The final problem

No, this isn't my final blog. I hope not anyway. But I would like to wrap up some loose ends on the subject of doubles. Devotees of Sherlock Holmes will of course recognize the title as that of one of the adventures.

First, I want to stress something about doubles which I haven't really emphasized before. Cooperative doubles are always a last resort. This comes from the definition that you have no other possible bid yet you have too much strength to pass.

I have mentioned previously the "three strikes you're out" rule which comes into play whenever our side makes a total of three doubles (see Three strikes - you're out). But there are other flavors of the three strikes rule. 

For example, suppose that I open 1♠, partner raises to 2♠ (with or without competition) and then later,  one of us bids 3♠. Each partner has clearly limited his hand, there's no doubt about our best strain, and nobody is prepared to bid game. By bridge logic, if the opponents continue on to the four level, a double by one of us must be for penalties.

For some time, I've been trying to determine if there is a simple trigger that applies to these situations. Essentially, these are the criteria:

• each partner has limited his hand by making a non-forcing bid;
• we have found a fit or we have settled into a quasi-fit.

Let me try some examples:

1. ♠KJ4 ♥75 ♦KQT962 ♣AQ opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQJ63 ♦J ♣J63: 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p); 2♦ (p) p (2♠); p (p) X: in this case, opener has bid and rebid diamonds -- responder was content to sit there in a quasi-fit -- until the opponents decided to balance. We know we cannot find a fit at a safe level and weren't thrilled about having to make eight tricks in diamonds. Opponent's 2♠ call is music to our ears: Double!
2. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦KQ62 ♣A7 opposite ♠QT86 ♥KQ62 ♦J3 ♣J63: 1♠ (2♣) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) 3♠ (p) p (4♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (three spade bids altogether), neither player has made any attempt to bid game (thus each is limited in strength). Double!

But is it necessary for both partners to have limited their hands? What if the one partner who has limited his hand, with a pass or a non-forcing bid, doubles? Is that always for penalty?

The case where one of us passes is covered in The dead auction rule. But I'm not sure that covers all of the cases. Doesn't it also apply when one of us makes a non-forcing bid and then doubles?

More situations:

1. ♠KJ942 ♥75 ♦K2 ♣AJ67 opposite ♠QT6 ♥KQ63 ♦JT43 ♣82: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (3♣); p (p) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), but opener is still unlimited while responder has limited his hand. Is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? It's relatively unlikely so that I have always defined this situation as being a cooperative double. How good are your spades, clubs? For many pairs, double is always penalty once we've found a fit.
2. ♠KJ942 ♥72 ♦AKJ2 ♣72 opposite ♠QT6 ♥JT65 ♦T3 ♣AJ83: 1♠ (p) 2♠ (x); p (3♣) X: here, we have found a limited fit in spades (just two spade bids this time), opener and responder are limited. Now, is it possible that responder can have a hand that is a penalty double of 3♣? Absolutely, he's sitting over the club bidder and he has a maximum balanced raise.

The conclusion, for me at least, is that as soon as both partners have limited their hands, then penalty doubles go into effect. But should penalty doubles only be in the direct seat? No, I think that's unworkable. We need to have both partners using the same meaning for double, otherwise it's possible that the fish can wriggle out of the net.

And now for a real hand, this one taken from the World Wide Pairs (hands rotated).

The bidding by the opponents is a little "forward" as the Abbot might say, yet this is the kind of thing that happens in club games. It's obviously important to be on the same wavelength as to the meaning of my final double. Given that my first double was essentially a bid of spades, our side had bid spades three times. Add to that the fact that I had passed over 2♠ showing no interest in going further, then it was clear that my final double was for business. [Editor's note: I have edited the bidding a little to suit my story better, although the first four bids are real, as is the final contract.]

Our result (+500 when we managed to get an extra trick on defense) was a local top and worth 99% worldwide. Note that 4♠ cannot be made legitimately, although there were quite a few making game (420) our way so we needed that extra trick. 

So, my question to my readers is this: is it a workable scheme to turn penalty doubles on whenever both partners are limited? Is it sufficiently obvious? I'm sure that it's correct to do it this way, but is it going to be usable in practice?

