One of the features that I like about the weak notrump, whether 10-11, 10-12, 12-14 (I've played them all at one time or another) is the preemptive aspect. Especially at "green" (not-vul vs. vul). It's very much harder for the opponents to come in and conduct a sensible constructive auction starting at the two-level, vulnerable because the opening bid is so well-defined and responder will know just when to apply the chopper.
But opportunities to preempt the opponents in no-trump don't begin and end with the opening bid. Take this hand from a recent team game at the club: ♠– ♥Q754 ♦QT2 ♣AJT843 (third seat at favorable vulnerability). Partner deals and opens 1NT (12-14) and the next player doubles. The opponents have at least a 9-card fit in spades and 17-19 hcp. Moreover, partner's values are going to be sitting under the opponents' strength. So, my hand might take a few tricks but partner will probably only score aces, assuming that the other hand can get the lead a couple of times.
In other words, there's just a little too much danger, in my opinion, of them making 620. I therefore raised partner to 3NT. This was followed by two passes and then double. Should I pull to 4♣? No, I decided to stand my ground (I had the feeling that the next player might take the double out). And so it proved. It went 4♥ on my left followed by two passes. Was I tempted to double? No way! That would have ruined the whole plan. The contract drifted off only one trick after I underled my ♣A at one point, allowing declarer to score her kingleton. But the damage was done. Our teammates were +620 at the other table giving us a 13 IMP swing.
As it happens, we could have made 3NT, at least with careful play and a peek (or an avoidance play) by felling that same club kingleton. Or we could have made 5♣ with the same peek (though there would be no particular reason for the avoidance play at a suit contract).
It takes a bit of a nerve to pull this kind of thing off. And you have to be ready with an apology to the rest of the team when it backfires. But the satisfaction of bringing off this sort of coup can turn an otherwise forgettable evening into something to smile about.
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Monday, May 6, 2013
Cohen versus Stewart
There is an article in the May 2013 edition of the Bridge Bulletin which pits Larry Cohen against Frank Stewart in "2/1? Help or Hindrance."
While I certainly come down on the side of Cohen and 2/1, I think both sides have made a few questionable assertions.
In my opinion, one of the major benefits of playing 2/1 is that it's easier. Yes, you read that right (Cohen agrees). In fact, many 2/1 auctions are simply a question of patterning out – no thinking or judgement required. Yes, there are styles of 2/1 that require more judgement, such as requiring that a "high reverse" by opener (e.g. 1♥ 2♦ 3♣) shows reversing strength. But most of the time, for example you just sit down with an unfamiliar partner and agree "2/1", you rarely have to worry about such subtleties.
So, I find it very strange that most (all?) bridge teachers of novices start them off in completely the wrong direction by teaching them "standard." How can so-called Standard American be considered "standard" when 80% of tournament players (according to Cohen) are playing 2/1?
I admit that I'm a little biased. When I first learned to play bridge it was lunchtime bridge at work, a close relative of "kitchen bridge." Bidding was natural. The more you had the more you bid. But within a few months I had graduated to duplicate. One of the most popular systems in those days was Kaplan-Sheinwold, essentially 2/1 with weak no-trumps. So, I never really was "corrupted" by this "SA" nonsense.
Let's dissect SA for a moment. It's essentially a hybrid (bastard might be more a propos) of Goren (four-card majors) and Roth-Stone (five-card majors) with perhaps a bit of K-S thrown in (for example if you play inverted minors). In other words, it's neither fish nor fowl. I'll go further to say that it encourages really bad bidding because minimum balanced openings with 12 or 13 high card points will frequently be forced to open a bad three-card minor. This is also true of course for 2/1 if you're playing a strong no-trump.
But I do wonder about some of Larry's examples of troublesome SA auctions. Surely, a tenet of SA is that a two-over-one response promises at least one more bid, with the possible exception of a sequence where opener rebids 2NT. So, I can't imagine having to worry about the auction 1♠ 2♦ 2♠ being passed out. Still, there must be some misguided souls who would pass here, otherwise Larry would not mention the possibility.
I'm also surprised that Larry should advocate a semi-forcing 1NT. Surely, the forcing 1NT (by an unpassed hand) is a cornerstone of 2/1? I have written previously (for example, The Forcing 1 Notrump) about the benefits of being able to show a game-going hand that does not want to suggest a slam by starting with 1NT. Obviously, you can't do that if 1NT isn't 100% forcing.
But these are relatively minor quibbles compared with my thoughts on Frank's contribution. He makes a comment which I believe shows a shocking misunderstanding of the 2/1 style. In an auction which begins 1♠ 2♣ 2♥, he says "I suspect many Easts in 2/1 would bid 2♠ 'to save space.' Well, if I were West with such mangy spades, wild horses couldn't get me to cooperate in a slam hunt opposite a tepid preference" [my emphasis].
What he seems to miss is that East bidding 2♠ after an initial 2♣, promises three card support (not a tepid preference). Not only that, it shows (at least if you play my style) a hand that will willingly cooperate in a slam hunt, and with good clubs too (else East could have started with a 1NT response and then jumped to 4♠).
He also points out that with both partners potentially making minimum bids at all opportunities, how does a partnership know how to get to slam? Again, this seems to miss the point. As soon as a fit is discovered, one partner or the other can make a control-showing cuebid. Normally, there will be plenty of space available for these types of slam tries. It's true that some delicacy is now required. I have written about this issue before in Slam Tries. One solution is to employ either serious (or frivolous) 3NT. The other solution is to discuss the situations when a control bid demands another control bid. Admittedly, neither of these approaches is covered in the 2/1 texts, but the concepts are not difficult either.
In his auction 1♠ 2♦ 3NT, he says that one player thought that 3NT showed "a powerhouse" and the other did not. But anyone who has read any book on 2/1 knows that a jump in a game-forcing sequence has a special meaning. Given that opener's 2NT rebid shows either a minimum balanced hand or a maximum balanced hand, there can only be one possible meaning for 3NT left: a medium balanced hand (15-17). So it seems that neither Frank nor his partner really knew the basics of 2/1. You can hardly blame the system for that!
