My young partner Alexander and I couldn't get our teammates from the most recent Eight is Enough at the Watertown, MA sectional (which we had won), but we got another very good pair: Steve and Vincent. We began the evening in a three-way whence we emerged with the disheartening total of 9 victory points. One of these teams ended up in second place, but that's small consolation. So, now we had only two more rounds—we would need blitzes in both matches in order to finish in the overalls.
One rather odd aspect of this event was that every single board in the first two rounds was played (at our table) in a no-trump contract: eleven at 3NT, one at 1NT. The first board of the next set was also a notrump contract. Together with three more in the final set, we ended up playing 2/3 of all contracts without the benefit of a trump suit.
Things turned around for us in the third round: we won by 39 IMPs. There were three pushes and three swings in our direction. Two of these were grand slams bid by our teammates but not by our opponents. We can't take any credit there. But here is a hand that merits some comment: my hand was ♠JTxxx ♥Kxx ♦x ♣QTxx. We were at favorable vulnerability and I passed as dealer. The next player also passed. Alexander opened 1♠ and the next player doubled. One of my favorite tactics is to feign strength. I could perhaps have jumped to 4♠ but who knows whether they might successfully reach 5♦ or 5♥? Instead I splintered with 4♦. The next player passed and Alexander signed off in 4♠. We were not doubled and drifted off two tricks for -100. Meanwhile, our teammates were able to bid a comfortable 3NT on their combined 25 hcp. Here's the whole hand...
This is thinking out of the box, for sure. Third-hand bidding is an art in itself. If prospects for your own game look dim, and the vulnerability is favorable, it's reasonable to try to get in the way of their game. So far, spades hadn't been claimed and, if I was to end up on lead, a spade out might be quite helpful, thus the 1♠ bidding card. I was as surprised as anyone to find out that declarer had only three. And I will have to be careful if this becomes a habit ("Alert: at least three spades, may have a really bad hand"). But coming as it did with three boards still to play, it was a great shot across the bows of the opponents.
Oh yes, we added 38 VPs in our last two rounds and ended up tied for fourth place.
Friday, September 12, 2014
Sunday, August 17, 2014
A new species of double?
A couple of hands came up the other evening where competitive auctions arose in which I was forced to make a cooperative penalty double. Is there such a thing? I think so.
Let's revisit what a normal cooperative (or competitive double is). It's a call where a) we believe our side has the strength to compete; b) there is no other possible action because we have insufficient cards in our suits; c) we expect (60%?) that partner will normally take it out but won't be surprised if he passes for penalties.
So, what's a cooperative penalty double? It's very similar. We believe that, based on the hand partner has shown so far, that the opponents will be going down in their contract. It's therefore a penalty double. Partner will leave it in probably 75% of the time, but we won't be surprised if partner takes it out.
Why would partner take out such a penalty double? For the simple reason that he thinks that he'll score more playing our own contract than defending.
A well-known case of a cooperative penalty double is made when the opponents sacrifice over our game bid (or our commitment to game) and partner makes a forcing pass. If we have no extra distribution, we will be, perhaps reluctantly, forced to double. But we will be thrilled if partner now pulls our double because this is the "pass-and-pull" maneuver which says that he's interested in slam.
Less spectacular was this hand:
Obviously, partner doesn't have a bid and therefore passed. We collected 300 for a top. Well, no, it wasn't a top. Several E/W pairs managed to find the lucky 3NT game. I wonder how their auctions might have gone. Even for those playing 16-18 (and I doubt there were any), surely the East hand isn't worth an invitation, is it?
Next up, from the same session, a much more controversial instance:
Notwithstanding the fact that you surely should have bid 2♥ at your previous turn, what are you going to do now? Is partner's double final and absolutely penalty? Seriously, how can it be? He doesn't know what your hand is, but he assumes that we can score a game our way but he doesn't know what in. How can he be sure that your side can get 2♠ down 2? And bear in mind that partner doesn't know about your third heart (indeed, he assumes you don't have it) nor your sixth diamond. Those are two offensive cards that will make us want to play our own contract.
In other words, he is making a cooperative penalty double.
When I posed this situation to the BridgeWinners site, there were three votes for taking out into hearts, 18 for pass and seven abstentions. At least one abstention was because they would have bid 2♥ at their previous turn so the problem would not have arisen.
Here's the full deal:
As you can see, 2♠N is cold as is 4♥E. What went wrong?
I think one clear error was made, and two misjudgments, each worth half an error. In total these were the cause of missing the two tricks we needed in defense of 2♠X. West never showed that he had three hearts. Presumably, he intended to support hearts after he had created a game force with 2♦—so what happened? And both East and West had six card suits when they might only have had a five card suit.
Switch a couple of small red cards from the West hand with a couple of small black cards from the South hand and we get the following layout:
In this layout, totally consistent with the actual auction, the "normal" contract is 3NT by West making four for 430. But 2♠X by North is now worth 500 to E/W.
So, this example of the cooperative penalty double was not such a success. But I think it could have been, given a full understanding of the idea. I should note that in neither situation had this concept ever been discussed, or even contemplated. But in at least one case it did work well.
I believe that this sort of double can only occur after responder has made a forcing bid (such as a game-forcing 2/1 or forcing-1NT-with-invitational hand). One is that it is only when we have an expectation of being able to make game (or are close) that we would even think of making a penalty double that might be pulled for tactical reasons. [I don't count those situations where partner pulls with a weak distributional hand because that is a unilateral action, not one anticipated by doubler].
The other reason is a more practical one. There aren't any other situations where responder makes a delayed support bid. In the auction on board 5, West was only able to avoid immediately supporting hearts because he had a forcing bid at his disposal. After such a response, opener doesn't yet know if his side has a fit or not so he may easily try for a penalty only to have his partner show support and revert to plan A—bidding and making game.
Let's revisit what a normal cooperative (or competitive double is). It's a call where a) we believe our side has the strength to compete; b) there is no other possible action because we have insufficient cards in our suits; c) we expect (60%?) that partner will normally take it out but won't be surprised if he passes for penalties.
So, what's a cooperative penalty double? It's very similar. We believe that, based on the hand partner has shown so far, that the opponents will be going down in their contract. It's therefore a penalty double. Partner will leave it in probably 75% of the time, but we won't be surprised if partner takes it out.
Why would partner take out such a penalty double? For the simple reason that he thinks that he'll score more playing our own contract than defending.
A well-known case of a cooperative penalty double is made when the opponents sacrifice over our game bid (or our commitment to game) and partner makes a forcing pass. If we have no extra distribution, we will be, perhaps reluctantly, forced to double. But we will be thrilled if partner now pulls our double because this is the "pass-and-pull" maneuver which says that he's interested in slam.
Less spectacular was this hand:
Next up, from the same session, a much more controversial instance:
In other words, he is making a cooperative penalty double.