The Hitchhiker’s Guide - part 4: the Tiger wraps it up

I have just finished reading a really excellent book on defense called Tiger and Fly by Krzysztof Martens. There are two parts, each with examples of the style of defensive play of one of the eponymous characters. The bulk of the book is devoted to the Tiger. He (or she) is a bold defender with a predator’s eye for deception and camouflage. He will cunningly ambush declarer by drawing a false picture of the deal then pounce at the last moment just as declarer is, he thinks, about to wrap up a successful contract.

Naturally, I was keen to show my feline mettle at my next club game. Here is the setting. I was sitting East, dealer, at favorable vulnerability and holding the following nice collection against one of the best pairs in the room:

♠ AK97 ♥ QJT62 ♦ K9 ♣ 85.
I opened 1♥ and partner raised to 2♥. We play Bergen raises so this bid showed only three hearts or a very flat hand. Unfortunately, this being the first round, I had momentarily forgotten that and was thinking we were playing constructive raises. Anyway, this was passed around to my LHO who doubled. Partner passed and RHO bid 3♣ which was alerted as showing five clubs. I only have thirteen points, but I am certainly better than a minimum opener so I doubled. By agreement, this is cooperative asking partner’s opinion about defending or bidding on. I usually have one or two clubs and will have something in each of the unbid suits. Partner passed and it was my lead. I do think I was a little over-aggressive in this action (especially given that we play Bergen) but this story isn’t about the bidding. It’s about the defense.

It seemed natural to lead a high spade and get a look at the dummy. Dummy came down with:

♠ QT2 ♥ A95 ♦ J85 ♣ AJ72
and the first trick was made up of A-2-8-4. We play UDCA so the 8 is probably a suggestion to switch. Now is the time to heed the usual warning for defending doubled contracts: DON’T PANIC!

I panicked. I led a heart and that was that: -670 and obviously a bottom.

Tigers don’t panic however. They own their territory and they know it. People don’t wander in with their reopening doubles and expect to get out alive. The tiger laid down the ♦K, continued to partner’s ace and received a diamond ruff. Five tricks in for the magic 200 and a clear top.

Why did the Tiger succeed when I failed? Mainly because he didn’t panic, of course. But he carefully analyzed the hand, too. It looks like we have three sure tricks in spades and diamonds. We need two more. Based on the auction, we can count on partner for two of the missing honors. What could these be, practically speaking? The ♥K, the ♦AQ and the ♣K are the relevant missing cards, although the ♦Q is a slow trick and will likely come too late to do us much good. Assuming that declarer really does have five clubs, the ♣Q cannot be a factor. If partner has the ♦A, we should be able to get a diamond ruff, providing our trumps don't get drawn first. Let’s consider what pairs of cards will get us the five tricks we need:

♥K ♦A

Down one if we cash second spade (2S, 2D, ruff); down two if we switch to ♦K immediately (♥K scores).

♥K ♦Q

Cannot defeat the contract (2S, 1H, 1D).

♥K ♣K

Down one provided we switch to hearts before the ♠Q is established (2S, 1H, 1D, 1C).

♦A ♦Q

Down one provided we switch to ♦K before losing the lead (2S, 2D, ruff); most probably down two.

♦A ♣K

Always down one (2S, 2D, 1C); down two if we switch to ♦K before losing the lead (2S, 2D, 1C, ruff).

♦Q ♣K

Cannot defeat the contract (2S, 1D, 1C)

Ignoring the sequences which result in down two (or making), we are left with a decision. If partner has the ♦A (three cases out of four), the contract is always going down provided that we switch to diamonds before losing the lead. The only time this would be fatal would be when partner has the two round-suit kings (the remaining case) without the diamond queen too. That's to say that any time partner has three of the four honors, the contract is going down anyway when we lay down the ♦K.

What if partner has only one of the honors? Well, obviously, if it's the ♦A and we switch to the king, it will be going down. As Martens points out, this is an application of Occam's Razor. If we can defeat the contract by assuming only one honor, then that's the way to go.

Wouldn't it have been better to cash the ♠K to see what would come next? Partner would play the trey, suit preference for diamonds, the lower-ranking suit. Was there any risk that declarer would show out on the second round of spades and draw trumps? If declarer only had a singleton spade, partner would have had five. Given that my double guaranteed at least three spades, we would then have had a double major suit fit of 16 cards. Far too much offense to risk passing for penalties.

