Can you win this robot tournament?

Continuing my series on robot play, I offer this little diversion.

Any time I can get in a normal contract at a robot tournament (i.e. Bridge Base Online, ACBL Robot tournament), I figure I have a good chance for a good score, especially now that the human plays his robot partner's declarations. Those of you who saw my last blog (The hitchhiker's guide to bridge – part 1) will know the kind of thing I mean where we are not in a normal contract.

The trouble is, it's rare when playing with the robots to put together twelve normal contracts. In this tournament, however, I managed to get to what I consider normal contracts on every hand and, with some careful though not brilliant declarer play I managed to come out on top.

I was fortunate that Leo LaSota wasn't playing in this tournament! He just topped 10,000 BBO points. Congratulations, Leo!

There are 26 humans in this event so that top on a board is 25.

Board 1: ♠AT ♥AK98 ♦Q764 ♣K87. You open 1NT and partner bids 2♣, Stayman. RHO doubles and you bid 2♥. Partner raises to 3♥. Your call? I should add, BTW, that in all but one of the 26 auctions, the bidding to this point is identical.

On board 2, you end up defending 3♠ for down one. The only odd thing about this is that your robot partner does some strange carding in the diamond suit which results in some human defenders going astray. Through no great brilliance on your part, you manage to snag 20 mps.

Board 3: ♠K72 ♥6 ♦KJ72 ♣AKJ64. You open 1♣ and partner bids 1♥. Opps are silent. Your call?

We'll skip over boards 4 and 5 which were reasonably normal major suit game contracts (going down in the second one when North decided that his 9-count with a singleton in my original major suit was worth an invitation), earning 16 and 10.5 mps respectively. And we'll skip the next one (6) too where we defended a normal 3♣ contract earning an 11.

Board 7: ♠A932 ♥K95 ♦AQT6 ♣KJ. You, like almost all of the humans, open 1NT and partner bids 2♠, described as "Minor Stayman 4+♣; 4+♦; 10+ total points." You dutifully bid 3♦ (many didn't) and the robot now bids 3NT. Your call?

Board 8:


Your call?

On board 9, you open 1♣ and your robot partner bids 1♠ with five spades to the ten, three hearts to the queen, four diamonds to the K and two small clubs. You struggle (remember the human has to play all hands now) to go down only one but succumb to a two trick set for 10.5 matchpoints. The play for down one which would score 21.5 is, to me at least, not only a double-dummy play but one that I would call triple-dummy. The play is likely to be found only by a computer playing double-dummy.

Board 10: ♠K982 ♥T62 ♦K6 ♣AQ32 (all vulnerable). East deals and opens 1♦. Your call?
[I originally showed the wrong hand here - my apologies]

Board 11:


Everyone is in the same contract and the lead is always the same. Clearly time to maximize your tricks. What's your general plan? Will you take the ♠ finesse at the risk of going down when they switch to a diamond?

Well, you've managed to lead the field for the last several boards so all you have to do now on the last one is to avoid an average minus or a bottom.

Board 12: ♠J943 ♥A76 ♦A8 ♣AQ97 (we are vulnerable). West deals and East opens 1♦ in third seat. Your call?

Answers to follow tomorrow.

The hitchhiker's guide to Bridge: part 1

The instruction DON'T PANIC was written in large letters on the front page of the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, according to Douglas Adams in the novel of that name (1979). It is also a good thing to remember at times when playing bridge.

There are probably several different aspects of the game where the exhortation is relevant. One is defending a contract with a good side suit. There is a tendency to panic unless we have a good count on declarer's hand. Another common situation is defending a doubled part score, especially when partner is the chief hawk and our hand is dove-like.

The situation that is the subject of this blog occurs during the auction. It's a common mistake of beginners in bridge to keep running from doubled contracts. Just the other day, I doubled a contract at the two-level (we were slated to earn 500) but the opponents panicked and ended up in the exact same suit, but one level higher. We enjoyed our 800.

Here's a situation where the BBO robots demonstrated that they too are subject to this type of panic attack. The hand occurred in a robot tournament, costing me a decent showing. To add insult to injury, the tournaments now require the human to play all the hands so I was the one playing the ridiculous contract. Assuming that 4♦ gets doubled it would have been worth approximately 12 IMPs to us (-100 against a vulnerable game). 4♠ doubled should also have been -100 although the two times it was played resulted in -500. That would have been worth 4.8 IMPs. The actual contract of 5♥X (-800 although I could have escaped for -500) was worth -4.1 IMPs.

