I had a great time in Cromwell, earning (modest) points in each event we entered. Mostly, I was playing with Tony.
I also took the opportunity to pick up a couple of bridge books. One of the Abbott series that I didn't already have is The Abbott's Great Sacrifice. There are two wonderful quotes on the very same chapter which seem appropriate to your humble blogger.
"He's the editor of Bridge Magazine, isn't he," grunted the Abbott. "If he was any good at playing the game, he would concentrate on that rather than writing about it."
...
"We needed a club lead, Abbott," said Brother Xavier. "Four clubs was my bid, playing fit jumps, and then you'd have led a club. You don't like to play them, of course."
Kim had a great time, advancing to the third round of the flight A KOs and playing Michael and Debbie Rosenberg, among other northeast experts.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Monday, February 7, 2011
An accident waiting to happen
The trouble with rules is that sometimes they are in mutual conflict and it isn't always obvious which rule takes precedence. Isaac Asimov gave his robots three rules and explicitly gave them a priority order. But in bridge, it isn't always so clear. Which rule is more binding may be "obvious" to one partner, while the other partner thinks a different rules is paramount.
Kim and I had just such a misunderstanding. It was a bomb waiting to go off. Fortunately for us, the bomb exploded alright but it blew up in the faces of our opponents, not us.
Here's the dichotomy in particular:
Life becomes further complicated when we overcall notrump. Again it's "to play" (bid in the face of competition) but what about "systems on"?
So here's the hand where this came up. I held ♠KT953 ♥AQ5 ♦K8 ♣AQT in third seat (no-one was vulnerable). Kind of an awkward hand, right? I suppose I have to open 1♠ and then rebid 2NT over 1NT but then partner will be declarer and my hand which is chock full of tenaces will be exposed as dummy. No matter, my RHO came to the rescue with 2♦. Now, this was easy: 2NT showing a balanced 15-18 possibly with a five-card major (since we play Romex including opposite an overcall). LHO now raised to 4♦ and partner doubled with ♠AQ72 ♥K732 ♦T2 ♣753.
Here's how I interpreted that double: I bid two NT in competition so it's 100% penalty. Here's how partner interpreted it: the opponents have strongly bid and raised a suit and our doubles are always for takeout (or two-way) in such cases. We play systems on, and therefore double should be for takeout [we had never actually discussed a four-level overcall of a 1NT or 2NT opening].
I was of course overjoyed to pass this double, whatever its meaning and we duly collected 1100. We could have made slam for 980/990 but in any case nobody else bid it (although all made 12 tricks in spades). 6NT (on 27hcp!) is the best contract but from my side of course in case the ♦A is in the wrong place. It was only afterwards we discovered that this hand could so easily have been a disaster.
The last word? I think that there are always three major considerations when discussing the meaning of calls: efficacy, frequency and simplicity. To a point, I'm a big fan of simplicity when it comes to doubles, which is why I have developed my set of rules. What about frequency and efficacy? LHO has bid something, partner has overcalled in notrump, and RHO has raised. Are we more likely to want to double for takeout (i.e. negative) or to penalize? To be honest, I think we're much more likely to want to double for takeout so that "systems on" should take precedence, thus supporting Kim's use of the double card. But, suppose that RHO didn't raise but bid a new suit. It's almost impossible for us to have much in the way of values now. Do we really want to make a takeout double? I don't think so. The only time I think we'd want to double would be when we happen to have some values in RHO's suit.
Really, I think the last word can be summed up in the typical experts' response when asked about this kind of double: "cards". He who made the notrump overcall has to decide what to do based on bridge logic. At IMPs and sometimes at matchpoints, the expert will generally "take the money". The rest of the time? Your guess is as good as mine.
Honey, let's agree that 2NT (3♦) X would also be negative (by extension of the 1NT sequence), thus overriding the other rule that a bid of 2NT is "to play". We'll agree therefore that no opening notrump bid is ever "to play". The next time it comes up, in about 2015, we should be well prepared :)
Kim and I had just such a misunderstanding. It was a bomb waiting to go off. Fortunately for us, the bomb exploded alright but it blew up in the faces of our opponents, not us.