But while it would be safe to cash the king and get the happy news that a diamond shift was right, in the one case where diamonds was wrong, we would now have given up the possibility of getting a heart trick. So, since the Tiger was planning to play on diamonds anyway, there was no need to continue spades.

In fact, partner didn't have two "cards." She had only the ♦A! This, together with the spade jack, made up her entire hand. Was it right, then to pass the double? In the long run, probably not. In 3♥, most pairs were making 140 although they should be down one. But minus 50 would be preferable to minus 110 of course (and much better than minus 670.

But partner actually got us to the theoretical top spot: all set for 200. Now, if only she'd been playing with the Tiger!

The Hitchhiker's Guide to Bridge - part 3

Part two of this series added some thoughts on safely cashing out in doubled contracts. Today I want to add a useful principle which I call "The Principle of the Disappearing Trick." Not the kind of trick whereby rabbits disappear under handkerchiefs — but the situation where a cashing trick becomes uncashable. This hand just came up with a random partner from the internet about whom I know nothing at all. Matchpoints.

First of all, you might ask yourself if you should sit for the double. If North has just the two red aces, they might make 3♥ while we will be down only 1 in 4♣ (may be better to bid on). If North has the ♠A and one other trick, then 3♥ is down just 1 (100) — unless we can ruff some spades — but we will be making 4♣ (130) (again, may be better to bid on).

You (random partner) decide to pass the double. If you step through the first couple of tricks, you will find yourself on lead at trick 3 with the exhortation in the comment area "DON'T PANIC!"

Ask yourself "what can go away?" If partner has a natural trump trick, it can't go away. If he has a promotable trump trick it will go away if we don't act quickly enough. What about the side suits? If partner has the ♦A, it's not going anywhere. What about the spades? Declarer presumably has five so they can't all be pitched on those diamonds. Is there any other way that our spade trick(s) (assuming we have some) are going away? Yes, if we try to promote partner's trumps by playing a third round of clubs. Declarer may be able to ruff high in hand and pitch one spade from the dummy. That defense, therefore will at best break even unless partner doesn't have either the ♠A or the ♠Q. But in that case, what is he doubling on? Five points?

So, let's look at this another way. First of all, there's an inference that declarer doesn't have much extra, either in points or distribution — he was content to let us play 3♣. Let's assume that North has the ♦A and that it will cash (we don't know if West is 5512, 6412 or 5422 yet). If North has the ♠A too, we need to cash out, starting with the ♠K for down one at least. If he only has the ♠Q then he'll have to have a natural trump trick. Based on all of these considerations, the ♠K is by far the best continuation as, if all goes well, we can also get some spade ruffs!

Here's the complete hand. If you step through again to trick 3, you can now press the GIB button to see what will happen with various continuations. Notice how the ♠K will result in down 3 for a magnificent 500 which would have scored 15/17. A diamond is OK providing North now under-leads his ♠A to give you just one spade ruff. Anything but a club results in at least +100 for a 7.5/17 matchpoints. Needless to say, random partner continued with a club giving us a total goose egg.

The Hitchhiker's Guide to Bridge - part 2

Part one of this series was published over a year ago. I don't recall if I had a sequel in mind at the time, but here is a totally new sequel. The key mantra, which every fan of the increasingly inappropriately named Hitchhiker's Guide trilogy (there are five parts), is of course DON'T PANIC!

Nowhere in bridge does this exhortation have more relevance than in defending a doubled part-score. When you're in this situation, two things are absolutely essential:

• you must have confidence that you are in the right spot and that the contract is going down (usually at the part-score level, you only need the contract to go down one but sometimes, when the opponents are not vulnerable, you actually need them to go down two);
• you must not panic.

I hope my partner from the following hand will forgive me for bringing this up. But it seems to me that both of us to some extent panicked on this hand which swung the entire matchpoints against us.

I have annotated some thoughts after the first trick. But basically, West knows almost exactly what my hand is — this is one of the hidden benefits of the cooperative double [there will be more hidden benefits in the next blog]. I don't have four spades (I would have raised to three) but I have stuff in the minors (and, based on the lead, the SK). In addition, East could have the DK, CQ, or a high heart, perhaps two of these. It's possible that declarer has a singleton in a minor, although the double would be somewhat questionable with a five-card suit on the side. One thing about playing doubled contracts at matchpoints is that it is much more like playing IMPs or Rubber bridge. You know precisely the number of tricks needed. In this case, exactly five. These will be two spades, the two minor suit aces, and either the DK or a high heart. Can any of these go away? Not the trump obviously, not the spade. A minor suit ace could disappear conceivably but if it's the club, there's not much we can do from our side. No, the only danger is losing a diamond trick if we have one.