So, is 2/1 (with 15-17 no-trumps) the best system out there? No, I don't think so. On theoretical grounds, I think that both K-S (or, if you like, 2/1 with weak no-trumps) and Precision are technically superior systems. But, 2/1 is certainly a lot easier than Precision and therefore a much better candidate for teaching beginners (which no-trump range to play is more a question of personal preference and familiarity).
Having said that, I will note that I've had all my best results playing with my favorite partner – and we play 2/1 with 15-17 no-trumps.
While I certainly come down on the side of Cohen and 2/1, I think both sides have made a few questionable assertions.
In my opinion, one of the major benefits of playing 2/1 is that it's easier. Yes, you read that right (Cohen agrees). In fact, many 2/1 auctions are simply a question of patterning out – no thinking or judgement required. Yes, there are styles of 2/1 that require more judgement, such as requiring that a "high reverse" by opener (e.g. 1♥ 2♦ 3♣) shows reversing strength. But most of the time, for example you just sit down with an unfamiliar partner and agree "2/1", you rarely have to worry about such subtleties.
So, I find it very strange that most (all?) bridge teachers of novices start them off in completely the wrong direction by teaching them "standard." How can so-called Standard American be considered "standard" when 80% of tournament players (according to Cohen) are playing 2/1?
I admit that I'm a little biased. When I first learned to play bridge it was lunchtime bridge at work, a close relative of "kitchen bridge." Bidding was natural. The more you had the more you bid. But within a few months I had graduated to duplicate. One of the most popular systems in those days was Kaplan-Sheinwold, essentially 2/1 with weak no-trumps. So, I never really was "corrupted" by this "SA" nonsense.
Let's dissect SA for a moment. It's essentially a hybrid (bastard might be more a propos) of Goren (four-card majors) and Roth-Stone (five-card majors) with perhaps a bit of K-S thrown in (for example if you play inverted minors). In other words, it's neither fish nor fowl. I'll go further to say that it encourages really bad bidding because minimum balanced openings with 12 or 13 high card points will frequently be forced to open a bad three-card minor. This is also true of course for 2/1 if you're playing a strong no-trump.
But I do wonder about some of Larry's examples of troublesome SA auctions. Surely, a tenet of SA is that a two-over-one response promises at least one more bid, with the possible exception of a sequence where opener rebids 2NT. So, I can't imagine having to worry about the auction 1♠ 2♦ 2♠ being passed out. Still, there must be some misguided souls who would pass here, otherwise Larry would not mention the possibility.
I'm also surprised that Larry should advocate a semi-forcing 1NT. Surely, the forcing 1NT (by an unpassed hand) is a cornerstone of 2/1? I have written previously (for example, The Forcing 1 Notrump) about the benefits of being able to show a game-going hand that does not want to suggest a slam by starting with 1NT. Obviously, you can't do that if 1NT isn't 100% forcing.
But these are relatively minor quibbles compared with my thoughts on Frank's contribution. He makes a comment which I believe shows a shocking misunderstanding of the 2/1 style. In an auction which begins 1♠ 2♣ 2♥, he says "I suspect many Easts in 2/1 would bid 2♠ 'to save space.' Well, if I were West with such mangy spades, wild horses couldn't get me to cooperate in a slam hunt opposite a tepid preference" [my emphasis].
What he seems to miss is that East bidding 2♠ after an initial 2♣, promises three card support (not a tepid preference). Not only that, it shows (at least if you play my style) a hand that will willingly cooperate in a slam hunt, and with good clubs too (else East could have started with a 1NT response and then jumped to 4♠).
He also points out that with both partners potentially making minimum bids at all opportunities, how does a partnership know how to get to slam? Again, this seems to miss the point. As soon as a fit is discovered, one partner or the other can make a control-showing cuebid. Normally, there will be plenty of space available for these types of slam tries. It's true that some delicacy is now required. I have written about this issue before in Slam Tries. One solution is to employ either serious (or frivolous) 3NT. The other solution is to discuss the situations when a control bid demands another control bid. Admittedly, neither of these approaches is covered in the 2/1 texts, but the concepts are not difficult either.
In his auction 1♠ 2♦ 3NT, he says that one player thought that 3NT showed "a powerhouse" and the other did not. But anyone who has read any book on 2/1 knows that a jump in a game-forcing sequence has a special meaning. Given that opener's 2NT rebid shows either a minimum balanced hand or a maximum balanced hand, there can only be one possible meaning for 3NT left: a medium balanced hand (15-17). So it seems that neither Frank nor his partner really knew the basics of 2/1. You can hardly blame the system for that!
So, is 2/1 (with 15-17 no-trumps) the best system out there? No, I don't think so. On theoretical grounds, I think that both K-S (or, if you like, 2/1 with weak no-trumps) and Precision are technically superior systems. But, 2/1 is certainly a lot easier than Precision and therefore a much better candidate for teaching beginners (which no-trump range to play is more a question of personal preference and familiarity).
Having said that, I will note that I've had all my best results playing with my favorite partner – and we play 2/1 with 15-17 no-trumps.
Friday, April 26, 2013
If you haven't gone down yet, there's still a chance
One of my favorite themes, as my regular readers know, is that you should never give up. I believe I have observed that this is a good mantra for the play of a particular hand, a session, or a bridge career. See for example my most recent effort in this genre: Never - ever - say die. Today, I'd like to talk about soldiering on when a particular hand looks hopeless.
But first, in the style of George Jacobs, let me tell you a story. I won't give the details away in order to protect the guilty, but Kim and I were having a good second session in a recent two-session event. There was nothing to play for, other than pride, since our first session score had not even reached the 40% mark! As is our custom on such occasions, we enjoyed a drink with dinner. Well, maybe it was two drinks. This was the last board of the event and all were vulnerable. Kim opened 2♣ (strong, artificial and forcing) and my RHO bid 2♦. I had a flat hand with four diamonds to the ten and the ♣Q. Our agreement is to double with any weak hand, regardless of shape. I was surprised to find Kim passing my double. How many diamonds could she reasonably have? At this point, my RHO, picked up the 2♦ card and asked the table "did I bid that?" Er, yes, we said. She then picked up the 3♣ card and placed it right on top of the 2♦ card, as if to obscure that bid. LHO and I both passed and Kim finished proceedings with a double.