Here's the dichotomy in particular:
- Rule "1" -- when one player bids notrump to play*, all subsequent doubles are for penalty (* "to play" is defined as any natural notrump bid in the face of competition or at the two-level or higher);
- Rule "A" -- advancer of a notrump overcall bids with systems on^, that's to say as much as possible, we stick to our standard responses (^ "systems on" in our case means [after 1NT] Stayman, four-suit transfers, Texas transfers, various 3-level bids; [after 2NT] Romex Stayman, Jacoby transfers, minor-suit stayman).
Life becomes further complicated when we overcall notrump. Again it's "to play" (bid in the face of competition) but what about "systems on"?
So here's the hand where this came up. I held ♠KT953 ♥AQ5 ♦K8 ♣AQT in third seat (no-one was vulnerable). Kind of an awkward hand, right? I suppose I have to open 1♠ and then rebid 2NT over 1NT but then partner will be declarer and my hand which is chock full of tenaces will be exposed as dummy. No matter, my RHO came to the rescue with 2♦. Now, this was easy: 2NT showing a balanced 15-18 possibly with a five-card major (since we play Romex including opposite an overcall). LHO now raised to 4♦ and partner doubled with ♠AQ72 ♥K732 ♦T2 ♣753.
Here's how I interpreted that double: I bid two NT in competition so it's 100% penalty. Here's how partner interpreted it: the opponents have strongly bid and raised a suit and our doubles are always for takeout (or two-way) in such cases. We play systems on, and therefore double should be for takeout [we had never actually discussed a four-level overcall of a 1NT or 2NT opening].
I was of course overjoyed to pass this double, whatever its meaning and we duly collected 1100. We could have made slam for 980/990 but in any case nobody else bid it (although all made 12 tricks in spades). 6NT (on 27hcp!) is the best contract but from my side of course in case the ♦A is in the wrong place. It was only afterwards we discovered that this hand could so easily have been a disaster.
The last word? I think that there are always three major considerations when discussing the meaning of calls: efficacy, frequency and simplicity. To a point, I'm a big fan of simplicity when it comes to doubles, which is why I have developed my set of rules. What about frequency and efficacy? LHO has bid something, partner has overcalled in notrump, and RHO has raised. Are we more likely to want to double for takeout (i.e. negative) or to penalize? To be honest, I think we're much more likely to want to double for takeout so that "systems on" should take precedence, thus supporting Kim's use of the double card. But, suppose that RHO didn't raise but bid a new suit. It's almost impossible for us to have much in the way of values now. Do we really want to make a takeout double? I don't think so. The only time I think we'd want to double would be when we happen to have some values in RHO's suit.
Really, I think the last word can be summed up in the typical experts' response when asked about this kind of double: "cards". He who made the notrump overcall has to decide what to do based on bridge logic. At IMPs and sometimes at matchpoints, the expert will generally "take the money". The rest of the time? Your guess is as good as mine.
Honey, let's agree that 2NT (3♦) X would also be negative (by extension of the 1NT sequence), thus overriding the other rule that a bid of 2NT is "to play". We'll agree therefore that no opening notrump bid is ever "to play". The next time it comes up, in about 2015, we should be well prepared :)
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Ruling the Game
This month's ACBL Bulletin has arrived (i.e. February's) and I was pleased to see photos of several players that we know well: Pat McDevitt/Rich DeMartino and the McNamaras. Congratulations to them for their outstanding WBF results in Philadelphia last year. And while I can hardly claim to "know" Brad Moss, it was interesting to see him as 2010 player of the year after facing him (and Gitelman) for two boards in the Reisinger.
I generally take a look at Mike Flader's column fairly soon after receiving a new bulletin. But I think he's a little off his game this month. In the third question, the opponents have the auction 2NT—4♥; 4♠—4NT. Opener now picks up his bidding cards and starts to put them back in the box. The questioner asked if it was appropriate for either his partner or himself to point out that the auction wasn't over. Maybe space was limited but Mike's answer addressed the simple fact that no call had been made (no card was placed on or near the table) so the director (none had been called) should allow the auction to continue and that was about that. I think he missed the point entirely.