Cashing out is not always as easy as it might be. If at this point, the DA is laid down and, in response to an encouraging signal, a small one continued, East may assume a doubleton diamond. Better perhaps is a low diamond, although there's a small chance that declarer will score a stiff K! I think the best approach is to play DA and a spade. Partner will not assume a doubleton diamond and will probably cash the DK and switch to a club (the ace will be the setting trick so there will be no need to play low). However, West continued a spade (not fatal but essentially wasting a tempo). I won the K and now had to switch to a minor suit, although I suppose another spade would not have been fatal either. If partner had the DA, why had he not played it at trick 2? Probably he had AQ of clubs, although that would leave him only a 10-count (possible for a third-seat opener I suppose). I led a small club and here is where the exhortation DON'T PANIC comes in. Trust me to have an honor in clubs and put in the T. This would automatically hold declarer to six hearts, and two black suit queens. But partner went up with the ace. Now, the tempo is critical — we are actually behind schedule in cashing our tricks and given time, declarer can get off a diamond. So now it is essential to start the DA. As you can see, this didn't happen so we went from +200 (a top) to -730 (a bottom).

This sort of thing has been the unfortunate result in many hands. I like to get those 200s so tend to make aggressive doubles. Against a doubled part-score contract, it doesn't take a genius to recognize that letting them make will be a bottom. So there is never any danger of making an even worse error that gives away an overtrick. You'd suffer the same bottom. So, always assume that the contract will go down with relatively normal play: building and cashing tricks. Trust that partner has his bid, because if he hasn't and they make overtricks, it can't get any worse.

Fun in the Smoky Mountains

Kim, CJ and I spent a very enjoyable week in Tennessee, mostly at the Mid-Atlantic Regional held in Gatlinburg, on the edge of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. The main attraction was playing in the bracketed knockouts at the invitation of our friends Bruce Downing and Mark Conner. I had been once before nine years ago, Kim had never been, but Bruce and Mark are regulars at the tournament.

One of the things you can do at this tournament is play five sessions a day. In truth the "dinner-bell" Compact KO is only half a session, and the midnight KOs are whatever you can manage to stay in for. But Kim and CJ indeed played all five sessions that day! And CJ managed to add significantly to his masterpoint total by playing in I/N events -- although he was the only player in the whole tournament under 20, I think.

If winning matches and masterpoints in the company of friends was our only goal then we succeeded handsomely: we won 7 of 8 matches and earned almost 48 masterpoints. Still, we came away feeling that something wasn’t quite right. Our total master points came to just under 10,000. But our competition was, in most cases, significantly outgunned. Each team surely had to have at least one gold life master, or four who are very close. Yet, the matches were not as competitive as we are used to at home even in flight B events. Nobody seemed to be able to bid slams and they were fairly ignorant of alerting procedures, how to deal with unauthorized information and general bridge etiquette. In the match we lost (the finals of the first event), we had bid a very good slam. The opponents were not in the auction. The opening lead went straight to their partner's ace in one suit followed by a switch to another suit, ruffed (my RHO had seven but had not bid the suit). Other than that, the slam was odds-on to make. But they didn't bid it at the other table of course. There were other bad boards for us too as we all made mistakes. The first event where we played in the sixth bracket of 21, offered significantly tougher competition than the second event (fifth bracket of 12). In the latter event, we felt a little bit bad for raining on their parade. In the semi-finals we found ourselves up by 70 imps at the half and our opponents decided to withdraw [how had they managed to beat two other teams?]

Possible explanations for this disparity of skills are (1) the tough competition in New England; (2) the fact that we usually play flight A events at home rather than collecting points in B flights; (3) simple randomness at work (a sample of two events, eight teams is hardly statistically significant); (4) a space-time warp. Or perhaps it's simply that, as Harold Feldheim supposedly has said, "as you get better, you won't notice it. Instead, you will think that other players are worse."