It was all so unnecessary – and a direct result of panicking. 4♦ hadn't even been doubled yet. You would think that my robot partner would be happy to have three cards in each of my announced suits. But no, he bids his own suit. When that gets doubled (surprise), he pulls to the strain that he previously eschewed. That gets doubled and he pulls yet again.



Are there any lessons to be learned (by the robot) here? The first lesson is that when partner has promised a two-suiter and voluntarily bids one of the suits "to play", then that suit is at least as good as the other suit and will usually be better. How do we know it's "to play?" In this case, it's clear from the auction that the opponents hold most of the cards and that the robot is broke. A raise would be unthinkable and a preference is only desired with significantly better hearts than diamonds.

The second lesson is that three card support (here in each of partner's suits!) is very good to have. Don't try to bid your own suit, unless it's at least eight cards long!

The third lesson is that once the opponents start doubling, they are likely to double everything in sight. The fact that they doubled 5♦, doesn't in any way suggest that 5♥ would play better. And that's going to be doubled too.

Don't get me wrong. I enjoy playing these robot tournaments. The robots are patient, they are fast. They never criticize my inept play. Occasionally they go off the rails, as above, but mostly I love them for being competent, if not brilliant, and dependable partners.

A tricky one

My regular readers know that I am keenly interested in the use of the red (double) card in competitive auctions. Some of you might say I'm obsessed.

Here's a hand that was reported to me from the regional A/X pairs in Cromwell, CT that engendered some discussion. The N/S players were experts. Vulnerability was favorable and your hand, the dealer, is ♠T6 ♥KQ52 ♦KQ853 ♣K3. You open 1♦ and LHO chimes in with 2♣. Partner makes a negative double and RHO raises the ante with 2♠. Now what? At the table, it was passed around to partner who doubled again.

Any good ideas? Is it obvious? I believe that if you were playing with me, and had agreed to use my rules for doubles (see many previous blogs including Introducing four-card suits in high-level auctions), then this shows hearts with at least tolerance for a 3♦ contract. That's to say this is not a penalty double but a cooperative (DSIP) double. But playing with a partner without the benefit of such explicit rules, there's room for doubt. I posted the hand on Bridge Winners so you might like to go there and see the comments.

At the table, South felt that partner must be showing both majors and was making a penalty double. The resulting –870 didn't garner many matchpoints.



Despite having 24 hcp, N/S cannot make a game yet E/W can make 4♠ blindfolded (shouldn't the score have been –1070, then?).

Is there a moral to this story? Perhaps more then one:

• develop and learn an explicit set of penalty double triggers (you can borrow/adapt mine – DSIP rule summary – if you like);
• make space-eating overcalls like 2♣ and advances like 2♠ whenever you get the chance;
• if you're not 100% sure as North that a second double will be taken as cooperative, then bid 3♦ – there's a very good chance that South, with four hearts, will bid 3♥ now, restoring (if it matters) the benefit of being in a major;
• play Larry Cohen's "Good/bad 2NT" – in this case, South might have managed to scrape up a 2NT ("bad") bid over 2♠ suggesting in this case minimum high-card points but competitive red-suit shape (admittedly, South's hand hasn't exactly improved after the first round of bidding so perhaps pass would still be appropriate here).

A surprising outcome

Here's a curious hand that came up today playing in a Speedball on BBO with Barmar.

Let's say you pick up ♠J643 ♥985 ♦AQ4 ♣QT7 at matchpoints and favorable vulnerability. There are two passes to you. At this point, what odds would you give that your side can make slam? You probably wouldn't be willing to bet a lot on it. Yet it turned out so (although we didn't actually bid the slam – and neither did anyone else).



Some explanation of my initial pass is in order. No, I didn't decide to downgrade my hand. I was aiming for the 1♦ button when I discovered that I had registered a pass. It's a problem with the mouse on the Macbook – it sometimes has a mind of its own.

Fortunately, East gave me a chance to get back in by opening 1♣ in fourth seat (a questionable decision in my view). The tricky thing for me now was how to "catch up" without committing some terrible sin. I decided to start out just as I should have in the first round – with 1♦. Over 3♥, I felt that the time had come to show my spades. Barry would probably think I was 6-5 but so be it. The vulnerability was in our favor. Naturally, he decided to take the push to 4♠ over 4♥. I'm certainly glad he did. For one thing, they are only down one in 4♥ and we probably wouldn't be doubling. For another thing, I wouldn't have a story.

