriented holding. He may misjudge and double the opponents when we should be bidding on. So, the side suit must have values. Something like AQJxx would be perfect. Partner, looking at Kxx in that suit, or even Txx, will know that we have a great double fit.
So, what about a hand? I'm a little ashamed of this example. Partly because, my side suit wasn't that good, and partly because, seeing the complete layout, the opponents could have done much better than they did. Still, the FSJ does put pressure on the opponents and they don't have the benefit of knowing so well about any double fits.
So, here's the hand: ♠95 ♥QJ42 ♦QJT84 ♣J9. The opponents were vulnerable while we were not, and my LHO dealt and opened the bidding with 1♠. Partner overcalled 2♥. RHO doubled (negative). I bid 4♦, a fit-showing jump showing a heart fit and a good diamond suit [yes, the A instead of the 8 would have been better]. I wanted my partner to be able to judge what to do if the opponents bid 4♠ (or perhaps 5♣). In the event, neither of these things happened. Partner, holding ♠7642 ♥AKT73 ♦A6 ♣84, simply bid 4♥ and there it rested. We were -100 while the opponents could easily make 4♣ (the most popular contract) or 4♠. Yes, the opponents could have doubled us for 300 which would have been good for them as it happens, or outbid us to 4♠ which would have been a shared top, but they didn't do either of these things. Even if partner decides to bid on, on the basis of Ax in my side suit, we'd still be only -500 against a vulnerable game.
I didn't have a lot of high-card points, and some might criticize my bid because partner should expect more and might be tempted to double 4♠ on his hand. But I think that, at the vulnerability, a little slack needs to be given to the jumping partner.
Given that R&S devote about 200 pages to this subject, I obviously have not been able to give it the full treatment. Another great aspect of the method is that, when we don't have a good side suit, we can cue-bid or bid 2NT showing three or four card support, respectively. Knowing how good our fit is will be more help than nothing.
I'm still awaiting the perfect FSJ hand. But it shouldn't be long now!
So, I was surprised when no fewer than five arose last week. All got us at least an average board and some did quite a bit better than that. They weren't all perfect specimens, but they were good enough.
So, in case you're wondering what is a fit-showing jump, I should refer you to Robson & Segal's excellent book: Partnership Bidding at Bridge: The Contested Auction. I was so impressed by a) the advantages conferred by this treatment and b) the fact that usually such bids have no other useful meaning, that I adopted the convention with every partner I could persuade or coerce into playing FSJs.
Here's my version of the basic idea: when our side has at about half the deck (or more) and a fit, we have various different ways of supporting partner: single raise, limit raise, delayed raise, Bergen raise, Jacoby 2NT, splinter, Soloway jump shifts, etc. etc. These are all wonderful ways to describe our hand and fit. There's just one snag: at least half the time the darn opponents are in there, muddying the waters. Many of these wonderful treatments are now off and we have to fall back on cue-bids, Truscott, simple raises, preemptive raises, etc.
It's well known that a double fit will often enable a side to take one (or more) additional tricks over what might be expected otherwise. Enter the FSJ.
Let's suppose we have a hand with a fit for partner which, opposite partner's minimum, we reasonably expect will allow our side to make a three-level contract. If, in addition, we have a good side suit, we show it by jumping in that suit. If the opponents continue to interfere, partner will be well-placed to know what to do. The bid is forcing to three-of-our-suit so we can use the bid with any strength. Either partner can continue the auction appropriately, showing either a minimum or extras.
Sometimes, the jump will actually be to the four-level and this will normally show greater values, especially if a jump to the three-level was available.
The reason that we limit the FSJ to hands with a good side suit is that partner will be basing his judgment (double, pass or bid on) based on knowing that all or most of our values will be in "our" two suits. If we were to make an FSJ with, say, an empty five-card side suit, partner will devalue his hand for offensive purposes with a singleton or void in that suit, when in fact, he will have a very offense-oriented holding. He may misjudge and double the opponents when we should be bidding on. So, the side suit must have values. Something like AQJxx would be perfect. Partner, looking at Kxx in that suit, or even Txx, will know that we have a great double fit.
So, what about a hand? I'm a little ashamed of this example. Partly because, my side suit wasn't that good, and partly because, seeing the complete layout, the opponents could have done much better than they did. Still, the FSJ does put pressure on the opponents and they don't have the benefit of knowing so well about any double fits.
