When attitude is known

It's customary when signaling to show attitude when we lead a suit.  If they lead a suit, our attitude is assumed to be bad and we skip to showing count.  If both attitude and count are known, or if bridge logic says that neither of these is important (e.g. a singleton in dummy), we skip to suit preference.

So much is reasonably standard.  Some people like to show count even on the opening lead, others on the opening lead if dummy presents a certain number of cards in the suit, etc.

In this blog entry, I would like to propose a variation: when attitude is already known from the auction, we give count on the first trick.  It's a method I've been playing for a while with one of my partners.

How does it operate?  When is attitude already known?  The premise is that when we get to show a good suit during the auction, our attitude is considered known (and good).  What constitutes showing a good suit?

• an overcall;
• a rebid of a suit;
• a "free" bid in a suit (when pass would be a valid alternative) [according to my principle of "stuff"];
• a lead-directing double of an opponent's artificial bid;

Thus, if we are not obliged to try to win the trick, for instance when partner leads a high card, or we cannot beat the dummy, our carding shows count, not attitude (when attitude is known from the auction).

Here's why it works: in all of the cases given, we have suggested length and strength in the suit.  Because of the length, the suit will not be standing up for very many tricks.  But how many tricks?  That's why count is so important.  Fie, I hear you say, sometimes I make bad overcalls.  Well, that may be true, but assuming partner is going to lead your suit anyway, the damage, if any, will already be done.  Much of the time the play to the first trick will clarify the position.  Yes, it's possible that a tempo or even a trick may be lost when partner gets in and, assuming good attitude (because you weren't able to discourage at trick one because of the obligation to show count), leads the suit a second time.  But for that to cost, four conditions must be met:

1. you have to have made a questionable bid during the auction;
2. you must have been in a position to signal at trick one (i.e. you were not trying to win the trick);
3. declarer/dummy must have sufficient cards in the suit for it to make a difference;
4. it must not be obvious from dummy's holding what's going on in the suit.

The chance of all these happening at the same time is actually quite small.

The same idea applies when the bidder is the one leading the suit.  On opening lead, it is normal to show count in any case so there's really no difference there.  But during the hand, it's common to make attitude leads of new suits.  Again, it's better to show count when we are leading our own "good" suit.

Note that this scheme may also apply (according to partnership agreement) when partner is leading his own known-to-be-good suit: our carding should show count if we can't win the trick.

As always, comments welcome.

Light third-hand openers

I've never found a really good written formula for when and how to open a sub-standard hand in third seat.  I've presented some ideas myself earlier in this blog: Third and Fourth Seat Openers.

A hand came up yesterday evening at the club which suggests a new rule for light third-hand openers: once partner has raised your "suit", never bid a new suit (unless partner forces you to).  This should never be necessary if you start with your best suit.  My partner picked up the following hand: ♠– ♥AJT8 ♦KQ432 ♣T843.  Only the opponents were vulnerable.  After two passes, partner bid 1♥.  My hand was ♠A976 ♥Q53 ♦J6 ♣K975.  My RHO passed and I contributed 2♥.  This went around to my RHO who backed in with 2♠.  Considering that I had a flat maximum, and somewhat forgetting that I had passed originally, I doubled.  Partner now felt that 2♠ was a likely make (it was) and decided to retreat to 3♦, giving me a choice of red suits.  I took this as a good distributional but solid opener, and jumped to the heart game.  My LHO was happy to double this and we went four off for a round zero (even two down would have given us the same matchpoint result).  Double-dummy, we can make 1♥, 2♦ or 4♣ (the par result).

So, what lessons if any are to be learned?  I've always believed that a passed hand should not take any questionable actions.  Doubling 2♠ was not automatic so I should not have done it.  But I think partner should have opened the hand, if at all, with 1♦ (his best suit).  If I bid 1♠ (as I surely would, assuming no intervention), he can then retreat to 2♣.  I would assume a "full" opener of course but the hand really is a full opener (27 Zar points which is an automatic opener in any seat) and, as noted, we can actually make 4♣.

So let me restate my guidelines for light third seat openers (with the new addition):

• Open only in a good suit of four or more cards, one which you'd like led [no "prepared" bids];
• Be ready to pass partner's one-level new suit bid [you can't rebid 1NT because you have too few points, by definition];
• Unless there's a suit you really want led, tend not to open with a very balanced hand, especially vulnerable;
• Don't bid a new suit of your own unless partner makes a forcing bid (he shouldn't, as a passed hand, unless he has a very good hand and fit for you).