When I posed this situation to the BridgeWinners site, there were three votes for taking out into hearts, 18 for pass and seven abstentions. At least one abstention was because they would have bid 2♥ at their previous turn so the problem would not have arisen.
Here's the full deal:
I think one clear error was made, and two misjudgments, each worth half an error. In total these were the cause of missing the two tricks we needed in defense of 2♠X. West never showed that he had three hearts. Presumably, he intended to support hearts after he had created a game force with 2♦—so what happened? And both East and West had six card suits when they might only have had a five card suit.
Switch a couple of small red cards from the West hand with a couple of small black cards from the South hand and we get the following layout:
So, this example of the cooperative penalty double was not such a success. But I think it could have been, given a full understanding of the idea. I should note that in neither situation had this concept ever been discussed, or even contemplated. But in at least one case it did work well.
I believe that this sort of double can only occur after responder has made a forcing bid (such as a game-forcing 2/1 or forcing-1NT-with-invitational hand). One is that it is only when we have an expectation of being able to make game (or are close) that we would even think of making a penalty double that might be pulled for tactical reasons. [I don't count those situations where partner pulls with a weak distributional hand because that is a unilateral action, not one anticipated by doubler].
The other reason is a more practical one. There aren't any other situations where responder makes a delayed support bid. In the auction on board 5, West was only able to avoid immediately supporting hearts because he had a forcing bid at his disposal. After such a response, opener doesn't yet know if his side has a fit or not so he may easily try for a penalty only to have his partner show support and revert to plan A—bidding and making game.
Thursday, July 31, 2014
The Rabbit's rules
One of my Christmas gifts last year was The Rabbi's Rules by Mark Horton and Eric Kokish,
and based on the late Leonard Helman and his bridge philosophy. It's a very instructive book, with many examples of bidding and play from top-level competition recounted by Horton and interjected with good system suggestions from Kokish. There are 20 of the Rabbi's rules in the set and all are worthy reminders of things to do or not to do.
With the book in mind, I thought I might have a little fun with my own set of rules. But given that my bridge resume is not nearly so impressive as that of Helman, Horton or Kokish, I have dubbed them "The Rabbit's Rules." Most of these have already been talked about in this blog and in those cases, there will be links to the full blog.
With the book in mind, I thought I might have a little fun with my own set of rules. But given that my bridge resume is not nearly so impressive as that of Helman, Horton or Kokish, I have dubbed them "The Rabbit's Rules." Most of these have already been talked about in this blog and in those cases, there will be links to the full blog.
- There are no undos in bridge – once you've told partner you have a particular type of hand, you must stick to your story. See The "no undo" principle or What's done is done.
- Every bid tells a story – there are many ways to bid a hand, especially in competition where you also have pass and double at your disposal so try to choose the sequence that best reflects your hand. See Every bid tells a story and also rule 11.
- Overcalls, and other bids in competition, are made with a specific purpose (or purposes) in mind – not just because you paid your entry fee. See Tram Tickets or To overcall or not to overcall...
- If you make a prepared bid of, say, 1♣ (i.e. with three clubs) you must rebid 1NT (or 2NT) unless partner bids your four-card suit. Rebidding a new suit promises 4+ clubs and a somewhat unbalanced hand. See Prepared Bids (part 1).
- Get on the same page with your partner regarding the meaning of Double! See many articles, e.g. the Cooperative double and Reviewing the situation.
- The best penalty doubles arise when you have no fit for partner. See Wielding the axe or What makes a good penalty double?
- Close competitive decisions should be resolved in terms of the following parameters: trump quality, shape, defensive values. See also rules 8 and 9.
- Close decisions by a passed hand should be resolved in favor of the more conservative action (usually pass). This is especially true when partner has made a "pressure bid." See Passed hands may make only one free bid.
- Only make disciplined sacrifices: don't do it with quacks in the opponents suit or without shortness – and force the opponents to make the last guess. See To sacrifice or not to sacrifice.
- Remember the Golden rules: Game before slam and Declare before game. See Two golden rules of bidding.
- Don't tell the same story twice. If you've already bid a suit and you don't have any extra strength or distribution, don't rebid your suit again just because you don't want to defend.
- If you're making a sub-standard third or fourth seat opener, bid a real suit, not a prepared bid. See Third and Fourth seat openers.
- When the opponents have settled in a place that suits you – and you have no equity to protect, let them play there peacefully. See Staying with happiness.
- If you plan to finesse twice in a suit, finesse against the lower honor first, unless you have a sequence above that honor. See The principle of least commitment.
- If partner has freely bid two suits and you find yourself on lead, then lead the second suit. See the Principle of substantive discretionary bids.
- If you've got it, flaunt it – but don't be a tease. You signal the location of a high card, say the king of spades in a notrump contract and later, partner gets in and leads a low spade. But you also have the ten while the jack is in dummy. Play the king, fulfilling your earlier promise, not the ten. Partner may have chosen to under-lead their ace on the basis of your earlier signal. [I feel sure there's an article on this in my blog but I couldn't find it]
- On defense, don't infer secondary motives on the part of your partner. For example, if you have overcalled a suit or signaled an interest in a suit, and your partner subsequently leads that suit, don't assume he's looking for a ruff – he's just doing what you asked. On the other hand, if trying for a ruff can't possibly cost, you might as well go for it.
- Try to be a lucky player. Have the opponents ever said after the hand was over "You were so lucky to make that contract – no other pair is going to bid that?" What those players don't appreciate is that you listened to the auction, visualized the hands, realized that all your cards were working and made your own luck. See How to be a lucky player.
- Don't underestimate your opponents. As much as we all know that we ourselves are better than almost everyone, those "clueless" opponents will not simply keel over and die when they come to our table – we have to work at beating them. Even in the hands of a total palooka, the ace of trumps is still going to take a trick.
- And the most important of all: Be nice to your partner. Have you ever been playing against a really good pair when they have a disaster? Do they argue and accuse each other of being an idiot? Not at all. They smile and put their cards back in the pocket. It can never be right to criticize partner at the table. Never, ever (although I have been guilty too many times). See RIP Norbert.
Monday, July 14, 2014
Goulash madness or the dog days of summer
I haven't been playing a lot of bridge lately but I'm still getting ideas for blogs. Here's one that has been ready to send to the presses for some time. I'm not sure why I haven't already published it.
I'm as fond of the occasional goulash tournament as the next man. Possibly more so. But one thing I've learned is that the way to do well in a goulash is to forget that the hands are all crazy—just bid the same way you would if you had just dealt the cards yourself. But when it comes to the play of the hand, remember that you cannot count on anything splitting as you normally might.
The denizens of internet goulashes (individual tournaments with pre-selected boards) are a special breed. All of the usual novice errors can be observed here, but they tend to be magnified by large factors when distributions are so wild. Furthermore, a kind of death-wish seems to settle on most of the other players, including—and especially—my partners. I'd like to present a few of the more outré happenings from a recent goulash on BBO which, contrary to my expectations, I won with an average gain of almost four imps per board.