First, the most obvious point. The writer (who has already passed in this round) should not be saying anything at all since it is not his turn to bid. Second, writer's partner should, in my opinion, wait a reasonable time and then call the director (or writer could call the director). Otherwise they'd logically still be sitting there. Clearly an infraction has occurred (it is incumbent on opener to make a call and he has not). And if I was that hypothetical director, I would rule, notwithstanding the laws, that opener had made the physical equivalent of a pass (removing his cards rather than placing one on the table amounts to the same thing). I would allow play to continue in 4NT (assuming that writer's partner also passes as any sane person would) and let the result stand if it was favorable for the defenders. If it was not favorable to the defenders, I would probably assign an adjusted score: give the defenders the table result and assess a procedural penalty against declarer, awarding his side an average minus.
If I were Flader, I'd point out that the laws were not well written in this case [to quote from The Mikado: That's the slovenly way in which these Acts are always drawn. However, cheer up, it'll be all right. I'll have it altered next session. Now, let's see about your execution — will after luncheon suit you]. Actually, this issue is not covered in the "Laws of Duplicate Bridge" because it is up to the regulating authority, the ACBL in our case.
But most of all, I'd criticize all those players who, not being the last to call in an auction, simply pick up the cards to indicate that the auction is over. It ain't over until the third pass in rotation is made! This particular behavior drives me potty. One of these days, I'm going to be the last to call over, say, 1NT—2NT—3NT and I'll be thinking of a lead-directing double when partner makes the opening lead. I certainly hope that partner will be allowed to replace his/her face-down lead if I do make that double.
The first question is more of a judgment call and maybe Mike Flader is correct for a table ruling, but in practice this would likely be referred to a committee (of players, rather than directors). Holding ♠9875 ♥A862 ♦KQ74 ♣T, our hero hears his partner open 1♠ (at favorable vulnerability) and RHO bid 2♣. Being an old-fashioned sort of player (but having, in a moment of weakness perhaps, agreed to play weak jump raises), he bids 3♠ meaning it as a limit raise. After ascertaining from opener that the jump is "weak", LHO bids 4♣ and partner passes as does RHO. The question is this: is said hero allowed to bid 4♠? Flader points out that pass is a logical alternative and that he may not choose another logical alternative that could have been demonstrably suggested by partner's explanation—he must decline the invitation that he thought he was making. But wait a moment! The situation is now quite different. Is it really a logical alternative to pass when our side is known to hold at least half the deck, nine spades and we have a singleton in the opponents' suit? I think not. Surely, we're still allowed to bid our cards! After all, the original 3♠ supposedly said "I think that, if you have a minimum hand, we have a better shot at making nine tricks than ten". But now, we're not even going to declare the hand. Surely our hero is allowed to try for -100 rather than suffer the likely -130!
This is one of those very tricky areas of bridge that unfortunately end up making somebody upset when the director rules a certain way. I'm not sure that I have a solution, other than screens, or electronic bidding with pre-loaded convention cards.
I generally take a look at Mike Flader's column fairly soon after receiving a new bulletin. But I think he's a little off his game this month. In the third question, the opponents have the auction 2NT—4♥; 4♠—4NT. Opener now picks up his bidding cards and starts to put them back in the box. The questioner asked if it was appropriate for either his partner or himself to point out that the auction wasn't over. Maybe space was limited but Mike's answer addressed the simple fact that no call had been made (no card was placed on or near the table) so the director (none had been called) should allow the auction to continue and that was about that. I think he missed the point entirely.