So, here's the hand: ♠95 ♥QJ42 ♦QJT84 ♣J9. The opponents were vulnerable while we were not, and my LHO dealt and opened the bidding with 1♠. Partner overcalled 2♥. RHO doubled (negative). I bid 4♦, a fit-showing jump showing a heart fit and a good diamond suit [yes, the A instead of the 8 would have been better]. I wanted my partner to be able to judge what to do if the opponents bid 4♠ (or perhaps 5♣). In the event, neither of these things happened. Partner, holding ♠7642 ♥AKT73 ♦A6 ♣84, simply bid 4♥ and there it rested. We were -100 while the opponents could easily make 4♣ (the most popular contract) or 4♠. Yes, the opponents could have doubled us for 300 which would have been good for them as it happens, or outbid us to 4♠ which would have been a shared top, but they didn't do either of these things. Even if partner decides to bid on, on the basis of Ax in my side suit, we'd still be only -500 against a vulnerable game.
I didn't have a lot of high-card points, and some might criticize my bid because partner should expect more and might be tempted to double 4♠ on his hand. But I think that, at the vulnerability, a little slack needs to be given to the jumping partner.
Given that R&S devote about 200 pages to this subject, I obviously have not been able to give it the full treatment. Another great aspect of the method is that, when we don't have a good side suit, we can cue-bid or bid 2NT showing three or four card support, respectively. Knowing how good our fit is will be more help than nothing.
I'm still awaiting the perfect FSJ hand. But it shouldn't be long now!
Friday, August 27, 2010
The (Doe) Rabbit visits the club (part III)
The conclusion of our exciting three-board sit-out after being bumped. This time, the South hand was ♠QT73 ♥A42 ♦KJT4 ♣53. LHO opened 1♣, RHO bid 1♠ whereupon LHO closed the auction with 3NT. My partner led ♦2 and dummy came down with ♠AJ842 ♥KT3 ♦763 ♣86. Declarer took my K with the A and proceeded to cash six clubs. On these, partner pitched three small hearts. Dummy pitched the remaining two diamonds, and the T3 of hearts. I pitched a spade, two hearts and my ♦J. Declarer then played the ♠K out of his hand, to which all followed small, then played the ♦8. I won with the T, cashed my ♥A, felling dummy's K then returned my ♦4 to partner's Q and 9. Partner then had to concede to declarer's ♥Q for his ninth trick. Although this was the par result, it turned out surprisingly well for us: 8 matchpoints out of 11.
My nemesis at the replay was apparently not content with a mere 8 match-points. No, she wanted them all! The play followed similar lines at first. On the clubs my counterpart, Ms Zia-Rabbit, nonchalantly pitched the ♠3, ♠7, followed by two hearts. Instead of conceding a diamond for the hoped-for throw-in this declarer went straight about the spades. K from hand, on which South played the T (and North the 6) followed by the ♠5 on which North played the 9. Never before have I witnessed such studied indifference on pitching the crucial two small spades. Declarer was taken in completely! He now took the "marked" finesse against the Q whereupon N/S took the rest of the tricks. Down 1 for all the match-points.
So was this mystery personage Zia in disguise? Or Ms. Rabbit with sticky fingers? I'll let you dwell on it a little. But remember this (form part I): this was daytime bridge!
Time to 'fess up.
This isn't how it happened at all. All of our brilliant defensive plays were by the South hand, but there was no sit-out and no kibitzing. In fact they were two-board rounds. And my partner and I didn't sit N/S, we sat E/W. Each of these remarkable defenses was achieved (perpetrated?) against us! And by three different Souths. Of course, this means that my descriptions of the play at "our" table were all completely bogus, but nonetheless reasonable.
One of the Souths was playing with an expert and they managed a little over 50%, the other two Souths garnered scores in the 43-49% range.
Ms. Rabbit or Ms. Zia? You be the judge.
My nemesis at the replay was apparently not content with a mere 8 match-points. No, she wanted them all! The play followed similar lines at first. On the clubs my counterpart, Ms Zia-Rabbit, nonchalantly pitched the ♠3, ♠7, followed by two hearts. Instead of conceding a diamond for the hoped-for throw-in this declarer went straight about the spades. K from hand, on which South played the T (and North the 6) followed by the ♠5 on which North played the 9. Never before have I witnessed such studied indifference on pitching the crucial two small spades. Declarer was taken in completely! He now took the "marked" finesse against the Q whereupon N/S took the rest of the tricks. Down 1 for all the match-points.
So was this mystery personage Zia in disguise? Or Ms. Rabbit with sticky fingers? I'll let you dwell on it a little. But remember this (form part I): this was daytime bridge!
Time to 'fess up.
This isn't how it happened at all. All of our brilliant defensive plays were by the South hand, but there was no sit-out and no kibitzing. In fact they were two-board rounds. And my partner and I didn't sit N/S, we sat E/W. Each of these remarkable defenses was achieved (perpetrated?) against us! And by three different Souths. Of course, this means that my descriptions of the play at "our" table were all completely bogus, but nonetheless reasonable.
One of the Souths was playing with an expert and they managed a little over 50%, the other two Souths garnered scores in the 43-49% range.
Ms. Rabbit or Ms. Zia? You be the judge.
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