One of my favorite hands came in the final (winning) match. Kim has been a little skeptical about the efficacy of fit-showing jumps. It’s true they don’t come up very often but when they do…

All white, my hand was something like ♠Qx ♥xxx ♦AQTxx ♣AJx. Dealer on my right bid 1♠ and I made a questionable overcall of 2♦. LHO bid 2♠ and Kim surprised me with 4♣, showing a diamond fit, a good club suit and a willingness to be at the four level. Thinking that her clubs might easily prove better than my ragged diamonds [not to mention Kim’s excellent declarer play], I raised to 5♣, which she wrapped up for 400 while our teammates were in 3♠ making four (11 imps). My judgment of strain proved fortuitous as my RHO had a void in hearts which would likely have been led against a diamond contract.

How do you get to be up 70 at the half? Let me quote from teammate Bruce Downing...




This board was a killer:

West opened 1D and I overcalled 1H. 1S from East and West (balked of the planned 2H reverse) ended the auction with 3NT. East passed slowly as well she might. It turns out not to matter which heart I lead. I can't stop her from getting 2 heart tricks. However we held it to 3 for a pedestrian imp result of 3NT making their way. Not so calm at the other table!!!

Kim also opened 1D but apparently the North hand does not meet the standards of their opponents for an overcall. North passed with my cards. 1S from Robin. Pass from South and 2H Reverse from Kim. Now double from North (lead directing? penalty? bizarre?) Whatever North's reasons for doubling 2H, the unfortunate woman had no idea with whom she was dealing. The next to bid would be Robin Hillyard who has spent many years refining theories of doubles. Having mastered the red card, he was ready to move on to the blue card. Redouble is Robin's bid. He likes his chances across from a red suit reverse. Pass from South (what can she do?) Pass from Kim (nice trust for partner) and it is back to North who has nowhere to go either. The contract is 2H**. Kim gave up only 3 tricks in the play, obviously playing her 4-2 fit brilliantly, and 2H made with 2 redoubled overtricks rang up +1040 for our side. Good times!

In truth, I probably shouldn't have redoubled with six spades. But when you get ahead in a match you can take a few liberties to see how things will work it. The hand always makes 9 tricks in hearts, 10 tricks in spades or notrump and 12 tricks in diamonds. So we beat par by only 120 (3 imps) but in practice it worked out as 12 imps.

We also did a lot of touristy stuff. We spent a day at Dollywood and I rode five (!) roller-coasters with CJ including the old scary Thunderhead (wooden coaster) and the sleek new Wild Eagle. There's also a kind of zip line on wheels and track called the Smoky Mountain Alpine Coaster which we enjoyed. The weather was good, the dogwoods were out in abundance. Good times indeed.

The cooperative double

I've written on this subject many times before here in this blog, see nine (currently) articles as well perhaps as some others of the articles answering to the label double.

A lot of the foregoing has concentrated on the rules and triggers for penalty doubles. That's to say what a cooperative double is not. What I want to do here is to try to explain simply and succinctly what it is and why you would use it.

A cooperative double is just another kind of double from which you are ready for partner to take out. In this sense it is no different than takeout, negative, responsive, support, snapdragon and maybe a few other types. What distinguishes a cooperative double from these other doubles is that the expectation of a takeout drops to somewhere around the 50% mark. You will have tried to find a fit with one or two suits mentioned already and so far you've been unsuccessful. The cooperative double is one last try. You invoke it because you believe you have as much right to declare this hand as the opponents, maybe more. But you fully expect that, about half the time, partner will leave your double in. You won't be surprised, as you might be when partner passes a takeout double. Instead, you'll get your defensive shoes on and prepare to take all your tricks to defeat the opponents' contract.

So, let's get a little more specific. First of all, what level do we generally find a cooperative double on? The most common is probably the three-level, but it can be found at almost any level, except the first which is more the realm of the above mentioned cousins.

Second, what about strength? There are two possibilities: the doubler himself has extras, perhaps a queen over minimum (which would normally give the doubler's side at least half the points in the deck), or the partnership taken together is known to "own" the hand (at least about 22 hcp).