First, the most obvious point. The writer (who has already passed in this round) should not be saying anything at all since it is not his turn to bid. Second, writer's partner should, in my opinion, wait a reasonable time and then call the director (or writer could call the director). Otherwise they'd logically still be sitting there. Clearly an infraction has occurred (it is incumbent on opener to make a call and he has not). And if I was that hypothetical director, I would rule, notwithstanding the laws, that opener had made the physical equivalent of a pass (removing his cards rather than placing one on the table amounts to the same thing). I would allow play to continue in 4NT (assuming that writer's partner also passes as any sane person would) and let the result stand if it was favorable for the defenders. If it was not favorable to the defenders, I would probably assign an adjusted score: give the defenders the table result and assess a procedural penalty against declarer, awarding his side an average minus.
If I were Flader, I'd point out that the laws were not well written in this case [to quote from The Mikado: That's the slovenly way in which these Acts are always drawn. However, cheer up, it'll be all right. I'll have it altered next session. Now, let's see about your execution — will after luncheon suit you]. Actually, this issue is not covered in the "Laws of Duplicate Bridge" because it is up to the regulating authority, the ACBL in our case.
But most of all, I'd criticize all those players who, not being the last to call in an auction, simply pick up the cards to indicate that the auction is over. It ain't over until the third pass in rotation is made! This particular behavior drives me potty. One of these days, I'm going to be the last to call over, say, 1NT—2NT—3NT and I'll be thinking of a lead-directing double when partner makes the opening lead. I certainly hope that partner will be allowed to replace his/her face-down lead if I do make that double.
The first question is more of a judgment call and maybe Mike Flader is correct for a table ruling, but in practice this would likely be referred to a committee (of players, rather than directors). Holding ♠9875 ♥A862 ♦KQ74 ♣T, our hero hears his partner open 1♠ (at favorable vulnerability) and RHO bid 2♣. Being an old-fashioned sort of player (but having, in a moment of weakness perhaps, agreed to play weak jump raises), he bids 3♠ meaning it as a limit raise. After ascertaining from opener that the jump is "weak", LHO bids 4♣ and partner passes as does RHO. The question is this: is said hero allowed to bid 4♠? Flader points out that pass is a logical alternative and that he may not choose another logical alternative that could have been demonstrably suggested by partner's explanation—he must decline the invitation that he thought he was making. But wait a moment! The situation is now quite different. Is it really a logical alternative to pass when our side is known to hold at least half the deck, nine spades and we have a singleton in the opponents' suit? I think not. Surely, we're still allowed to bid our cards! After all, the original 3♠ supposedly said "I think that, if you have a minimum hand, we have a better shot at making nine tricks than ten". But now, we're not even going to declare the hand. Surely our hero is allowed to try for -100 rather than suffer the likely -130!
This is one of those very tricky areas of bridge that unfortunately end up making somebody upset when the director rules a certain way. I'm not sure that I have a solution, other than screens, or electronic bidding with pre-loaded convention cards.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Responding to opener's reopening double
My wife-and-favorite-bridge-partner has the slightly disconcerting habit – to someone who thinks of himself as a theoretician – of frequently teaching said theoretician some little bit of theory. Here's an example from a late-night bout with the GIBs on BBO (nobody is vulnerable): ♠AQ ♥8543 ♦QT54 ♣832.
Kim opened (second seat) 1♠ and RHO overcalled 2♥. I passed as did LHO and Kim re-opened with a double. What now? Clearly my hand isn't good enough to pass (that would net us -570!) but what is best? I chose 3♦, hoping for four diamonds opposite, which was not a success. The robots mercifully let me play undoubled but I somehow lost a trick I was supposed to get and ended up -200 for a 4.5 imp loss. I basically shrugged it off, noting that I might not have reopened with a double myself, and thought nothing more of it.
Kim made a very astute observation, however. Why didn't you just bid 2♠? [She believes that I always try to wrest the contract from her, but that's another story – and certainly not the case here as I had no enthusiasm whatsoever for playing this particular hand!].
But her comment triggered a thought. Suppose RHO had never bid. The auction would have unfolded 1♠ – 1NT* – 2♣ – 2♠. That's automatic using the 2/1 system. There never would have been any question of anything else. I'd do the same with two small spades (assuming I had a 1NT response to start with). So isn't it logical that I should do the same thing in this sequence? It would result, assuming double-dummy play and no double, in -100 (which would beat the par of -140).