After my lead, dummy came down with a balanced six-count, but with three diamonds and three clubs. At this point, we called the director over and explained what had happened; he offering to return if necessary. By the time the smoke cleared we were +1400 (Kim had a 28-hcp moose). We quickly determined that slam was impossible so it seemed that we had a top and didn't need a return by the director. My RHO's hand was something like ♠853 ♥T75 ♦Q5 ♣QT762, so what was that 2♦ all about? I admit I don't know. Most probably it was tiredness at the end of two long sessions. It's hard to imagine making any bid with that hand, even if the clubs were a major and could be bid at the two-level. I do have a sneaking suspicion that it might have been some sort of psych bid. In any case, we had received enough of those sorts of gifts to finish the second session with 68%.
So, back to my theme which is exemplified by a hand from a robot tournament. I think, judging from his sheer exuberance, that this must have been one of the younger robots playing as my partner. The auction followed the same lines at most tables. Only a handful were able to play in a more modest small slam. I was tempted to bid 7NT but thought better of it – if I could make 13 tricks in any strain, it would surely be a good score (though I admit that this argument doesn't hold as well as it might at, say, a club game).
When I saw the dummy, I was reminded of a similar exercise in grand slam futility mentioned in Mark Horton's excellent book Misplay these hands with me. Well, I had twelve tricks all day assuming the opening lead didn't get ruffed. But what chances were there for a thirteenth? Somewhere between no chance and a dog's chance, I calculated. But, and here is the key, I wasn't down yet.
There appeared to be no legitimate miracle. The only possibility was a squeeze-induced mis-defense. So, I simply ran all my tricks. The one thing that the robots are not good at is signaling. Note how East misplays at trick three by discarding ♦2. Doesn't his partner have a right to know that he holds the king? Surely all can see that spades and diamonds are the key suits on this hand. It's not like he's worried that partner will get in and lead diamonds pickling his K. If partner gets in, the grand slam is already down! In my opinion, the proper card to pitch is ♦T, implicitly denying the jack and showing something good, hopefully the K. Actually, from West's point of view, he knows partner has the king because if I had it, I would be claiming. At trick four, East compounds his error by discarding the ♠6. Given that he's going to have to pitch several spades, he might as well tell a good story. I think that the jack would be much more informative – the start of an echo to show an even number of spades and implicitly denying the queen. At trick five, he pitches the ♣9 prematurely. It's obvious that pretty soon, I'll be cashing clubs and he'll show out sooner than necessary and will have to pitch something else. Jumping from suit to suit makes it that much harder to pass a consistent message to partner. At trick six – well, by this time, I think he's thoroughly confused his partner so it really doesn't matter what he pitches.
At trick ten, he bizarrely pitches the ♦K while holding on to two spades (surely one is enough) and the ♦9 (which at this point is not equal to the king). After the next trick, I knew that there were still two spades out so clearly there was no point in trying to cash the deuce. Furthermore, I could be fairly sure that they held one spade each (why would anyone hang on to two?) I therefore tried my only hope, to promote the ♦J. When the 9 appeared on my right, it was a sort of show-up squeeze. I was able to go up with the ace, felling the Q.
I was the only declarer to make all the tricks. One other tried the same line but was thwarted by a Robot East who seemed to know what he was doing. The other twelve declarers playing the same contract from the same side all gave themselves no chance at all.
Anyway, the moral of this story is that when there is no legitimate play, try the squeeze. Defenders are notoriously bad defending against squeezes and you never know – they might help you out as my East did for me.
But first, in the style of George Jacobs, let me tell you a story. I won't give the details away in order to protect the guilty, but Kim and I were having a good second session in a recent two-session event. There was nothing to play for, other than pride, since our first session score had not even reached the 40% mark! As is our custom on such occasions, we enjoyed a drink with dinner. Well, maybe it was two drinks. This was the last board of the event and all were vulnerable. Kim opened 2♣ (strong, artificial and forcing) and my RHO bid 2♦. I had a flat hand with four diamonds to the ten and the ♣Q. Our agreement is to double with any weak hand, regardless of shape. I was surprised to find Kim passing my double. How many diamonds could she reasonably have? At this point, my RHO, picked up the 2♦ card and asked the table "did I bid that?" Er, yes, we said. She then picked up the 3♣ card and placed it right on top of the 2♦ card, as if to obscure that bid. LHO and I both passed and Kim finished proceedings with a double.
After my lead, dummy came down with a balanced six-count, but with three diamonds and three clubs. At this point, we called the director over and explained what had happened; he offering to return if necessary. By the time the smoke cleared we were +1400 (Kim had a 28-hcp moose). We quickly determined that slam was impossible so it seemed that we had a top and didn't need a return by the director. My RHO's hand was something like ♠853 ♥T75 ♦Q5 ♣QT762, so what was that 2♦ all about? I admit I don't know. Most probably it was tiredness at the end of two long sessions. It's hard to imagine making any bid with that hand, even if the clubs were a major and could be bid at the two-level. I do have a sneaking suspicion that it might have been some sort of psych bid. In any case, we had received enough of those sorts of gifts to finish the second session with 68%.
So, back to my theme which is exemplified by a hand from a robot tournament. I think, judging from his sheer exuberance, that this must have been one of the younger robots playing as my partner. The auction followed the same lines at most tables. Only a handful were able to play in a more modest small slam. I was tempted to bid 7NT but thought better of it – if I could make 13 tricks in any strain, it would surely be a good score (though I admit that this argument doesn't hold as well as it might at, say, a club game).