What would you bid with this hand (favorable vulnerability after RHO deals and opens 1♥): ♠QJT8652 ♥— ♦AK64 ♣T9? How about 4♠? It seems reasonable to me. LHO now bids 5♣ and partner doubles. RHO bids 6♣ and it's back to you. Well, 6♦ stands out. No, I'm kidding of course, but that's what my partner bid. This was doubled by your LHO and passed back. You rescue yourself into 6♠ (doubled of course) and here's the whole hand:
You go down three for -500 (-7 imps) instead of collecting 800 in 6♣X for +14.5 imps. If you follow the play you can see that at one point we should have been down four. See what I mean about madness? Of course, North could have saved two imps simply by passing my double. But that's just a peccadillo compared with my partner's transgression.
How about ♠J6 ♥A64 ♦— ♣KQJT9632 all vulnerable, second seat? Would it occur to you to preempt with this hand? What if you knew it was a goulash hand? And, if you do preempt, how high do you go? My partner opened this hand 3♣ and, although I had a decent hand with a singleton club, I did not bid. We missed an easy game when the next player passed too (this may be the first time I've seen a contract in a goulash tournament lower than the four-level). And the only reason 6♣ didn't score was that the opponents could get a first-round heart ruff. Damage? Only one imp!
Now, this one requires a true expert touch by my partner. See how you would measure up. ♠AK98 ♥A ♦53 ♣KJT764. Nobody is vulnerable and your RHO deals and opens 4♥. Your call? My partner made the "master bid" of 4♠. He must have been sweating bullets when I raised him to slam! My hand? ♠QJT762 ♥3 ♦AKT9 ♣Q2. Slam was cold for a 10.5 imp gain. What can I say? Sometimes you just get lucky.
And now for something completely different; a lead problem. Your hand is ♠— ♥KQ62 ♦54 ♣AKT7543, white on red. Partner (that would be me) opens 1♦ and RHO leaps to 4♠ despite being at unfavorable vulnerability. Naturally (!), you bid 5♣ and this is passed back to RHO who bids the fifth spade. This comes back around to partner who doubles, ending a relatively short auction. I'll bet that you cannot duplicate the lead which was found at my table. Honor sequences are for wimps, right? And, of course, leading partner's suit is simply passé.
That's right, you select your fourth highest from... er your second-longest and strongest suit, to wit, the ♥2. Unfortunately dummy's knave wins the first trick and we end up getting only 200 out of this mess instead of the 500 we were due. Given that we can actually make 6♦, this proves to be a loss of 9.5 instead of just 4.5 imps. Of course, nobody is voluntarily bidding slam our way (I had only 10hcp but seven solid diamonds) but our "teammates" pushed their opponents into it.
But I think my favorite of all is the bid chosen by the holder of this hand: ♠AK8 ♥— ♦AQJT9862 ♣A2, dealer at all vulnerable. Do you feel good about opening this 2♣ (strong/artificial)? Or do believe that it will take up too much room given that you will have to show your fine suit at the 3-level? My LHO (yes, I was very happy to have this person as my opponent for this board) found what I think is probably a unique solution: 5♦. My brilliant partner who obviously doesn't enjoy being pushed around bid the obvious (!) 5♥. RHO, presumably assuming that everyone had something approaching their bids, passed and, after some consideration as to whether we could possibly make slam, I passed too. LHO felt that his hand was worth another bid and rebid 6♦. This came around to me and I figured that surely it was better to be in our slam, maybe going down, then to let them play theirs. So I bid 6♥. This was passed out (!) and we quietly drifted off three tricks. See the whole hand for just how bizarre this result was:
Yes, they are cold for 7♦, although nobody managed to bid the grand. But one pair did bid the small slam so our result netted us 11 imps.
And, lest you think that the other players in this tournament had all taken up bridge yesterday, I assure you that every one of the weird actions was taken by somebody with approximately the same level of BBO experience and success as myself. How did I win after so many bad results? It's hard to imagine, I know. But just remember that there are twice as many crazy people at the table playing against you as there are supposedly playing with you.
If you haven't tried the delights of a goulash tournament, you should. But check your ego and your pride at the door, together with your acerbic comments. It's definitely just for fun!
Cheers!
I'm as fond of the occasional goulash tournament as the next man. Possibly more so. But one thing I've learned is that the way to do well in a goulash is to forget that the hands are all crazy—just bid the same way you would if you had just dealt the cards yourself. But when it comes to the play of the hand, remember that you cannot count on anything splitting as you normally might.
The denizens of internet goulashes (individual tournaments with pre-selected boards) are a special breed. All of the usual novice errors can be observed here, but they tend to be magnified by large factors when distributions are so wild. Furthermore, a kind of death-wish seems to settle on most of the other players, including—and especially—my partners. I'd like to present a few of the more outré happenings from a recent goulash on BBO which, contrary to my expectations, I won with an average gain of almost four imps per board.
What would you bid with this hand (favorable vulnerability after RHO deals and opens 1♥): ♠QJT8652 ♥— ♦AK64 ♣T9? How about 4♠? It seems reasonable to me. LHO now bids 5♣ and partner doubles. RHO bids 6♣ and it's back to you. Well, 6♦ stands out. No, I'm kidding of course, but that's what my partner bid. This was doubled by your LHO and passed back. You rescue yourself into 6♠ (doubled of course) and here's the whole hand:
You go down three for -500 (-7 imps) instead of collecting 800 in 6♣X for +14.5 imps. If you follow the play you can see that at one point we should have been down four. See what I mean about madness? Of course, North could have saved two imps simply by passing my double. But that's just a peccadillo compared with my partner's transgression.
How about ♠J6 ♥A64 ♦— ♣KQJT9632 all vulnerable, second seat? Would it occur to you to preempt with this hand? What if you knew it was a goulash hand? And, if you do preempt, how high do you go? My partner opened this hand 3♣ and, although I had a decent hand with a singleton club, I did not bid. We missed an easy game when the next player passed too (this may be the first time I've seen a contract in a goulash tournament lower than the four-level). And the only reason 6♣ didn't score was that the opponents could get a first-round heart ruff. Damage? Only one imp!
Now, this one requires a true expert touch by my partner. See how you would measure up. ♠AK98 ♥A ♦53 ♣KJT764. Nobody is vulnerable and your RHO deals and opens 4♥. Your call? My partner made the "master bid" of 4♠. He must have been sweating bullets when I raised him to slam! My hand? ♠QJT762 ♥3 ♦AKT9 ♣Q2. Slam was cold for a 10.5 imp gain. What can I say? Sometimes you just get lucky.
And now for something completely different; a lead problem. Your hand is ♠— ♥KQ62 ♦54 ♣AKT7543, white on red. Partner (that would be me) opens 1♦ and RHO leaps to 4♠ despite being at unfavorable vulnerability. Naturally (!), you bid 5♣ and this is passed back to RHO who bids the fifth spade. This comes back around to partner who doubles, ending a relatively short auction. I'll bet that you cannot duplicate the lead which was found at my table. Honor sequences are for wimps, right? And, of course, leading partner's suit is simply passé.