It's not only logical, it should be automatic.
Kim opened (second seat) 1♠ and RHO overcalled 2♥. I passed as did LHO and Kim re-opened with a double. What now? Clearly my hand isn't good enough to pass (that would net us -570!) but what is best? I chose 3♦, hoping for four diamonds opposite, which was not a success. The robots mercifully let me play undoubled but I somehow lost a trick I was supposed to get and ended up -200 for a 4.5 imp loss. I basically shrugged it off, noting that I might not have reopened with a double myself, and thought nothing more of it.
Kim made a very astute observation, however. Why didn't you just bid 2♠? [She believes that I always try to wrest the contract from her, but that's another story – and certainly not the case here as I had no enthusiasm whatsoever for playing this particular hand!].
But her comment triggered a thought. Suppose RHO had never bid. The auction would have unfolded 1♠ – 1NT* – 2♣ – 2♠. That's automatic using the 2/1 system. There never would have been any question of anything else. I'd do the same with two small spades (assuming I had a 1NT response to start with). So isn't it logical that I should do the same thing in this sequence? It would result, assuming double-dummy play and no double, in -100 (which would beat the par of -140).
It's not only logical, it should be automatic.
Monday, January 3, 2011
Bridge at the Enigma Club
I am always thrilled to receive bridge books as Christmas gifts. This time Joan, my mother-in-law, bought me one I hadn't seen or heard of before: Bridge at the Enigma Club by Peter Winkler. As soon as I saw the title and read the cover, I knew I was going to enjoy it. But it's better than that. I love it! And, therefore, I highly recommend it to anyone who loves reading about bridge.
Peter Winkler is a professor of math and computer science at Dartmouth College and a former cryptographer. Although I'd heard long ago about encrypted signals at bridge, I hadn't realized that it was Winkler who originated the idea. Given my love of cryptography (and its relevance to my work), I've always been fascinated by the idea of crypto signals at bridge and somewhat saddened by the fact that they are illegal in many bridge jurisdictions, in particular the ACBL. Why should this be? It's such an arbitrary ruling. And, of course, it turns out that one can theoretically use crypto during the auction too. Perhaps Winkler won't mind if I quote a passage from his book:
"And?"
"Well, you now know which ace your partner has, right?"
"Sure."
"If I, your opponent, ask you which ace she holds, do you tell me?"
"Of course not, but that's not the same thing, nothing hangs on which ace she holds."
"That's because you didn't hang anything on it. On that auction you and your partner developed two bits worth of cryptographic 'key' that you could theoretically use to hide information..."
The whole business of full disclosure is based on the fact that you have to tell your opponents your agreements, even down to the last detail if necessary, but you don't have to tell them your hand. So, if there's something about your hands that you know, legally, but they don't know, why should it be that you can't take advantage of this bonus knowledge?
While Winkler makes a good case for allowing crypto in bridge, he doesn't do it as a proselytizer might do. In fact, his "hero" in the book is the skeptic, the one who is unfamiliar with it all, just as we the readers typically are.
The book is really just a great read. There are fascinating ideas about system here, too, in particular, the meaning of 2/1 bids. He also describes a bridge club, and its ways of playing duplicate bridge, which is fascinating. A cross between online and face-to-face bridge which is elegant but goes much further than either. Some of the ideas aren't quite so novel now that we have pre-duplicated boards and electronic scoring, but still it represents to me a kind of nirvana for playing bridge.
Monday, December 27, 2010
GIBs at their best and worst
See if you can do better (or as well):
- ♠7 ♥AKT962 ♦6 ♣AKQ92. None vul. You deal and open 1♥ and partner bids 3♥. Over your slam try of 4♣, partner declines with 4♥. Do you press on?
- ♠K ♥AQ8 ♦AKJ86 ♣QT62. White on red. Partner deals and opens 1♥. You bid 2D and he rebids 2♥. What's your plan and final destination?
- ♠874 ♥KQ976 ♦K976 ♣5. All Red. RHO deals and opens 1NT (15-17). Partner doubles LHO's Stayman 2♣ and RHO promptly redoubles showing "rebiddable" clubs. LHO closes with 3NT and it's your lead.