Finally, and this is the key point, what sort of hand does the cooperative doubler have? Simply put, he will be one card short of a bid in each suit that hasn't been claimed by the opponents. Too few cards to support partner, too few to rebid his own suit, too few to mention a new suit (he would typically have five to mention a new suit at the three-level, for example). Let's say doubler has four of his own suit, having implied four, three of partner's suit (he having promised four), and four of another unbid suit. That leaves two in the opponents' suit. In other words, much of the time he will double with a balanced hand holding two cards in their suit. When partner leaves the double in with three or four cards in their suit, she will be counting on about two trumps in the other hand. Occasionally, as the level gets higher and you are more reluctant to introduce a new suit by bidding it directly, you might be reduced to only one card in their suit. Partner will take the auction so far into account when deciding to pull or pass the double. She will only pass when she has no extra distribution of her own beyond what she's already promised (can't rebid her suits and can't support yours) and, hopefully, she will have something usefully placed in the enemy suit.

Furthermore, if there are two unbid suits, doubler should have approximately the same length in each, perhaps one card different (5-4 or even 4-3). But two cards (6-4) is far too much disparity in my opinion. Not only might you end up in a 4-4 fit when you have a 6-3 fit available, not in and of itself a tragedy, but if partner has 3-3 in the unbid suits, you may end up defending a doubled contract despite having a nine-card fit of your own. This is not the time to be defending unless the level is high enough that you expect a substantial penalty (i.e. a sacrifice situation). Of course this applies to negative and responsive doubles too.

Now let's look at things from the other side of the table. Partner has made a cooperative double. Should you take it out or leave it in? If you have one of the distributional features (assets) that partner is looking for, bid it, even if you fancy your chances on defense. Nothing is more demoralizing than doubling the opponents in some part-score and then having it make. Sometimes it is supposed to go down but you need double-dummy defense or even a lucky defense to set it. For this reason, I believe that passing the double should be the last resort, especially at teams. The cooperative double is a way to find our own contracts more than a way of nailing the opposition. Declaring at both tables of a team game can generate a lot of swings in the 4-7 range. And at matchpoints, you will be winning a lot of boards simply by successfully outbidding the opponents. The occasional penalty will be a bonus but it should not become an end in and of itself.

The lower the level, the less willing partner should be to leave the double in and, conversely, the higher the level, the more willing partner should be to pass (but note that doubler may have fewer trumps as the level gets higher as explained above). Doubled and freely-bid suit contracts at the two level are rarely very profitable. The one exception being after an overcall is followed by a reopening double. But even that situation is usually not very profitable at the one-level. And of course, vulnerability should be factored in. Stretching to double the opponents when they aren't vulnerable is not winning bridge, especially if bidding on would give us a decent shot at a vulnerable game.

Note also that the cooperative double is part of a bidding style often called Do Something Intelligent, Partner (DSIP). But I've come to the realization that not only does DSIP suggest a more extreme (looser, more speculative) version of competitive bidding but, with a disciplined cooperative double, partner isn't required to do anything more intelligent than looking to see if he has any undeclared offensive assets and acting accordingly.

The cooperative double can also go by several different names (card-showing, action, etc.). One of the most apposite is Mel Colchamiro's "BOP" double (for balance-of-power). The BOP double is in fact a slightly more conservative version of the cooperative double and well-suited to IMP scoring. In order to use it, the partnership must have the balance of power (not just equal power) and the doubler must be sitting under the hand with most length in the suit.

Experts routinely make use of cooperative doubles below the level of game. For the expert, it is a sharp weapon. However, lesser mortals need to remember that like any other weapon, it can end up being turned against us. So, understanding the benefits and limitations of the method and being disciplined about its use is extremely important. It is easy to get carried away and double without the proper values or while holding a card that may be valuable, offensively, to our side. But, properly used, it will gain you matchpoints and IMPs in the long run.

The blue card

I realize that I've been surprisingly reticent on the subject of redoubles in this blog, especially given my obsession with doubles. I've mentioned redouble just a few times, particularly in the context of DSIP and the various triggers and in my recent blog on staying with happiness. The "blue card" is such a rarity at the bridge table, that whenever it appears there's a little sense of shock that runs around the table. If your side is the redoubler you expect to get an above average board at least. If your side was the doubler, then you're not so hopeful. But, despite the fact that it seldom comes up, it is essential to have good understandings about what it means in order to take advantage of the situation.

My musings were prompted by a question came up in an email conversation as to the meaning of this redouble: 1♠ pass 2♣ X XX?