When I saw the dummy, I was reminded of a similar exercise in grand slam futility mentioned in Mark Horton's excellent book Misplay these hands with me. Well, I had twelve tricks all day assuming the opening lead didn't get ruffed. But what chances were there for a thirteenth? Somewhere between no chance and a dog's chance, I calculated. But, and here is the key, I wasn't down yet.
There appeared to be no legitimate miracle. The only possibility was a squeeze-induced mis-defense. So, I simply ran all my tricks. The one thing that the robots are not good at is signaling. Note how East misplays at trick three by discarding ♦2. Doesn't his partner have a right to know that he holds the king? Surely all can see that spades and diamonds are the key suits on this hand. It's not like he's worried that partner will get in and lead diamonds pickling his K. If partner gets in, the grand slam is already down! In my opinion, the proper card to pitch is ♦T, implicitly denying the jack and showing something good, hopefully the K. Actually, from West's point of view, he knows partner has the king because if I had it, I would be claiming. At trick four, East compounds his error by discarding the ♠6. Given that he's going to have to pitch several spades, he might as well tell a good story. I think that the jack would be much more informative – the start of an echo to show an even number of spades and implicitly denying the queen. At trick five, he pitches the ♣9 prematurely. It's obvious that pretty soon, I'll be cashing clubs and he'll show out sooner than necessary and will have to pitch something else. Jumping from suit to suit makes it that much harder to pass a consistent message to partner. At trick six – well, by this time, I think he's thoroughly confused his partner so it really doesn't matter what he pitches.
At trick ten, he bizarrely pitches the ♦K while holding on to two spades (surely one is enough) and the ♦9 (which at this point is not equal to the king). After the next trick, I knew that there were still two spades out so clearly there was no point in trying to cash the deuce. Furthermore, I could be fairly sure that they held one spade each (why would anyone hang on to two?) I therefore tried my only hope, to promote the ♦J. When the 9 appeared on my right, it was a sort of show-up squeeze. I was able to go up with the ace, felling the Q.
I was the only declarer to make all the tricks. One other tried the same line but was thwarted by a Robot East who seemed to know what he was doing. The other twelve declarers playing the same contract from the same side all gave themselves no chance at all.
Anyway, the moral of this story is that when there is no legitimate play, try the squeeze. Defenders are notoriously bad defending against squeezes and you never know – they might help you out as my East did for me.
Thursday, April 11, 2013
No wonder it takes so long to learn this game - the denouement
My previous blog No wonder it takes so long to learn this game! has generated a lot of discussion both here on blogger.com and also at BridgeWinners. I really appreciate everyone's contributions. I've learned an important lesson in the complex curriculum of competitive bidding, in particular when the partnership can stop in four-of-a-minor after a game-forcing sequence (almost never).
Although I was clearly in a minority of one in my thinking about my partner's 4♣ call, I wasn't ready to give up on what seemed to me to be bridge logic until I heard back from my competitive bidding guru Andrew Robson. Thanks, Andrew.
In my own defense, I will point out that this notion of "game-forcing" being forcing only to 3NT or the four-level wasn't my own idea. I've read it in several places (although frustratingly now I don't remember where exactly). But I think I've got clarification now. In particular, in a non-competitive auction we can stop in four-of-a-minor only when we lack controls in the unbid suit and neither partner has sufficient extras to go to the five-level. If the opponents are silly enough to blunder into such an auction, we will of course take the opportunity to punish them. So, once the auction gets competitive, we will either double them or bid our game. No stopping in four-of-a-minor!
So, with the help of all the input, including the votes from the BridgeWinners polls, I've formulated some competitive bidding "rules" (I don't claim these as being in any way original). These rules revolve around the concept of a "committed" contract or level. A specific committed contract arises when one partner makes a call which forces the partnership to reach a particular higher-ranking contract. Examples include Bergen raises, Inverted Minor raises, Jacoby 2NT, Truscott/Jordan 2NT, cue-bids of the enemy suit, fit-showing jumps, etc. Some of these calls may include an "or better" clause which suggests that the bidder himself plans to keep on bidding beyond the committed contract if he has extras. In all cases of a committed contract, there is at least some element of fit, although in the case of an "or better" call, the bidder may be planning on or hoping for some other strain, such as no-trump.
When only a level, typically game, has been committed, it implies that no suit has been agreed and thus the partnership is committed to any contract that satisfies the level requirement. In such a case, the number one priority is to determine the strain of our game contract. Thus, showing support below game is 100% forcing to game – yes, even if it four-of-a-minor! [This is why, in the auction in the first post on this subject, 4♣ was forcing – and actually more encouraging than 5♣]. Denying support (by passing) and then pulling double (or 3NT) to 4♣ might be non-forcing – it seems to say "partner, I have a really bad hand, but I think you might be better off playing 4♣ than anything else." This probably requires some prior thought (but isn't likely to occur with much frequency).
In general, where this is a commitment, the partnership is said to be "in a force." This has the following implication:
At all other times in a competitive auction, i.e. when there is no commitment, we are back to "normal bridge." Thus, bidding shows something extra and passing says you have nothing to say. Double means whatever you and your partner have agreed to. But, based on all of the recent polls and articles I've seen on BridgeWinners, any time we have not yet found a fit and the most recent bid is below game, double is almost always takeout-oriented or "cards" where there is no explicit pre-agreement.
So, let me try to summarize these rules (where intervention is always a bid – doubles are out of scope for this discussion):
Although I was clearly in a minority of one in my thinking about my partner's 4♣ call, I wasn't ready to give up on what seemed to me to be bridge logic until I heard back from my competitive bidding guru Andrew Robson. Thanks, Andrew.
In my own defense, I will point out that this notion of "game-forcing" being forcing only to 3NT or the four-level wasn't my own idea. I've read it in several places (although frustratingly now I don't remember where exactly). But I think I've got clarification now. In particular, in a non-competitive auction we can stop in four-of-a-minor only when we lack controls in the unbid suit and neither partner has sufficient extras to go to the five-level. If the opponents are silly enough to blunder into such an auction, we will of course take the opportunity to punish them. So, once the auction gets competitive, we will either double them or bid our game. No stopping in four-of-a-minor!