- ♠62 ♥Q6 ♦J42 ♣K98654. We are red and partner opens 1♦ in third seat. RHO overcalls 1♥ and we pass. LHO raises to 2♥ and partner doubles. RHO bids 2♠. What do you do?
- Follow up question. Suppose that in the previous situation you bid 3♣ and RHO bids 3♥ and LHO raises to 4♥ which partner doubles. What do you do when it gets back to you?
Abiding by the law
My previous blog on pressure bidding prompted another look at the so-called Law of Total Tricks and, especially, I fought the law by Mike Lawrence and Anders Wirgren.
One of the first things I realized twenty years ago when I first read about the "law" was of course that at best it is a rule of thumb. It is no more a true law (and perhaps even less so) than Bode's law. Some people, if I am to believe the L&W book, seem to believe that it is absolutely true, in the same way that certain fundamentalist religious people think that their "book" is literally true. I say this because Lawrence and Wirgren devote a large part of the book to debunking the myths of the LOTT. Would they bother if there weren't true believers?
Of course the "law" isn't literally true. Every bridge player knows that, including and especially Larry Cohen. And so do I. Yet, one of my bridge friends still chides me for quoting the law when making general statements about competitive bidding, as if I was one of the devoted followers, believing every word of the gospel.
Nevertheless, the "law" does, in a very general sense, show how the total number of tricks available (ours at our best trump suit plus theirs at their best trump suit) increase with the combined lengths of the two best trump suits (ours plus theirs). That's to say, on the whole, each additional trump (of ours) in one of our hands, or their trump in one of their hands, will result in an additional trick (either for us or for them). It doesn't state this as a categorical fact. It simply says that, in general, total tricks increases in step with total trumps.
Although it's never a true law, as mentioned above (in the majority of hands exact equality is the exception rather than the rule), it works best under the following conditions:
As noted, it won't always be right. But bridge, especially matchpoints, is a game where we try to maximize our score in the long run without worrying too much about the occasional hand where things don't work out. For example, with no enemy bidding, no special avoidance requirements, and holding three small trumps in dummy (with outside entries) and AQT9x in our hand we will play low from dummy, playing the 9 if RHO plays low. Generally speaking, we expect to lose one trick only. But in fact, this favorable outcome will only occur 76% of the time. Do we feel hard done by if occasionally we lose two tricks? Of course not. Bridge is not normally a game of absolutes.
Now, you might be wondering what "long suits beget short suits/voids" was supposed to mean. What I mean by that is that as you get longer suits in your hand, you expect, or at least hope for, short suits to go with them, if not in your hand, then perhaps in partner's. For example, you pick up a 7-card suit. If the other suits are 2-2-2, this feels a little unnatural, and a bit of a disappointment, doesn't it? You'd be much less surprised by the 7-3-2-1 pattern. In fact, the 7-3-2-1 shape is three-and-one-half times more common than 7-2-2-2. And, as Lawrence and Wirgren tell us, it is really shortness rather than length that is most indicative of the number of tricks we can take. All things being equal, we'll take more tricks with a 7-3-2-1 hand than a 7-2-2-2 hand. But the "law" only takes into account the length of the trumps, in this case, presumably the seven-card suit. That's one of the obvious reasons why the law can't possibly be the gospel truth.
So, going back to my earlier question "what use is the law?", I do believe that it can help you decide what to do in a high-level competitive auction. Here's an example from a recent club game. You pick up in second seat, vulnerable versus not, ♠T7 ♥93 ♦KQT4 ♣97653. RHO passes, as do you, and LHO opens the proceedings with 2♠. Partner bids 4♣ (showing a good hand and at least 5-5 in hearts and clubs) and RHO bids 4♠. Now what? Let's try to do a "law" calculation. Given that LHO opened a weak two at favorable vulnerability in third seat, he probably has only five spades. I doubt if RHO has five spades with shape because he'd probably have jumped straight to 5♠. But he might have five spades without any shortness. It looks like we have a ten-card club fit and they have a nine-card spade fit so we're guessing 19, or possibly only 18 tricks. We don't have much in the way of points, but it does seem to be our hand, based on the auction so far, though perhaps not by a lot. If they can make 4♠ (-420), we could be -500 or even -800 in 5♣ so that doesn't look good. OTOH, if we can make 5♣ (600), they might be only -500 or -300 when doubled. We decide to pass smoothly (ah, there's the rub!) hoping that given partner's quasi-game-forcing bid, our pass will be considered forcing.