Here are a few hands that I think should open 1♥ in third seat:

• ♠A86 ♥KQ93 ♦J6 ♣T975 (probably should pass this if vulnerable);
• ♠K862 ♥AQT5 ♦6 ♣T975, assuming you can't open this with an artificial 2♦ (if partner bids a natural 2♦, you'll just have to suck it up);
• ♠A86 ♥KQ963 ♦86 ♣T95.

 Here are a few hands that I think should probably be passed in third seat, especially if vulnerable:

• ♠A86 ♥KQ93 ♦J65 ♣T97;
• ♠A86 ♥KJ93 ♦Q5 ♣T975;
• ♠A6 ♥K83 ♦Q65 ♣QT975.

Comments welcome.

Protecting Equity

The concept of protecting your equity applies to any form of bridge scoring and at any bidding level but it is especially pertinent for part-scores at matchpoints.  The idea is that if you think you were going to make your contract and the opponents bid on, you have to double them in order to protect your equity.

In the double-or-pass decision, only their vulnerability is relevant.  In most situations, where our part score would score more than 100, doubling has much more to gain if they are vulnerable. Otherwise, doubling only makes good sense if we expect to set them two or if we were planning to get 90 (in 1NT or 2-of-a-minor).  Doubling to protect our equity in the latter case would be extremely rare.

Let's give an example.  Only they are vulnerable and both sides have found a fit.  We have bid 3H, expecting to make (+140) and the opponents counter with 3S.  We basically have two choices: bid on, hoping that we can actually make 4H (or be down only 1 while they can make 3S) or double them, hoping that they can't make 3S.  There is of course the option of passing, which is appropriate if we are vulnerable and/or we think that they have the balance of power.  If we pass and they are down 1 only, our +100 will not score well against those making +140, which is why we would want to double to protect our equity.

Let's say we encounter this board in the last round of a 13 round duplicate.  So far, the board has been passed out once and 3S their way has made twice and gone down one undoubled twice.  3H our way has made four times and gone down once.  One pair our way went down in 3NT doubled and another pair actually made 4H.  Assuming that our defense is going to be accurate, we expect to score +100 as is, earning a 6 (on a 12 top) for an average score.  In other words, if we do nothing, we will get an average board.

We might make 4H (for 11.5) but at the risk of going down (only 2.5 if they double) [gain:5.5 or lose 3.5], but let's say our hand is fairly balanced in light of the auction so we are not seriously considering 4H.  If partner still has a bid, he might bid 4H regardless of what we do, but let's suppose that whatever we do will be final.  Let's say that we decide to double to protect our equity.  If we're right, we will earn an 11 (gain 5).  If we're wrong, we will get an absolute bottom (lose 6).  On the other hand, if we had allowed them to make 3S undoubled, that would have scored only 1 matchpoint so, in fact, our double actually has a rather good reward/risk ratio: 5 to 1. 

Note how important it is that they are vulnerable.  I was reminded of this by my partner Steve yesterday in the morning STAC game.  On board 16, I elected to double 3S.  On paper, this wasn't a terrible decision, because I rated to gain 4.5 mps on a 15 top (there were 9 pairs in 3S the other way) and, assuming that we weren't setting it, we probably were only getting something like 6 mps anyway.  But now the reward/risk ratio is actually only 3/4 (nothing like the 5/1 we had above).  This is primarily because they weren't vulnerable!  So, our hypothetical gain was only from beating the 9 defenders of 3S (who we would otherwise have tied).  Because of the opponents' lack of vulnerability, the hoped for +100 wouldn't have restored our equity which in this case was +110 for 3C.  Assuming that there were a few pairs our way making 110 or 130, we'd have gained a whole point against each of these if the opponents were vulnerable, meaning that our R/R ratio would at least be greater than 1.

As it happens, of course, we couldn't defeat 3S (actually we let them score an overtrick) and 4C would have been down 2 vulnerable, possibly doubled.  Despite our 21 hcp, they can take 9 tricks in spade while we can take 8 tricks in clubs.  The commonest number of total tricks (17) but on this occasion biased in favor of the other direction.  Allowing them to make 10 tricks would only have earned us 3 matchpoints so in a way we only lost those 3.  But maybe our defense would have been more passive if we weren't trying to set the contract, in which case we'd have scored 7.

Jacoby Two-Notrump Rebids

Not much to write about these days from the bridge trail.  I haven't seen any really interesting hands.