So, with the help of all the input, including the votes from the BridgeWinners polls, I've formulated some competitive bidding "rules" (I don't claim these as being in any way original). These rules revolve around the concept of a "committed" contract or level. A specific committed contract arises when one partner makes a call which forces the partnership to reach a particular higher-ranking contract. Examples include Bergen raises, Inverted Minor raises, Jacoby 2NT, Truscott/Jordan 2NT, cue-bids of the enemy suit, fit-showing jumps, etc. Some of these calls may include an "or better" clause which suggests that the bidder himself plans to keep on bidding beyond the committed contract if he has extras. In all cases of a committed contract, there is at least some element of fit, although in the case of an "or better" call, the bidder may be planning on or hoping for some other strain, such as no-trump.
When only a level, typically game, has been committed, it implies that no suit has been agreed and thus the partnership is committed to any contract that satisfies the level requirement. In such a case, the number one priority is to determine the strain of our game contract. Thus, showing support below game is 100% forcing to game – yes, even if it four-of-a-minor! [This is why, in the auction in the first post on this subject, 4♣ was forcing – and actually more encouraging than 5♣]. Denying support (by passing) and then pulling double (or 3NT) to 4♣ might be non-forcing – it seems to say "partner, I have a really bad hand, but I think you might be better off playing 4♣ than anything else." This probably requires some prior thought (but isn't likely to occur with much frequency).
In general, where this is a commitment, the partnership is said to be "in a force." This has the following implication:
- the opponents may not play a contract below the commitment unless it is doubled.
And this further implies that:
- a direct pass over intervention below the commitment is 100% forcing.
The other key question about the commitment is its level: are we committed to game? or only to a part-score? This matters when the opponents intervene with a bid above our commitment. If we are committed to game, then the force is still in effect. There are some possible exceptions to this blanket statement, but these are beyond the scope of this article. See, for example, Robson and Segal: Partnership Bidding – The Contested Auction.
At all other times in a competitive auction, i.e. when there is no commitment, we are back to "normal bridge." Thus, bidding shows something extra and passing says you have nothing to say. Double means whatever you and your partner have agreed to. But, based on all of the recent polls and articles I've seen on BridgeWinners, any time we have not yet found a fit and the most recent bid is below game, double is almost always takeout-oriented or "cards" where there is no explicit pre-agreement.
So, let me try to summarize these rules (where intervention is always a bid – doubles are out of scope for this discussion):
- Intervention below committed contract: when a partnership is committed to a particular contract, any opponent's intervention of a bid which ranks below the committed contract imposes the following rules on direct bids:
- bidding the committed contract shows no interest in defending or probing for a higher-scoring contract (i.e. it is a minimum hand, both defensively and offensively) and is therefore the only non-forcing call available (other than double) – this can be thought of as a form of fast arrival if you like;
- for the sake of argument, double is assumed here to be penalty-oriented but note that the question of employing "pass-double inversion" is according to partnership agreement (and not in scope for this discussion);
- all other calls are 100% forcing:
- pass tends to show extra high cards without extra distribution and suggests at least the possibility of a penalty;
- all other bids below the committed contract are trial bids for a higher-scoring contract (just as they would be if there had been no intervention);
- bids above the committed contract show extras and, obviously, raise the level of commitment (again, we're essentially ignoring the intervention).
- Intervention below committed level: similar to the above, but:
- showing support is the first priority:
- if this is still below the commitment, this is obviously forcing and more encouraging than supporting directly at the committed level;
- otherwise, our support bid is not forcing because we have reached our committed level;
- pass is forcing and denies support;
- double is again the subject of partnership agreement.
- Intervention above committed part-score contract: normal bridge logic:
- bidding shows extras;
- passing shows nothing to say;
- double is penalty (since pass is non-forcing, if you have the hand for penalizing them, you have to do it).
- Intervention above committed game contract:
- subject to possible exceptions (see discussion above), we are in a "force":
- pass is forcing;
- double and pass are subject to pass-double inversion if agreed;
- pass-and-pull is slam-invitational;
- bidding on is "to play."
- Intervention above committed level: this situation is a little more complex because the intervention may have precluded supporting at the committed level in one strain, but not in another:
- pass (forcing) denies the ability to support at the committed level (i.e. we might still be able to support but it would require going beyond our committed level);
Some example sequences:
- 1♥ p 2NT 3♦: the partnership will play either 4♥ or a heart/no-trump slam – unless defending the opponents' doubled contract looks better; therefore pass is forcing and suggests that you wouldn't at all mind if partner decides to make a penalty double; any other bid below 4♥ is control-showing; of course, an immediate bid of 4♥ says you have a bare minimum (as it would without the interference) and furthermore that you would not welcome partner's penalty double.
- 1♥ 1♠ 2♠ 3♦: the partnership will play at least 3♥ but partner may have higher ambitions of course – pass is forcing and suggests a relatively balanced hand with at least a little extra – if partner can make a penalty double you won't pull it; an immediate call of 3♥ (the committed contract) says you have no extra strength or distribution and have no interest in penalizing the opponents or of bidding beyond 3♥.
- 1♥ X 2NT 3♣: the partnership will play at least 3♥ as before (assuming that 2NT is Truscott/Jordan); 3♦ suggests extra distribution (but implies no extra strength) which you hope will help partner decide how high to go if there is more competition.
- 1♥ X 2NT 3♠: they have bid beyond our committed part-score contract so all "normal" bidding notions are back in force – bidding shows extras (either high cards, distribution or both); 4♦ suggests extra distribution and no extra strength and forces our side to at least 4♥. You hope the diamond bid will help partner decide how high to go if there is yet more competition.
- 1♥ p 2♣ 2♦: the partnership is committed to game, but we don't know which game yet; in this situation (there have been no jumps or cue-bids yet by our side), I do recommend pass-double inversion (as my regular readers know) so that pass keeps open (and suggests) the possibility of defending 2♦X while denying support for clubs; double therefore shows a hand which is relatively short in diamonds (and clubs) and therefore likely to have four spades – this could be happily converted to penalty in appropriate circumstances (rare). With two stoppers in diamonds one partner or the other is likely to bid no-trump (unless perhaps we are at favorable vulnerability in which case double becomes more tempting).