That's right, you select your fourth highest from... er your second-longest and strongest suit, to wit, the ♥2. Unfortunately dummy's knave wins the first trick and we end up getting only 200 out of this mess instead of the 500 we were due. Given that we can actually make 6♦, this proves to be a loss of 9.5 instead of just 4.5 imps. Of course, nobody is voluntarily bidding slam our way (I had only 10hcp but seven solid diamonds) but our "teammates" pushed their opponents into it.
But I think my favorite of all is the bid chosen by the holder of this hand: ♠AK8 ♥— ♦AQJT9862 ♣A2, dealer at all vulnerable. Do you feel good about opening this 2♣ (strong/artificial)? Or do believe that it will take up too much room given that you will have to show your fine suit at the 3-level? My LHO (yes, I was very happy to have this person as my opponent for this board) found what I think is probably a unique solution: 5♦. My brilliant partner who obviously doesn't enjoy being pushed around bid the obvious (!) 5♥. RHO, presumably assuming that everyone had something approaching their bids, passed and, after some consideration as to whether we could possibly make slam, I passed too. LHO felt that his hand was worth another bid and rebid 6♦. This came around to me and I figured that surely it was better to be in our slam, maybe going down, then to let them play theirs. So I bid 6♥. This was passed out (!) and we quietly drifted off three tricks. See the whole hand for just how bizarre this result was:
Yes, they are cold for 7♦, although nobody managed to bid the grand. But one pair did bid the small slam so our result netted us 11 imps.
And, lest you think that the other players in this tournament had all taken up bridge yesterday, I assure you that every one of the weird actions was taken by somebody with approximately the same level of BBO experience and success as myself. How did I win after so many bad results? It's hard to imagine, I know. But just remember that there are twice as many crazy people at the table playing against you as there are supposedly playing with you.
If you haven't tried the delights of a goulash tournament, you should. But check your ego and your pride at the door, together with your acerbic comments. It's definitely just for fun!
Cheers!
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Equal-level Conversion?
Are you one of those people who fills out the overcalls point range on the convention card with something like 8 to 16? My answer to that question is a very British "Rubbish!" How can anyone seriously suggest that overcalls are about high card points? Especially the people designing convention cards!
To me, the difference between overcalling and doubling then bidding a suit is all about the suit quality and the shape of the rest of the hand. There are some really excellent offensively oriented hands that might do it with only 15 to 16 high card points. And others with 18 or 19 that are really only good enough for a simple overcall. Here's a hand from the other day where we were the only pair to reach game: ♠AKQJ72 ♥QT5 ♦A5 ♣64. All were vulnerable and my RHO, the dealer, opened 1♦. I regard this hand as somewhere in the vicinity of the tipping point between starting with 1♠ and double. But the quality of the spade suit tipped the balance in favor of double. The next player passed and, naturally, partner bid 2♣. After RHO passed, I bid 2♠. My partner, Alexander, who recognized this for what it was, had few qualms about bidding 3NT which he made with an overtrick. His hand was: ♠6 ♥K9 ♦QJ63 ♣J98732.
The only complication that we have to worry about is due to the concept of "equal-level conversion." Like some other bridge conventions or rules, such as "negative free bids" or "restricted choice," equal level conversion is about as badly named as anything could be. I've previously mentioned this subject briefly in Gosh, what a hand! The problem is that not everyone knows how to distinguish an equal-level-conversion from a good, one-suited hand. How can we be certain what's going on?
For the last several years, I've been thinking along the lines suggested by Robson and Segal in their book on competitive bidding (see that other blog entry for a reference). They talk about bidding above two-of-opener's-suit. But last evening at the bridge club [this was actually six months ago as I am now writing], I realized that there is one and only one determining factor which separates an "equal-level" conversion from a GOSH (good one-suited hand). Did you skip over the third suit after partner's response?
You pick up, in fourth seat, red on white,♠4 ♥AJ976 ♦AKT943 ♣A. LHO opens 1♠ partner passes and RHO raises to 2♠. How are you going to treat this monster? My friend Peter chose to bid 3♠, resulting eventually in the top spot of 5♥, but he was at another table. I'm really not sure what's best here, although I think I like 3♠, as it cannot possibly be passed by partner. At this vulnerability, double can't be too dangerous because partner will never pass the double for penalties. What about 2NT? Although it seems unlikely that this could be to play, it might be misinterpreted and then when partner chooses clubs and you rebid diamonds, partner might wonder if it was supposed to be natural all along.
So let's say for the sake of argument that you double and partner bids, as expected, 3♣. You are going to bid a red suit but which one you bid makes all the difference. When you double and partner selects one of the three unbid suits and you correct to the next cheapest (in this case 3♦), you are showing a two suited hand (note that the next cheapest might not be at the same level as the cheapest if for example hearts was their suit). This just shows a two-suited takeout and would be described, potentially erroneously, as an equal-level conversion.
But if instead you bid the fourth suit, bypassing the next-cheapest, then you are showing a GOSH (good one-suited hand).
Here's another hand from the same session to illustrate the principle of the (non) equal-level conversion. You hold ♠A432 ♥98 ♦AJ4 ♣QJT2 and with favorable vulnerability you decide to double the 1♦ call on your right. Personally, I like to have a little more ammo for this kind of off-shape double but the vulnerability is in your favor. If partner makes the expected 1♥ call, you will bid 1♠ showing the black suits. Here, you have converted at equal level, but partner may have to raise the level if he likes clubs more than spades. In practice, your LHO is the one with the balance of power (not partner) and he (LHO) redoubles. Partner bids 2♣ denying four cards in either major and they end up in a heart game, making five.
Occasionally, there will still be some ambiguity. If, going back to the first hand, my spades and hearts were switched, and the auction proceeded as before 1♦ X p 2♣ p ? 2♥ could still be showing a major two-suiter. If partner chooses spades and you bid 3♥, partner should get the message. But what if he likes the majors equally and passes 2♥? You might miss a game when you have a really outstanding hand (better than this one). In such a case you might have to make a jump bid of 3♥ over 2♣, but I think that would be rare.
And don't forget that you do need some extras (say 13 hcp?) if you have an off-shape double that will require conversion as you will often end up a level higher than you'd really like. Even then, you're likely to suffer the occasional 800.
Clearly, you have to be confident that partner won't misinterpret your rebid after a takeout double. As long as you have that assurance you can be much more frisky in your off-shape takeout doubles.