However, one topic has been on my mind for a while and an example came up just the other day in the STAC tournament (Friday morning, board 4).  As dealer, with both sides vulnerable, you pick up the following hand: ♠QJ953 ♥3 ♦KQ ♣AK542.  You have a decent 15 point hand although you couldn't say that it was a great 15 points.  Anyway, with silent opponents throughout, you open 1♠ and partner responds 2NT (game-forcing with four or more spades and either a good 13 or more hcp or a balanced hand, or both).  What should your rebid be?  What is the most useful thing for partner to know?  The singleton ♥3 or the good club suit?  Of course, that depends on partner's hand.  But one thing is for sure, partner will know you have a singleton (or void) regardless of which bid you choose.  A computer simulation is probably the best way to determine the best call. With ♠QJ953 ♥3 ♦K5 ♣AKQ42, I think that 4♣ stands out a mile.  Even with the actual hand, I think that 4♣ is best, even though it uses up more bidding space.  On this particular hand, responder held ♠AT72 ♥AK865 ♦92 ♣Q6.  Given that we're off an ace and the trump K, no good pair is going to bid the slam (which makes by the way).  Nevertheless, the responding hand will have cause to get very excited and bid 4♥ over 4♣ because whether opener's shortness is in hearts or diamonds, it really doesn't matter much as there's no wastage either way.  Over the actual 3♥ rebid, responder bid 3♠ leaving the door open but we ended up subsiding in 4♠.  However, if opener's hand had been ever so slightly different, ♠KJ953 ♥3 ♦KJ ♣AK542, we probably would have missed an easy and biddable slam.

So, what sort of suit quality does a 4-level rebid promise.  I'd say the usual "two of the top three" honors is about the minimum (similar to a positive response to a 2♣ bid).  Missing the ace or king, we'd probably want the J too, or at least the ten.  So AKxxx, AQJxx would all qualify but nothing less.  KQTxx would be OK when every other aspect of the hand is perfect.

Comments?

Sometimes you're the windshield, sometimes you're the bug

Sometimes you're the windshield, sometimes you're the bug.  This is an expression that Kim often consoles me with after I've had a bad session or two of bridge (or, for example, when England loses to Germany).  It's something that bridge players have to live with.  Because bridge is essentially a game of incomplete information for all four players at the table, almost anything can happen.  Add to that the varying skill levels of the players, the different bidding and defensive systems of the partnerships, the different states of emotion and readiness of the individuals.  And the fact that in duplicate bridge, there is always at least one other table in play over which "we" at our table no control whatsoever.

The only other time I played with Peter in a serious event, we were tied for second.  In yesterday's A/X pairs we might have been tied for second again, but this time counting from the bottom!  Whereas in our first effort, we got lucky with some of our actions and received a good number of gifts, yesterday it was the reverse.  I played badly.  No question about that.  Especially in the evening session where I couldn't concentrate to save my life.  Having had a mediocre first session, there was essentially nothing to play for.  We both could have used a good nap.

One board stands out as being particularly exasperating.  I was declaring a perfectly normal 4-of-a-major contract against a pair I didn't know.  I had a combination in a side suit that cried out for an elimination (in hopes of an overtrick).  Watching the carding of the opponents (playing standard carding) it appeared that one of the suits to be eliminated was dividing 3-4.  It was a totally normal situation where defenders would normally show count in a side suit early in the hand (this was trick 2).  However, I was aware that one, or both, players might "lie" about the count.  Yet their carding appeared consistent.  So, I made a play that depended on the location of the 9 of trumps being right (50%), and the opponents' carding.  In other words, there was significantly better than a 87.5% chance of my play being safe.  Both opponents had to be "lying" for no good reason and the 9 had to be wrong.  You guessed it.  I'm sure I was the only person in the room going down in what was a claimer for 10 tricks at trick 1.  And with the actual layout, it turned out that no overtrick was ever possible.  The dumb things we sometimes do at matchpoints!  [postcript: in my defense, it turns out that 420 was worth 5.5 while 450 was worth 15 matchpoints, so that on the unfavorable lead I received, I was risking 5 mps to gain 10, that's to say odds of 2:1].

Jan and I did enjoy winning the single-session Swiss (euphemism for "wooden spoon") with a score of 64.  I also enjoyed, with Peter, our losing knockout match against the #2 seed.  As everyone says, if you want to improve, you have to play the best teams.  One thing about playing good teams is that table manners are, at least in my experience, universally impeccable.  That really adds to the enjoyment of getting crushed!