- 1♥ p 1♠ p 3♣ 3♦ (the original problem auction): 4♣ is forcing and showing some slam interest; 5♣ is not forcing; pass denies club or heart support (and suggests no great ability to stop diamonds).
Sunday, April 7, 2013
No wonder it takes so long to learn this game!
Kim and I went over to England for Easter for some family time. The weather was unusually cold and dreary but we had a lot of fun. On our last couple of days, we went up to London to see Les Miserables on the stage (fabulous) and then, on the way to the airport, so to speak, we played bridge at the Andrew Robson Bridge Club close to where I grew up in Fulham. For various reasons, we've wanted to play at that club for quite a long time now. It was a relatively small game (seven tables) and we received sufficient gifts along the way to win our direction. Our own game wasn't exactly error free though. We doubled a part-score and then mis-defended allowing them to make it.
Then this hand came up (rotated) with nobody vulnerable:
I opened 1♥ in fourth seat; Kim responded 1♠ and I rebid 3♣. So far, so good. We are in a "game force" but still need to determine the right strain. At this point, West decided to throw a monkey wrench into the proceedings with 3♦. I thought we had pretty good understandings of how to deal with interference – but I was wrong.
Here are the options that I thought Kim had:
Then this hand came up (rotated) with nobody vulnerable:
I opened 1♥ in fourth seat; Kim responded 1♠ and I rebid 3♣. So far, so good. We are in a "game force" but still need to determine the right strain. At this point, West decided to throw a monkey wrench into the proceedings with 3♦. I thought we had pretty good understandings of how to deal with interference – but I was wrong.
Here are the options that I thought Kim had:
- pass (forcing) to await developments [if I double and she then pulls it, that shows extra strength and an interest in slam];
- double (penalty because I jumped at my second turn – see my rules for doubles);
- 3♥ (forcing) which I would take as delayed support with ♥xxx (and about 9+ hcp since she didn't simply raise initially) or ♥Hx (probably 10+ hcp);
- 3♠ (forcing) extra length in spades, nothing about strength;
- 3NT ("to play");
- 4♣ (non-forcing, competitive);
- 4♦ (forcing) though with no pre-discussed meaning;
- 5♣ (fast arrival);
- 4♥ (fast arrival) likely based on ♥Hx and a minimum (6-9) response.
Unfortunately, Kim felt that an immediate 4♣ was forward-going and 100% forcing. I passed, given that my hand lost quite a bit of its lustre as the auction unfolded. I was able to wrap up twelve tricks without breathing hard.
How can two decent players, who have discussed these situations so often, be on such completely different wavelengths?
I decided to put the question to BridgeWinners. However, because I wanted to understand general principles, I created two polls to try and separate what I thought were the two different issues. Here are the links:
In the first, I tried to get an answer in general terms of direct seat options when an intervening bid was made below a specific "committed" contract. There are of course several different ways to "commit" our partnership to, say, 3 of a major. Another common sequence might be: 1♠ (2♦) 3♦. If the next player doubles or bids 3♥, opener will have choices, including a forcing pass. My understanding of standard "expert" bridge was that 3♠ is the only non-forcing call (other than double/redouble which could be left in if appropriate).
But, so far, the votes (and especially the comments) on BridgeWinners have not been unanimous, although at this point, my scheme is the majority opinion (23/33 votes). How can something so fundamental (and quotidian) have such divergent opinions?
In the second poll, I tried to ascertain what exactly was meant by being in a "game force," especially as it relates to the minor suits. My own understanding was that a jump shift by opener (as in this case) was only forcing to four of the minor. If the responder had bid with a bare minimum and 3NT is missing a stopper, then the partnership can play in four of the minor.
Again, I was somewhat surprised by the votes and comments on the poll. The majority opinion was that this is something that must be agreed in advance by the partnership (although of the others most thought that game meant just that – game).
So, I would be very interested in your comments. But, at the risk of being repetitive, I will reiterate that it amazes me that these are not the subject of clear-cut rules. No wonder it takes so long to learn this game!
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Never - ever - say die
In looking at my posts and drafts, I am a bit shocked to see that I haven't published in three weeks! Apologies to my regular readers. As always, I have many inchoate articles but none have seemed ready. So, at the risk of being accused of too much self-congratulation or just too much fluff, I offer this reminder that we can turn things around -- especially in the relative randomness of a robot tournament.
This is something of a follow-up to my earlier Never say die article from last year and another in my series on robot bridge (see previous posting). The basic premise is that, no matter how bad things seem in a session of bridge, you should never (ever) give up.
Admittedly, this is a far cry from doing well in a real-person two-session event, but the message applies even to a lowly 12-board robot tournament on Bridge Base Online.
I like to think of myself as not being a quitter, but there are times when, having invested only a dollar and a few minutes of my time, I am tempted to give up on one of these tournaments if I start badly. But I don't give up. The only time I give up is if I make a mis-mouse which is unfortunately all-too-frequent with my MacMouse (I've mentioned this here before). If, instead, I simply make a bad play or I take a losing gamble, I simply resolve to do better in the remaining boards.
The other day, I played such a tournament (matchpoints), and my early efforts did not augur well. On the first board, I was slated to go down 2 in 1NT but managed hold myself to down 3. That was a zero, as everyone else was able to take more than four tricks. On board 2, we failed to compete to the two-level on our vulnerable 7-card fit and allowed the opponents to properly take their 9 tricks in diamonds (36%). Then in 3NT, I didn't appreciate the likelihood of a K being either singleton (a "kingleton?") or doubleton when I was missing six cards to the KJ in the suit (30%). Then, my opponents defended accurately in another 1NT hand and I went down 2 for -200. Half the field got softer defense and only went down one (23%). So, after four boards I had a rollicking 22.16%. Was this an appropriate time to quit? Hell, no!