To me, the difference between overcalling and doubling then bidding a suit is all about the suit quality and the shape of the rest of the hand. There are some really excellent offensively oriented hands that might do it with only 15 to 16 high card points. And others with 18 or 19 that are really only good enough for a simple overcall. Here's a hand from the other day where we were the only pair to reach game: ♠AKQJ72 ♥QT5 ♦A5 ♣64. All were vulnerable and my RHO, the dealer, opened 1♦. I regard this hand as somewhere in the vicinity of the tipping point between starting with 1♠ and double. But the quality of the spade suit tipped the balance in favor of double. The next player passed and, naturally, partner bid 2♣. After RHO passed, I bid 2♠. My partner, Alexander, who recognized this for what it was, had few qualms about bidding 3NT which he made with an overtrick. His hand was: ♠6 ♥K9 ♦QJ63 ♣J98732.
The only complication that we have to worry about is due to the concept of "equal-level conversion." Like some other bridge conventions or rules, such as "negative free bids" or "restricted choice," equal level conversion is about as badly named as anything could be. I've previously mentioned this subject briefly in Gosh, what a hand! The problem is that not everyone knows how to distinguish an equal-level-conversion from a good, one-suited hand. How can we be certain what's going on?
For the last several years, I've been thinking along the lines suggested by Robson and Segal in their book on competitive bidding (see that other blog entry for a reference). They talk about bidding above two-of-opener's-suit. But last evening at the bridge club [this was actually six months ago as I am now writing], I realized that there is one and only one determining factor which separates an "equal-level" conversion from a GOSH (good one-suited hand). Did you skip over the third suit after partner's response?
You pick up, in fourth seat, red on white,♠4 ♥AJ976 ♦AKT943 ♣A. LHO opens 1♠ partner passes and RHO raises to 2♠. How are you going to treat this monster? My friend Peter chose to bid 3♠, resulting eventually in the top spot of 5♥, but he was at another table. I'm really not sure what's best here, although I think I like 3♠, as it cannot possibly be passed by partner. At this vulnerability, double can't be too dangerous because partner will never pass the double for penalties. What about 2NT? Although it seems unlikely that this could be to play, it might be misinterpreted and then when partner chooses clubs and you rebid diamonds, partner might wonder if it was supposed to be natural all along.
So let's say for the sake of argument that you double and partner bids, as expected, 3♣. You are going to bid a red suit but which one you bid makes all the difference. When you double and partner selects one of the three unbid suits and you correct to the next cheapest (in this case 3♦), you are showing a two suited hand (note that the next cheapest might not be at the same level as the cheapest if for example hearts was their suit). This just shows a two-suited takeout and would be described, potentially erroneously, as an equal-level conversion.
But if instead you bid the fourth suit, bypassing the next-cheapest, then you are showing a GOSH (good one-suited hand).
Here's another hand from the same session to illustrate the principle of the (non) equal-level conversion. You hold ♠A432 ♥98 ♦AJ4 ♣QJT2 and with favorable vulnerability you decide to double the 1♦ call on your right. Personally, I like to have a little more ammo for this kind of off-shape double but the vulnerability is in your favor. If partner makes the expected 1♥ call, you will bid 1♠ showing the black suits. Here, you have converted at equal level, but partner may have to raise the level if he likes clubs more than spades. In practice, your LHO is the one with the balance of power (not partner) and he (LHO) redoubles. Partner bids 2♣ denying four cards in either major and they end up in a heart game, making five.
Occasionally, there will still be some ambiguity. If, going back to the first hand, my spades and hearts were switched, and the auction proceeded as before 1♦ X p 2♣ p ? 2♥ could still be showing a major two-suiter. If partner chooses spades and you bid 3♥, partner should get the message. But what if he likes the majors equally and passes 2♥? You might miss a game when you have a really outstanding hand (better than this one). In such a case you might have to make a jump bid of 3♥ over 2♣, but I think that would be rare.
And don't forget that you do need some extras (say 13 hcp?) if you have an off-shape double that will require conversion as you will often end up a level higher than you'd really like. Even then, you're likely to suffer the occasional 800.
Clearly, you have to be confident that partner won't misinterpret your rebid after a takeout double. As long as you have that assurance you can be much more frisky in your off-shape takeout doubles.
Monday, June 23, 2014
Nashua, NH
I don't often use this space to tell you about good results that happened at the table. Typically, I am more interested in some point of theory or maybe some problem hand that arose. But it's nice to be able to write about good results, especially when I can give most of the credit to my partner.
Last week I got to play with my wife and favorite bridge partner, Kim—for a change—in one of the big pairs events at the Nashua, NH, summer regional. We got a few gifts in the first session, resulting in a 63% game. One of my favorite hands, and an excellent example of the efficacy of the cooperative double, is the following:
What is particularly impressive here is that most of the evidence suggested passing my double. Yet, knowing that I was a passed hand, it must have appeared very likely that 2♠ would make (it would) and so Kim sensibly bid 3♥. At the point of the 2♠ bid, we were destined for either 5 or 10.5 matchpoints (out of 25), depending on our defense. When they didn’t double 3♥, we had improved to average. When one defensive trick was mislaid, we moved up to 17.5 mps, but then they dropped another, allowing Kim to actually make her contract. That put us all the way up to 23.5.
We were about half-way through the afternoon session, struggling a bit and getting insufficient gifts, when this hand came up. As you can see there's not much to the auction—but all day we had been defending a lot and doing it quite well, this being perhaps our best effort. We were lucky that declarer went astray a little—but we did everything we could to help him along.
Kim chose the ♠8 for her opening lead which helped create the illusion that she started with AJ98. I quickly decided to duck the first high spade so I could smoothly follow low (2). Now, it must have seemed "obvious" how the spades were dividing. Declarer has no very good option at this point, the suit he wants to develop first (spades) being playable only from the other side of the table. Obviously hearts is the suit to attack, but which one? I think running the 9 stands out, but on this layout it turns out just as wrong as leading low to the king and ace, which is what declarer actually did.
Kim had noticed my ♠2 (we play upside-down carding) and so she continued with the ♠9. After some thought, declarer backed his earlier hunch and played the king which I captured with my ace. It was still far from obvious how we were setting this contract, but I chose to lead ♣2. I knew this would persuade Kim to return a club if she won the trick (we play attitude leads in the middle of the hand) but I didn't mind that too much as I did have the 9 sitting over the T8 and quite possibly the thirteenth club. But even more so, I didn't particularly want her to continue spades just yet or to switch to another suit.
Some of the plays seem a bit odd, I know. It's possible that I have the exact sequence of spots wrong—my recollection is that my hand took four tricks including the last trick with a diamond—but I couldn't make that work so I must have misremembered. But the final outcome is correct—we ended up setting the contract by two tricks. No other N/S pair managed eight tricks on defense. Our result was a shared top (23/24) because two other pairs managed to set contracts of 2NT and 3NT, each by two tricks.
This board helped us to a 55% session which was just enough to give us a creditable fourth place. Not too bad for a 27-table event with average masterpoints of almost 3500.