New DSIP rule to cope with two-suited bids

In the DSIP rule summary, I state that doubles after a two-suited bid (by either side) are for penalties.  The one noted exception is that when partner makes a two-suited bid and one of the suits is unknown, an immediate double asks partner to bid the unknown suit.

When they make a two-suited bid, the situation is slightly different.  Whether we know both suits or not, we don't know which suit they are going to settle in.  I propose that a delayed double after they make a two-suited bid is for takeout of the suit they have now bid.  This should not be confused with a delayed double of a (known) suit, which is always for penalty.

Here's an example of a hand where a delayed double would have worked better.  Partner opened 1NT (12-14) and RHO bid 2NT for the minors.  None were vulnerable and I held the following hand: ♠xxxx ♥Kxxx ♦x ♣KQxx..  I wanted to compete and/or to suggest a possible penalty so I doubled.  Partner doubled the takeout to 3♦ and they made 5 (most probably I could have saved a trick but I thought I was squeezed).  We lost 11 imps on the board. Obviously, I didn't have enough hcp to suggest a penalty double.

What I perhaps needed to do was to pass over 2NT and then double when 3♦ came around to me.  Even then it's a questionable action because my club holding won't be very useful.  But I think we'd have done better than -670, assuming partner takes it out to his four-card major. 

Jumping in the pass-out seat

There's fairly uniform agreement on what kind of a hand 2♥ or 2♠ shows after three passes: it's kind of an intermediate two-bid: a good six card suit and somewhere in the 9-13 hcp range.  In other words, either a maximum weak two or a minimum opener.  The logic is easy.  You have, say, 11 hcp which leaves 29 for the other players.  You already know that none of them has an opening bid.  Most probably they have 9 or 10 points each. Between them, they have 7 spades so that's 2 or 3 each on average. If partner has 9 with two pieces in support, you will typically be able to make 2♠ and the opponents, remember each of them has already passed, will be loathe to come in at the three level.  Preemption with a good expectation of making.  What could be better?

But what if LHO opens, say, 1♣ or 1♦ and there are two passes to you?  If there is a "standard" meaning for 2♥ or 2♠ here, it is a good hand with a good suit.  Something around 16 hcp and a good six-card suit.  What always surprises me is how many good players don't seem to know this.  Many think that it is an intermediate sort of bid (as after three passes).

This time the logic is less compelling.  LHO has at least opening strength and may have just less than he needs to open 2♣ or 2NT.  He doesn't have a balanced hand in his 1 notrump opening range, but that doesn't exclude very many hands.  On general principles, let's say he has 14 points or thereabouts.  We know RHO has less than about six points.  Let's say we have the hand with 11 hcp and six spades.  Again, partner should have about 10 hcp so 2♠ is likely make reasonably easily.

But there's a catch.  And it's especially likely to happen the longer is our holding in LHO's minor and the shorter we are in the other major.  The feared circumstance is when partner is in fact weak and LHO is strong.  He is likely to double our 2♠ and might even find a game (or slam) when we could have passed it out!

If we have length in LHO's minor, partner is, all things being equal, likely to have few cards and therefore, with any modicum of strength, might have been able to act.  And if we're both short in the other major, the opponents might have a good fit there.

Given that both treatments have some merit, it's good to decide ahead of time whether to use the jump balancing overcall as intermediate or strong.

At last week's tournament in Saratoga, my partner and I had not discussed it.  The bidding started on my left with 1♦, followed by two passes (none vulnerable).  My hand was something like ♠AQJxxx ♥KQJ ♦xx ♣Axx.  I bid 2♠ and LHO asked what that meant.  Partner informed her that we had no specific agreement (in fact, he thought it was intermediate).  LHO doubled, partner passed and RHO bid 2♦.  Yes, you read that right.  I decided to accept the 2♦ call and was obliged to borrow my LHO's 2♠ card in order to bid 2♠ again.  This time, partner felt that his hand was just good enough to raise to 3♠, although it's hard to know exactly what 2♠ means when it's bid again.  I raised that to 4♠ which I was able to make on the nose.  The opponents at the other table made the same tricks but did not bid the game, so we picked up a useful 6 IMPs.

It's always fun to be able to make the same bid twice!  I suppose I could have accepted and passed and allowed partner to bid 2♠ with support.  Perhaps that would have been better but I felt I had a little extra myself.