Partner comes in now with 5♥ which strongly suggests 6-5 in the round suits since he'd probably just double with the 5-5 he originally promised. RHO takes the push to 5♠ (perhaps he did have five spades after all) and we revise our idea of the hand now. It looks like they have 10 spades and we have 10 clubs with an 8-card heart fit. So I'm guessing we might have 20 total tricks. However, given that all our honors are in what appears to be a short suit in partner's hand (at most a doubleton), I'm going to be conservative and estimate 19 total tricks as before. So we decide to double expecting to gain 100, 300 or 500 as against (for 6♣) -800, -500, or -200. If we're wrong and there are 20 total tricks, we will be spectacularly wrong in the two extreme cases: they make 850 (pass would be best) or we could make 1370; but still doing fine in the middle (and perhaps more likely) cases: 100, 300 instead of -500, -200.
How did we do in practice? Both sides can take 10 tricks in their black suit, so it was right not to let them play 4♠. Their RHO made the all-too-common error of going to the well twice and falling down it the second time. We score +100 for about average (somewhat as we'd expect). However, there were no other pairs our way scoring 100 for 5♠X. Some pairs managed to set 5♠X two tricks but this must have been careless declarer play.
I think the law was helpful here, keeping us at average despite a difficult competitive board. It was difficult because a) our balanced and poorly fitting hand suggested fewer total tricks than there were; and b) the other side can make game on only 17 high-card points. For the full hand, look up board 18 from the Newton-Wellesley game on Christmas Eve. I was not playing, by the way, so all my thinking described above was fictional, but reasonable.
One of the first things I realized twenty years ago when I first read about the "law" was of course that at best it is a rule of thumb. It is no more a true law (and perhaps even less so) than Bode's law. Some people, if I am to believe the L&W book, seem to believe that it is absolutely true, in the same way that certain fundamentalist religious people think that their "book" is literally true. I say this because Lawrence and Wirgren devote a large part of the book to debunking the myths of the LOTT. Would they bother if there weren't true believers?
Of course the "law" isn't literally true. Every bridge player knows that, including and especially Larry Cohen. And so do I. Yet, one of my bridge friends still chides me for quoting the law when making general statements about competitive bidding, as if I was one of the devoted followers, believing every word of the gospel.
Nevertheless, the "law" does, in a very general sense, show how the total number of tricks available (ours at our best trump suit plus theirs at their best trump suit) increase with the combined lengths of the two best trump suits (ours plus theirs). That's to say, on the whole, each additional trump (of ours) in one of our hands, or their trump in one of their hands, will result in an additional trick (either for us or for them). It doesn't state this as a categorical fact. It simply says that, in general, total tricks increases in step with total trumps.
Although it's never a true law, as mentioned above (in the majority of hands exact equality is the exception rather than the rule), it works best under the following conditions:
- high card points are more or less evenly divided between the two opposing pairs (the usual range is quoted as 17-23 but this is of course an arbitrary boundary);
- total trumps are nearer to 17/18 rather than the extremes of 14/21;
- shortness and length are more or less in harmony (long suits beget short suits/voids);
- you are willing to be off by one trick either way;
- if you have a choice of trump suits of equal length, you choose the best one;
- defense and declarer play at your table are perfect (double-dummy);
- the layout doesn't contain too many short-suit honors, such as K, Qx, Jxx.