Last week I got to play with my wife and favorite bridge partner, Kim—for a change—in one of the big pairs events at the Nashua, NH, summer regional. We got a few gifts in the first session, resulting in a 63% game. One of my favorite hands, and an excellent example of the efficacy of the cooperative double, is the following:
[deal rotated]
What is particularly impressive here is that most of the evidence suggested passing my double. Yet, knowing that I was a passed hand, it must have appeared very likely that 2♠ would make (it would) and so Kim sensibly bid 3♥. At the point of the 2♠ bid, we were destined for either 5 or 10.5 matchpoints (out of 25), depending on our defense. When they didn’t double 3♥, we had improved to average. When one defensive trick was mislaid, we moved up to 17.5 mps, but then they dropped another, allowing Kim to actually make her contract. That put us all the way up to 23.5.
We were about half-way through the afternoon session, struggling a bit and getting insufficient gifts, when this hand came up. As you can see there's not much to the auction—but all day we had been defending a lot and doing it quite well, this being perhaps our best effort. We were lucky that declarer went astray a little—but we did everything we could to help him along.
Kim chose the ♠8 for her opening lead which helped create the illusion that she started with AJ98. I quickly decided to duck the first high spade so I could smoothly follow low (2). Now, it must have seemed "obvious" how the spades were dividing. Declarer has no very good option at this point, the suit he wants to develop first (spades) being playable only from the other side of the table. Obviously hearts is the suit to attack, but which one? I think running the 9 stands out, but on this layout it turns out just as wrong as leading low to the king and ace, which is what declarer actually did.
Kim had noticed my ♠2 (we play upside-down carding) and so she continued with the ♠9. After some thought, declarer backed his earlier hunch and played the king which I captured with my ace. It was still far from obvious how we were setting this contract, but I chose to lead ♣2. I knew this would persuade Kim to return a club if she won the trick (we play attitude leads in the middle of the hand) but I didn't mind that too much as I did have the 9 sitting over the T8 and quite possibly the thirteenth club. But even more so, I didn't particularly want her to continue spades just yet or to switch to another suit.
Some of the plays seem a bit odd, I know. It's possible that I have the exact sequence of spots wrong—my recollection is that my hand took four tricks including the last trick with a diamond—but I couldn't make that work so I must have misremembered. But the final outcome is correct—we ended up setting the contract by two tricks. No other N/S pair managed eight tricks on defense. Our result was a shared top (23/24) because two other pairs managed to set contracts of 2NT and 3NT, each by two tricks.
This board helped us to a 55% session which was just enough to give us a creditable fourth place. Not too bad for a 27-table event with average masterpoints of almost 3500.
Wednesday, June 18, 2014
Using double to find out about fit (part 2)
This follow-up of the earlier Using double to find out about fit is prompted by some comments by Jeff Lehman on my last DSIP-related blog The final problem. [I apologize in advance for the inordinate length of this article, but I simply don't have the time to make it shorter—but at least I have included quite a few hand diagrams.]
Jeff maintains that in a competitive auction, after we have found a fit, we should use double to penalize the opponents, bid with an offensive hand, and pass otherwise [I hope I have this right]. And I would guess that at least 95% of active bridge players would agree with him. I recognize that I am in the minority.
So, I'd like to explain why I think my style is better. But, first, I'd better summarize it. When we find a fit at the two-level, we usually don't know whether it's a single eight-card fit, a nine-card-plus fit or some kind of double fit. I say "usually" because pairs playing Bergen raises and perhaps some other conventions actually do know. But, I am talking about the normal situation where the auction has gone, say, 1♥ (p) 2♥ or perhaps 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p) 2♥, although for simplicity I will only discuss the first of these auctions. Let's say that the last bid is immediately overcalled by 2♠. Or perhaps there is a double, taken out to 2♠. How should we proceed?
I recommend what amounts to a pass-double inversion, just like some expert pairs play at higher levels when they're in a forcing pass situation. Here, we're not in a force, of course, but I should say that we will do something probably 75% of the time or more. Pass says either "I have neither extra strength nor extra distribution" or "I have a hand which would like to defend a doubled contract if you have extra strength." Double says "I'm relatively short in their suit [usually a doubleton], and I have extra strength but no clear bid." Much of the time, therefore, we will bid on, sometimes we will "nail" the opponents and sometimes we will meekly pass and let them have the contract.
The first thing we notice is that we no longer have a good way to invite game. All of our Kokish game tries, help-suit game tries and their like are essentially out the window. We can show a second suit, bid 2NT or we can bid 3♥ (higher bids will commit our side to game anyway). But those bids can also be used simply to compete with an offensively-oriented hand. Which style makes most sense? I believe that the scoring table favors an approach which goes: declare before game before slam. I don't have the space to justify this idea here but I do talk about it some more in Two golden rules of bidding. But very briefly: if they have intervened with 2♠, and can make it while you can take ten tricks not-vulnerable in hearts, you will earn 7 imps just by bidding on to 3♥ and only a further 4 imps by actually bidding game. If you think you might be able to make game but have no good way to find out partner's opinion, just bid it. If you're right you'll gain 11 imps, if you're wrong then at least you break even over letting them play even if they do double.
Here, I'm going to make an assumption that may shock you. Once we have established that our side has approximately half the deck (that's to say the high cards) or more, we do not need much in the way of extras to compete. It's a question of pigs at the trough—if you don't get in there you will starve. The most important issue we're faced with therefore is: declare or defend? (DoD). In other words, we are now trying to determine the absolute par contract whereas, before the intervention, we were only concerned with determining our (directional) par contract, which frequently is not the same thing. At pairs, quite a few matchpoints may be riding on whether we reach par or not. At teams, there is no difference between +100 and +110 for instance. But at matchpoints, getting it right could easily swing 25% of a board. Trying for game or trying for a big penalty are also possibilities of course, but they have to take a back seat to the main issue. So, we look at the possible tools we have available and, if there are two possible uses, we choose the meaning that most helps us to decide the DoD question. If we have sufficient tools still available to help us try for game, for example, then we use them for that purpose.
What tools do we have after the auction described above: 1♥ (p) 2♥ (2♠) ? Pass, double, 2NT, 3 of a minor, 3♥ (as mentioned above). By general agreement, pass and three of our suit (3♥ here) are non-forward going. Since defending 2♠ may be the par contract, we have to include pass in our arsenal for both players in a pair.
We are therefore left with double, 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣. I hope we all agree without any further explanation that 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣ are not logical contracts. One of these bids can be used as a game try and the other two can be used as you prefer for a different kind of game try, or simply a competitive bid. Personally, I think that the lowest of the available bids should be the game try (as it leaves the most room for partner to respond with some useful information) and the higher bids should be used to further describe your hand when you have good distribution. If RHO had bid 2NT, that would obviously remove one option... and so on until a 3♦ intervention leaves us no room for a game try at all. Let me put it on record that I do not like the "maximal double" here as an artificial game try.