I came back with a 64%, 90%, 98%, 60%, 92%, 63%, 88% and finally 82%. These scores were good enough to get me up to 60.4% and a fourth-place finish.
I was particularly happy with this hand, which earned the 98%, especially because I so often don't take advantage of potential ruffs in dummy:
After the switch to the ♥Q, I sensed something a little fishy, like a 1-3 split but it seemed that no harm could come of another round of trumps (plus, these Robots can be tricky). The auction suggested that my RHO wouldn't be able to overruff any club or diamond ruffs I might want to take. So I resisted my normal urge to wipe the enemy trumps out, and set about doing some ruffing. I didn't have a lot of hope for the the diamond finesse, given the auction, but it worked!
Twelve tricks are cold on the deal, but of the other 21 heart contract declarers, only two managed to take all the tricks, and one of those wasn't even in game!
BTW, did you spot that the robot sitting East tried to confuse me by playing his 9 and 7 before the 4? The robots like to do that in case there's a Rabbit at the wheel who might forget about the lowly 4. In this case, he just made it too easy.
This is something of a follow-up to my earlier Never say die article from last year and another in my series on robot bridge (see previous posting). The basic premise is that, no matter how bad things seem in a session of bridge, you should never (ever) give up.
Admittedly, this is a far cry from doing well in a real-person two-session event, but the message applies even to a lowly 12-board robot tournament on Bridge Base Online.
I like to think of myself as not being a quitter, but there are times when, having invested only a dollar and a few minutes of my time, I am tempted to give up on one of these tournaments if I start badly. But I don't give up. The only time I give up is if I make a mis-mouse which is unfortunately all-too-frequent with my MacMouse (I've mentioned this here before). If, instead, I simply make a bad play or I take a losing gamble, I simply resolve to do better in the remaining boards.
The other day, I played such a tournament (matchpoints), and my early efforts did not augur well. On the first board, I was slated to go down 2 in 1NT but managed hold myself to down 3. That was a zero, as everyone else was able to take more than four tricks. On board 2, we failed to compete to the two-level on our vulnerable 7-card fit and allowed the opponents to properly take their 9 tricks in diamonds (36%). Then in 3NT, I didn't appreciate the likelihood of a K being either singleton (a "kingleton?") or doubleton when I was missing six cards to the KJ in the suit (30%). Then, my opponents defended accurately in another 1NT hand and I went down 2 for -200. Half the field got softer defense and only went down one (23%). So, after four boards I had a rollicking 22.16%. Was this an appropriate time to quit? Hell, no!
I came back with a 64%, 90%, 98%, 60%, 92%, 63%, 88% and finally 82%. These scores were good enough to get me up to 60.4% and a fourth-place finish.
I was particularly happy with this hand, which earned the 98%, especially because I so often don't take advantage of potential ruffs in dummy:
After the switch to the ♥Q, I sensed something a little fishy, like a 1-3 split but it seemed that no harm could come of another round of trumps (plus, these Robots can be tricky). The auction suggested that my RHO wouldn't be able to overruff any club or diamond ruffs I might want to take. So I resisted my normal urge to wipe the enemy trumps out, and set about doing some ruffing. I didn't have a lot of hope for the the diamond finesse, given the auction, but it worked!
Twelve tricks are cold on the deal, but of the other 21 heart contract declarers, only two managed to take all the tricks, and one of those wasn't even in game!
BTW, did you spot that the robot sitting East tried to confuse me by playing his 9 and 7 before the 4? The robots like to do that in case there's a Rabbit at the wheel who might forget about the lowly 4. In this case, he just made it too easy.
Monday, March 4, 2013
Can you win this robot tournament - solutions
Last time, we looked at several problems in a 12-board robot tournament. Top was 25.
Board 1: ♠AT ♥AK98 ♦Q764 ♣K87. Partner invited game in hearts after his Stayman bid had been doubled by RHO. If you bid 4♥, you earned 16 or 23 if you found the (doubleton) trump queen (I didn't). If you passed you were below average with 5.5 or 10.5.
Running score after two: 36 (72%).
Board 3: ♠K72 ♥6 ♦KJ72 ♣AKJ64. You opened 1♣ and partner bid 1♥. If you were really disciplined and resisted the reverse, to rebid your nice clubs, you earned a healthy 19 (+110), assuming you didn't butcher the play. If you reversed, you received 13 for –50. If you rebid 1NT then you were getting either a top or a bottom depending on your play and the robots' defense.
Running score after six: 92.5 (61.7%).
Board 7: ♠A932 ♥K95 ♦AQT6 ♣KJ. You opened 1NT, partner bid 2♠ (Minor Stayman), you rebid 3♦ and the robot bid 3NT. If you made a move (I chose 4♦), you would have ended up with a 24.5 (only one other table bid the cold 6♦). I reasoned that the KJ were useful cards in clubs (they were) and that the robot wouldn't have bid 2♠ unless slam was reasonable.
I mentioned in the exposition of this little problem that not all humans responded 3 to the Minor Stayman bid. I can only guess that those who bid 3♣ didn't bother to read the explanation of the call. Some simply rebid 3NT, essentially denying a four-card minor. Presumably they didn't read the explanation either. I have some sympathy for these folks. The explanations are often quite inaccurate, at least as far as strength is concerned. But when they say they have a particular shape, that is usually true. [Just today, I opened 2NT, next player bid 4♦ and my robot doubled; the explanation was "biddable diamonds" – he had a small singleton!]
Running score after seven: 117 (67%).
Board 8:
I probably just got very lucky but I bid 4♣ (splinter) which was worth another 24.5 when 11 tricks were there for the taking. If you did anything else (or if you didn't double at your second turn) you most probably scored a 13.5.
Running score 152 (67.5%).
Board 10: ♠K982 ♥T62 ♦K6 ♣AQ32. East dealt and opened 1♦. Did you double? If you did, then you won this board in a somewhat unusual way: you wrong-sided the resulting 3NT contract by the opponents. You will have suffered a twinge of dread when it went redouble on your left, but your partner was there with his 1♠ preference bid. Most probably you would have ended up with 18.225 for down one but I got really lucky when declarer went wrong and down two for 23.45 mps.