Clearly, it's not a "support" redouble since opener couldn't have raised partner's response to the two-level. It seems to me that it denies a good raise of clubs (Qxx or better), denies the ability (or desire) to rebid spades, and suggests extras (we could have passed with a minimum hand that has nothing to say). It further suggests that opener isn't enthusiastic, at least not yet, about bidding notrump. So what's left? Some sort of hand with extras, either unbalanced or semi-balanced but unsuitable for a 1NT opener. I would think that it suggests four hearts (that being the guaranteed suit of the doubler) and probably 5=4=2=2 or 5=4=3=1 shape, possibly 5=4=1=3 with three small clubs. Opener might have a void in clubs of course in which case the hand is probably 5=4=4=0.

Once we have redoubled, any subsequent direct pass by our side is forcing and any double is for penalties. Depending on the vulnerability, our goal should be either to punish the opponents for their misjudged interference or to bid game ourselves.

So, what's the meaning of redouble in general? I believe that the following list covers the common situations:

• shows a good hand (extras) with no fit;
• shows a bad hand with no fit (SOS);
• asks partner to name his implied but unnamed suit (this may not be "standard" but to me is so obvious that I can't understand why it wouldn't be);
• shows three card "support" when raising partner's suit to the two level is a possibility (assuming you've agreed to play it);
• shows/denies an honor in partner's suit (Rosenkranz if you have agreed it);

Unfortunately, many of these situations have grey areas. For instance, what do you call with ♠Q92 ♥Q54 ♦KQJ3 ♣J72 when partner opens 1♥ and RHO doubles? Many would probably redouble but this could easily backfire if we later come in at a high level or if we pull partner's penalty double "to show our support." One strategy which I favor with this sort of hand is to pass initially and then bid hearts at whatever level is necessary (or make our own penalty double if they get too high first). Partner will infer we have this sort of hand.

However, I posted this problem on BridgeWinners and many votes (65%) were given for redouble, even though I said that the "Redouble implies no fit" box was checked. I can understand redouble on this really flat awful 11 count in the sense that we don't have a good fit. Others avoid this whole problem by using a transfer system in this situation.

Passing first may not work well with a more distributional hand, though, say ♠2 ♥Q54 ♦KQJ93 ♣K872. Here, a Truscott/Jordan 2NT or, better, a fit-showing jump to 3♦ would be more more descriptive (even though partner will expect another trump with either of these bids). Redouble and pass will probably work very badly if the opponents quickly jump to 4♠. We might be cold for slam in a red suit and they might even end up making 4♠ doubled. The BridgeWinners community again voted mostly (48%) for redouble here too, though. I have to admit that this surprises me quite a lot.

What surprises me is redoubling with three-card support, especially in the second hand. Perhaps Karen Walker has it right when she says that the "implies" box really means temporarily imply no fit (her emphasis).

There's one other somewhat controversial treatment that I like to play. If partner opens and RHO makes a takeout double, redouble shows no fit, but also doesn't promise any particular number of points. If partner has opened 1♣ and you have 1 or fewer clubs, then redouble. It's an advance SOS call in case LHO is planning to pass. Partner will take it out to a better spot (at the one level), assuming that they don't. Of course, if we do have decent values (10+ hcp) then we will now contribute to harassing the opponents or until we find a good contract of our own. If partner opens 1♠ and we have 1 or fewer, we may already be in our best spot, so here XX would tend to show good values. Hearts and diamonds are treated somewhere in between. This hasn't come up much, I admit. But on the few occasions when it has, we have ended up getting a decent result.

Finally, a hand that came up just today. You hold: ♠8754 ♥A92 ♦3 ♣KJ952 with everyone vulnerable. LHO passes, partner bids 1♥ and the next player doubles. Again, you're a bit stuck for a bid. I think 3♣ is almost perfect here, assuming that you have agreed to play fit-showing jumps. It says you're willing to play 3♥, four if partner has extras. It says you have good clubs. Partner's going to expect better hearts and/or better clubs but I think it's the least lie so to speak. Had this been bid at the table, we would have scored exactly 50% on the board. As it was, this hand redoubled and the next player bid 2♦. Partner passed and now our hand came in with 2♥. This was followed by two passes and then 3♦. Partner closed it out by doubling. We ended up with +200  for a 79% board (it was fortunate that the declarer was the one with the ♦A else it would be -670). We got a little lucky here. In my opinion, redouble should be used with relatively flat hands with at least 10hcp and no more than a doubleton in partner's major suit.