Trying to penalize the opponents at this low-level is generally not going to work out profitably. If we can set their contract by two tricks doubled, that will be a very nice +300. But, wait a moment, if there are 16 total tricks available (most deals have at least this many total tricks) that means we could have made ten tricks in hearts for +420. Hence doubling for penalties won't be very profitable at equal or unfavorable vulnerability. Only at favorable vulnerability will it work out well, and even then it's only at matchpoints that the result will be a triumph. So, if we rule out wanting to penalize the opponents with a direct double, it frees up that call to show extra values and relative shortness in the enemy suit. Something like a short-suit game try. If partner has an extra trump, he will take the double out automatically. Likewise if he too is short in the enemy suit. All suit bids can be used to show extra distribution, and might even help us find that magic double fit that produces game even on minimum hands.
Thus, double is the most flexible DoD invitation. It has the advantage that if partner does decide to defend—and assuming he's right and that we don't choke during the defense—we get the greatest possible consolation for our "equity" (the score we were hoping to achieve with our two-of-a-major contract). But you mustn't abuse double here or you will end up with lots of -470s and -670s. See my various other posts in this series (DSIP). Generally, you will have a balanced hand with two cards in the opponent's suit. In this context, that means 5422, 5332, or possibly 5431 shape—not 5521 or anything like that. That's what the other suit bids are for. However, you might double your singleton (or void) suit if you've already shown two suits. And, if partner has a biddable suit in response to your double (or extra length in a suit he's already shown), he should take the double out.
So, does that mean that our opponents can enter into our auctions with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they can never be caught speeding? Not at all. Often they will escape relatively unscathed when we bid on to a successful contract or we let them play undoubled when we have nothing extra. But when the trap does close, they will find that the player with the most high-card points has the short holding in trumps. His partner will have the longer holding and these conditions are perfectly suited to extracting the largest possible penalty.
Sometimes, even when we do "catch them speeding," they can wriggle out into a better contract. So, give up on waiting for juicy doubles of low-level intervention after we've found a fit—it's better to use double as an essentially constructive tool and get the occasional penalty as a bonus.
Here's a typical layout from a recent instant tournament on BBO. At the table, all were vulnerable and West made a poor decision to reopen with double. Perhaps he should have considered the board number first. All looked good at first when East bid 2♠ and N/S passed, but things went rapidly downhill thereafter, resulting in -300, a very poor matchpoint score.
Declarer could have played it a bit better and saved a trick. Perhaps North should have redoubled over the first double to show a balanced hand with maximum points. South might then feel able to double the contract for a gain of 800 to N/S. But that's being a little greedy. N/S took no risk of anything bad happening and ended up with better than an 80% board.
Now let's look at some other variations and see how they might play out using the ideas described above. We leave the E/W hands to distribute themselves as they see fit and bid as before.
In the first example on the left, South is the one with extra strength, a balanced hand and a doubleton spade: hence double. The final contract is 2♠X for +100 (assuming an unchanged E/W layout). This loses an IMP to the par contract of +140 for 3♥.
In the second variation (right) neither North nor South can bid on over 2♠ and the opponents "escape". Nevertheless, they go down two for +200 to N/S. Surprisingly, again assuming E/W remain the same, N/S can actually make 4♥ on this layout. But is it reasonable to expect anyone to bid it? +200 is therefore likely to win at least average if not better.
And, in fairness, here's a hand that appears to deflate my arguments. It's from long ago (2006) on OKbridge (I found this using Stephen Pickett's wonderful program BridgeBrowser) where the players were all good. East/West were playing "standard" and the 500 they reaped was worth 7.35 IMPs.
Playing my recommended system, the result would almost surely be only 200 (no double) for only 0.75 IMPs. This is exactly what happened at another good table but this time, the defenders did even better and extracted 300 for 3.27 IMPs. In any case, I dare say the actions would be the same at matchpoints and there the difference is much smaller: 49/51 matchpoints for 500, 48 for 300, and 41 for 200. That's still an 80% board! In other words, you will get a very good matchpoint result on this hand without having to double.
And here's a hand which many players got seriously wrong (from the same source)—again all good players at the table shown.
Par on this board is +100 for N/S for 2♠X-1. The only reasonable way to get that result is for N/S to be playing according to my system and have South double with his extras and spade shortness. North will have no reason to take it out and par will be achieved. In practice many Easts took fewer than their allotted seven tricks and at those tables 2♠X would have done very nicely for N/S. Note that although this N/S did get a fine 300, it was only because West made a dreadful bid in my opinion. They were almost surely going to escape for -50 until then.
Now for a board where N/S use double to win the declaration:
Note that in almost every real-life playing of this hand, after the first six calls, South made a very undisciplined raise to 3♥. He has no shape and could have been summarily punished an a bad day. The safe way to show your extras is with a double as shown here. North, with four hearts and a doubleton spade will take it out to 3♥ and all will be well. If E/W bid on they will be -200 or, even worse, if N/S decide to take the push to 4♥ on their 21 hcp they will be extraordinarily lucky, given their lack of useful shape, and score game.
Jeff maintains that in a competitive auction, after we have found a fit, we should use double to penalize the opponents, bid with an offensive hand, and pass otherwise [I hope I have this right]. And I would guess that at least 95% of active bridge players would agree with him. I recognize that I am in the minority.
So, I'd like to explain why I think my style is better. But, first, I'd better summarize it. When we find a fit at the two-level, we usually don't know whether it's a single eight-card fit, a nine-card-plus fit or some kind of double fit. I say "usually" because pairs playing Bergen raises and perhaps some other conventions actually do know. But, I am talking about the normal situation where the auction has gone, say, 1♥ (p) 2♥ or perhaps 1♦ (p) 1♥ (p) 2♥, although for simplicity I will only discuss the first of these auctions. Let's say that the last bid is immediately overcalled by 2♠. Or perhaps there is a double, taken out to 2♠. How should we proceed?
I recommend what amounts to a pass-double inversion, just like some expert pairs play at higher levels when they're in a forcing pass situation. Here, we're not in a force, of course, but I should say that we will do something probably 75% of the time or more. Pass says either "I have neither extra strength nor extra distribution" or "I have a hand which would like to defend a doubled contract if you have extra strength." Double says "I'm relatively short in their suit [usually a doubleton], and I have extra strength but no clear bid." Much of the time, therefore, we will bid on, sometimes we will "nail" the opponents and sometimes we will meekly pass and let them have the contract.
The first thing we notice is that we no longer have a good way to invite game. All of our Kokish game tries, help-suit game tries and their like are essentially out the window. We can show a second suit, bid 2NT or we can bid 3♥ (higher bids will commit our side to game anyway). But those bids can also be used simply to compete with an offensively-oriented hand. Which style makes most sense? I believe that the scoring table favors an approach which goes: declare before game before slam. I don't have the space to justify this idea here but I do talk about it some more in Two golden rules of bidding. But very briefly: if they have intervened with 2♠, and can make it while you can take ten tricks not-vulnerable in hearts, you will earn 7 imps just by bidding on to 3♥ and only a further 4 imps by actually bidding game. If you think you might be able to make game but have no good way to find out partner's opinion, just bid it. If you're right you'll gain 11 imps, if you're wrong then at least you break even over letting them play even if they do double.