As noted, it won't always be right. But bridge, especially matchpoints, is a game where we try to maximize our score in the long run without worrying too much about the occasional hand where things don't work out. For example, with no enemy bidding, no special avoidance requirements, and holding three small trumps in dummy (with outside entries) and AQT9x in our hand we will play low from dummy, playing the 9 if RHO plays low. Generally speaking, we expect to lose one trick only. But in fact, this favorable outcome will only occur 76% of the time. Do we feel hard done by if occasionally we lose two tricks? Of course not. Bridge is not normally a game of absolutes.
Now, you might be wondering what "long suits beget short suits/voids" was supposed to mean. What I mean by that is that as you get longer suits in your hand, you expect, or at least hope for, short suits to go with them, if not in your hand, then perhaps in partner's. For example, you pick up a 7-card suit. If the other suits are 2-2-2, this feels a little unnatural, and a bit of a disappointment, doesn't it? You'd be much less surprised by the 7-3-2-1 pattern. In fact, the 7-3-2-1 shape is three-and-one-half times more common than 7-2-2-2. And, as Lawrence and Wirgren tell us, it is really shortness rather than length that is most indicative of the number of tricks we can take. All things being equal, we'll take more tricks with a 7-3-2-1 hand than a 7-2-2-2 hand. But the "law" only takes into account the length of the trumps, in this case, presumably the seven-card suit. That's one of the obvious reasons why the law can't possibly be the gospel truth.
So, going back to my earlier question "what use is the law?", I do believe that it can help you decide what to do in a high-level competitive auction. Here's an example from a recent club game. You pick up in second seat, vulnerable versus not, ♠T7 ♥93 ♦KQT4 ♣97653. RHO passes, as do you, and LHO opens the proceedings with 2♠. Partner bids 4♣ (showing a good hand and at least 5-5 in hearts and clubs) and RHO bids 4♠. Now what? Let's try to do a "law" calculation. Given that LHO opened a weak two at favorable vulnerability in third seat, he probably has only five spades. I doubt if RHO has five spades with shape because he'd probably have jumped straight to 5♠. But he might have five spades without any shortness. It looks like we have a ten-card club fit and they have a nine-card spade fit so we're guessing 19, or possibly only 18 tricks. We don't have much in the way of points, but it does seem to be our hand, based on the auction so far, though perhaps not by a lot. If they can make 4♠ (-420), we could be -500 or even -800 in 5♣ so that doesn't look good. OTOH, if we can make 5♣ (600), they might be only -500 or -300 when doubled. We decide to pass smoothly (ah, there's the rub!) hoping that given partner's quasi-game-forcing bid, our pass will be considered forcing.
Partner comes in now with 5♥ which strongly suggests 6-5 in the round suits since he'd probably just double with the 5-5 he originally promised. RHO takes the push to 5♠ (perhaps he did have five spades after all) and we revise our idea of the hand now. It looks like they have 10 spades and we have 10 clubs with an 8-card heart fit. So I'm guessing we might have 20 total tricks. However, given that all our honors are in what appears to be a short suit in partner's hand (at most a doubleton), I'm going to be conservative and estimate 19 total tricks as before. So we decide to double expecting to gain 100, 300 or 500 as against (for 6♣) -800, -500, or -200. If we're wrong and there are 20 total tricks, we will be spectacularly wrong in the two extreme cases: they make 850 (pass would be best) or we could make 1370; but still doing fine in the middle (and perhaps more likely) cases: 100, 300 instead of -500, -200.
How did we do in practice? Both sides can take 10 tricks in their black suit, so it was right not to let them play 4♠. Their RHO made the all-too-common error of going to the well twice and falling down it the second time. We score +100 for about average (somewhat as we'd expect). However, there were no other pairs our way scoring 100 for 5♠X. Some pairs managed to set 5♠X two tricks but this must have been careless declarer play.
I think the law was helpful here, keeping us at average despite a difficult competitive board. It was difficult because a) our balanced and poorly fitting hand suggested fewer total tricks than there were; and b) the other side can make game on only 17 high-card points. For the full hand, look up board 18 from the Newton-Wellesley game on Christmas Eve. I was not playing, by the way, so all my thinking described above was fictional, but reasonable.
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