Board 11:
As you can see, if you took the spade finesse (or you just cashed the top two spades at some point), then you made ten tricks like most other declarers for 14 mps. The danger of a diamond switch was a lot less than it might have been. Somebody managed to take 11 tricks when West got pseudo-squeezed and pitched a spade.
BTW, I always look for opportunities to sow seeds of confusion in the defenders. I therefore took the club "finesse" at trick 3 to suggest to East that his partner might have the Q.
Running score: 189.5 (69%).
Board 12: ♠J943 ♥A76 ♦A8 ♣AQ97. After East opened 1♦ in third seat, double was the call most likely to succeed. A few bid 1NT which strikes me as being absurd (15 hcp vulnerable, with only Ax in the bid suit?). Some of those got lucky making 120 or even 150 when LHO didn't lead his partner's suit. But most got their just deserts with –100, –200 or even –300.
After your double, BTW, it went 1♥ by partner and 2♦ by East. Would you have doubled again? If you did, partner would have competed to 3♣ for down one and a shade over 7 mps. If you were disciplined and passed (or even if you raised to 2♥), West would compete to 2♠ going down one (12.5 as in my case) or, if you were lucky, two (18.75).
Final score: 202 (67.3%), good enough for 1st place.
I hope you've enjoyed this little quiz. It isn't hard to win a robot duplicate and I don't claim that it reflects any great brilliance on the part of the player. Like any duplicate, it needs luck, some gifts and some reasonable care not to end up in unusual, no-play contracts.
What makes a robot duplicate a particularly good event to use for a bit of fun like this is that the robots are fairly predictable. If there was an alternative play/call that some other human chose, we can see what the robots' reaction(s) would likely have been if you had done the same thing.
Board 1: ♠AT ♥AK98 ♦Q764 ♣K87. Partner invited game in hearts after his Stayman bid had been doubled by RHO. If you bid 4♥, you earned 16 or 23 if you found the (doubleton) trump queen (I didn't). If you passed you were below average with 5.5 or 10.5.
Running score after two: 36 (72%).
Board 3: ♠K72 ♥6 ♦KJ72 ♣AKJ64. You opened 1♣ and partner bid 1♥. If you were really disciplined and resisted the reverse, to rebid your nice clubs, you earned a healthy 19 (+110), assuming you didn't butcher the play. If you reversed, you received 13 for –50. If you rebid 1NT then you were getting either a top or a bottom depending on your play and the robots' defense.
Running score after six: 92.5 (61.7%).
Board 7: ♠A932 ♥K95 ♦AQT6 ♣KJ. You opened 1NT, partner bid 2♠ (Minor Stayman), you rebid 3♦ and the robot bid 3NT. If you made a move (I chose 4♦), you would have ended up with a 24.5 (only one other table bid the cold 6♦). I reasoned that the KJ were useful cards in clubs (they were) and that the robot wouldn't have bid 2♠ unless slam was reasonable.
I mentioned in the exposition of this little problem that not all humans responded 3 to the Minor Stayman bid. I can only guess that those who bid 3♣ didn't bother to read the explanation of the call. Some simply rebid 3NT, essentially denying a four-card minor. Presumably they didn't read the explanation either. I have some sympathy for these folks. The explanations are often quite inaccurate, at least as far as strength is concerned. But when they say they have a particular shape, that is usually true. [Just today, I opened 2NT, next player bid 4♦ and my robot doubled; the explanation was "biddable diamonds" – he had a small singleton!]
Running score after seven: 117 (67%).
Board 8:
I probably just got very lucky but I bid 4♣ (splinter) which was worth another 24.5 when 11 tricks were there for the taking. If you did anything else (or if you didn't double at your second turn) you most probably scored a 13.5.
Running score 152 (67.5%).
Board 10: ♠K982 ♥T62 ♦K6 ♣AQ32. East dealt and opened 1♦. Did you double? If you did, then you won this board in a somewhat unusual way: you wrong-sided the resulting 3NT contract by the opponents. You will have suffered a twinge of dread when it went redouble on your left, but your partner was there with his 1♠ preference bid. Most probably you would have ended up with 18.225 for down one but I got really lucky when declarer went wrong and down two for 23.45 mps.
Board 11:
As you can see, if you took the spade finesse (or you just cashed the top two spades at some point), then you made ten tricks like most other declarers for 14 mps. The danger of a diamond switch was a lot less than it might have been. Somebody managed to take 11 tricks when West got pseudo-squeezed and pitched a spade.
BTW, I always look for opportunities to sow seeds of confusion in the defenders. I therefore took the club "finesse" at trick 3 to suggest to East that his partner might have the Q.
Running score: 189.5 (69%).
Board 12: ♠J943 ♥A76 ♦A8 ♣AQ97. After East opened 1♦ in third seat, double was the call most likely to succeed. A few bid 1NT which strikes me as being absurd (15 hcp vulnerable, with only Ax in the bid suit?). Some of those got lucky making 120 or even 150 when LHO didn't lead his partner's suit. But most got their just deserts with –100, –200 or even –300.
After your double, BTW, it went 1♥ by partner and 2♦ by East. Would you have doubled again? If you did, partner would have competed to 3♣ for down one and a shade over 7 mps. If you were disciplined and passed (or even if you raised to 2♥), West would compete to 2♠ going down one (12.5 as in my case) or, if you were lucky, two (18.75).
Final score: 202 (67.3%), good enough for 1st place.
I hope you've enjoyed this little quiz. It isn't hard to win a robot duplicate and I don't claim that it reflects any great brilliance on the part of the player. Like any duplicate, it needs luck, some gifts and some reasonable care not to end up in unusual, no-play contracts.
What makes a robot duplicate a particularly good event to use for a bit of fun like this is that the robots are fairly predictable. If there was an alternative play/call that some other human chose, we can see what the robots' reaction(s) would likely have been if you had done the same thing.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)