Here, I'm going to make an assumption that may shock you. Once we have established that our side has approximately half the deck (that's to say the high cards) or more, we do not need much in the way of extras to compete. It's a question of pigs at the trough—if you don't get in there you will starve. The most important issue we're faced with therefore is: declare or defend? (DoD). In other words, we are now trying to determine the absolute par contract whereas, before the intervention, we were only concerned with determining our (directional) par contract, which frequently is not the same thing. At pairs, quite a few matchpoints may be riding on whether we reach par or not. At teams, there is no difference between +100 and +110 for instance. But at matchpoints, getting it right could easily swing 25% of a board. Trying for game or trying for a big penalty are also possibilities of course, but they have to take a back seat to the main issue. So, we look at the possible tools we have available and, if there are two possible uses, we choose the meaning that most helps us to decide the DoD question. If we have sufficient tools still available to help us try for game, for example, then we use them for that purpose.
What tools do we have after the auction described above: 1♥ (p) 2♥ (2♠) ? Pass, double, 2NT, 3 of a minor, 3♥ (as mentioned above). By general agreement, pass and three of our suit (3♥ here) are non-forward going. Since defending 2♠ may be the par contract, we have to include pass in our arsenal for both players in a pair.
We are therefore left with double, 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣. I hope we all agree without any further explanation that 2NT, 3♦ and 3♣ are not logical contracts. One of these bids can be used as a game try and the other two can be used as you prefer for a different kind of game try, or simply a competitive bid. Personally, I think that the lowest of the available bids should be the game try (as it leaves the most room for partner to respond with some useful information) and the higher bids should be used to further describe your hand when you have good distribution. If RHO had bid 2NT, that would obviously remove one option... and so on until a 3♦ intervention leaves us no room for a game try at all. Let me put it on record that I do not like the "maximal double" here as an artificial game try.
Trying to penalize the opponents at this low-level is generally not going to work out profitably. If we can set their contract by two tricks doubled, that will be a very nice +300. But, wait a moment, if there are 16 total tricks available (most deals have at least this many total tricks) that means we could have made ten tricks in hearts for +420. Hence doubling for penalties won't be very profitable at equal or unfavorable vulnerability. Only at favorable vulnerability will it work out well, and even then it's only at matchpoints that the result will be a triumph. So, if we rule out wanting to penalize the opponents with a direct double, it frees up that call to show extra values and relative shortness in the enemy suit. Something like a short-suit game try. If partner has an extra trump, he will take the double out automatically. Likewise if he too is short in the enemy suit. All suit bids can be used to show extra distribution, and might even help us find that magic double fit that produces game even on minimum hands.
Thus, double is the most flexible DoD invitation. It has the advantage that if partner does decide to defend—and assuming he's right and that we don't choke during the defense—we get the greatest possible consolation for our "equity" (the score we were hoping to achieve with our two-of-a-major contract). But you mustn't abuse double here or you will end up with lots of -470s and -670s. See my various other posts in this series (DSIP). Generally, you will have a balanced hand with two cards in the opponent's suit. In this context, that means 5422, 5332, or possibly 5431 shape—not 5521 or anything like that. That's what the other suit bids are for. However, you might double your singleton (or void) suit if you've already shown two suits. And, if partner has a biddable suit in response to your double (or extra length in a suit he's already shown), he should take the double out.
So, does that mean that our opponents can enter into our auctions with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they can never be caught speeding? Not at all. Often they will escape relatively unscathed when we bid on to a successful contract or we let them play undoubled when we have nothing extra. But when the trap does close, they will find that the player with the most high-card points has the short holding in trumps. His partner will have the longer holding and these conditions are perfectly suited to extracting the largest possible penalty.
Sometimes, even when we do "catch them speeding," they can wriggle out into a better contract. So, give up on waiting for juicy doubles of low-level intervention after we've found a fit—it's better to use double as an essentially constructive tool and get the occasional penalty as a bonus.
Here's a typical layout from a recent instant tournament on BBO. At the table, all were vulnerable and West made a poor decision to reopen with double. Perhaps he should have considered the board number first. All looked good at first when East bid 2♠ and N/S passed, but things went rapidly downhill thereafter, resulting in -300, a very poor matchpoint score.
Declarer could have played it a bit better and saved a trick. Perhaps North should have redoubled over the first double to show a balanced hand with maximum points. South might then feel able to double the contract for a gain of 800 to N/S. But that's being a little greedy. N/S took no risk of anything bad happening and ended up with better than an 80% board.
Now let's look at some other variations and see how they might play out using the ideas described above. We leave the E/W hands to distribute themselves as they see fit and bid as before.
In the first example on the left, South is the one with extra strength, a balanced hand and a doubleton spade: hence double. The final contract is 2♠X for +100 (assuming an unchanged E/W layout). This loses an IMP to the par contract of +140 for 3♥.
In the second variation (right) neither North nor South can bid on over 2♠ and the opponents "escape". Nevertheless, they go down two for +200 to N/S. Surprisingly, again assuming E/W remain the same, N/S can actually make 4♥ on this layout. But is it reasonable to expect anyone to bid it? +200 is therefore likely to win at least average if not better.
And, in fairness, here's a hand that appears to deflate my arguments. It's from long ago (2006) on OKbridge (I found this using Stephen Pickett's wonderful program BridgeBrowser) where the players were all good. East/West were playing "standard" and the 500 they reaped was worth 7.35 IMPs.
Playing my recommended system, the result would almost surely be only 200 (no double) for only 0.75 IMPs. This is exactly what happened at another good table but this time, the defenders did even better and extracted 300 for 3.27 IMPs. In any case, I dare say the actions would be the same at matchpoints and there the difference is much smaller: 49/51 matchpoints for 500, 48 for 300, and 41 for 200. That's still an 80% board! In other words, you will get a very good matchpoint result on this hand without having to double.
And here's a hand which many players got seriously wrong (from the same source)—again all good players at the table shown.
Par on this board is +100 for N/S for 2♠X-1. The only reasonable way to get that result is for N/S to be playing according to my system and have South double with his extras and spade shortness. North will have no reason to take it out and par will be achieved. In practice many Easts took fewer than their allotted seven tricks and at those tables 2♠X would have done very nicely for N/S. Note that although this N/S did get a fine 300, it was only because West made a dreadful bid in my opinion. They were almost surely going to escape for -50 until then.
Now for a board where N/S use double to win the declaration:
Note that in almost every real-life playing of this hand, after the first six calls, South made a very undisciplined raise to 3♥. He has no shape and could have been summarily punished an a bad day. The safe way to show your extras is with a double as shown here. North, with four hearts and a doubleton spade will take it out to 3♥ and all will be well. If E/W bid on they will be -200 or, even worse, if N/S decide to take the push to 4♥ on their 21 hcp they will be extraordinarily lucky, given their lack of useful shape, and score game.
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