I managed to avoid any great blunders during the play and surprised all, not least myself, by making two overtricks. I was then slightly disappointed that I hadn't been doubled as +790 would have been worth 99%. Another declarer was doubled but only made one overtrick. As it was, we managed a nice 88%.

What's interesting about this unusual circumstance (well, not so very unusual on BBO where there are no undos) is that had I opened as I should, we would have found our spade fit immediately via a negative double. But advancing an overcall is rather different than responding to an opening, especially when the opening is in a minor. Is there really any chance we'd have found slam? Not on the evidence of the other tables in play.

You can imagine the chagrin of my poor RHO. All she had to do was pass the hand out for a 93% board (in fact, there was one pass-out). That decision represents a negative swing of 81%!

This was a big tournament with 102 pairs playing this board. This hand helped us score a 71% game for 5th overall.

Psychopaths and bridge

I've recently read and enjoyed one of last years crop of new bridge books: Shades of Grey by Ken Allan. This is a book about cheating – but in a light-hearted vein – and therefore a lighter, perhaps more easily accessible read than Truscott's The Great Bridge Scandal or Chua's Fair Play or Foul?

I found the whodunnit style rather engaging. As the book progresses, the style turns into a how'd-they-get-caught which is equally interesting. The characters are believable, even if there is perhaps a little too much intrigue for the "Soo" region of Ontario. I would definitely recommend it.

The only odd thing was that people who saw me reading the book would ask "have you got to the naughty bits yet?" These people were apparently free-associating the book with the 2011 erotic best seller Fifty Shades of Grey. I can't say if the latter book has any bridge in it but, strangely enough, the 2012 bridge book does have a few, albeit very mild, naughty bits.

My only complaint is that an important character in the book, Rocky, goes missing and we never find out his fate. It's possible I just missed it, but I don't think so.

I learned a lot about psychopaths in the book, as one of the characters is professionally acquainted with psychopaths and one of the cheaters may be one. Not all sufferers turn to a life of crime but psychopaths tend to have no guilty conscience and do not get embarrassed easily by doing bad or even stupid things.

One of the things that keeps most of from making really idiotic bids at the bridge table is our fear of embarrassment, and possibly our conscience prevents us from treating our partners thus badly.

Our robot partners on Bridge Base Online suffer from no conscience or embarrassment – and therefore can be considered psychopaths. Take for example a hand that arose last week in an ACBL robot tournament. My hand, as dealer at matchpoints with none vulnerable was ♠AKQT7654 ♥Q6 ♦– ♣QT4. Perhaps I began the train-wreck with my 1♠ call. The hand just seemed too good to open 4♠. LHO showed hearts and a minor with 2♠ and partner passed (take note). RHO bid 3♥ and I decided that the time had come to put things to bed with 4♠. But I had reckoned without my partner who so far had underbid his hand somewhat. His call? 6NT.

I watched in some amusement as the opponents wrapped up 9 tricks and then let partner in (their defense was less than optimal – they should have taken the first 11 tricks!). Here is the whole hand:



If you hover over my 4♠ call, you will see that it is supposed to show (according to the Robots' system) a hand with good spades and about 20 hcp. Clearly, my hand was not so well appointed as that! But even so, is it sane for partner to bid 6NT with two suits unstopped?

So, did this result (-400) score the world's coldest bottom? Not at all. We got a 25% board! Although N/S can make 6♠, only one pair (of 24) got there. Many were in 5♠ often doubled. One optimistic pair got to 7♠ which was allowed to make on a diamond lead. Par on this board is actually 7♥X by E/W down 4. Several E/W pairs (our "teammates") were allowed to play (and make!) 5♥, thus saving us from ignominy.

And I should point out that we had company. Five other pairs had the exact same auction and result as ours.

Going down eight (even undoubled) is generally such an embarrassment at bridge (although I have it on good authority that Michael Rosenberg once went down seven –350– in 1NT when his opponents were cold for a grand but were unable to bid) that those of us with a conscience won't do it without being fairly sure of our stoppers. The Robots suffer from no such inhibitions. In short, they are psychopathic bridge players!

Masterpoints, or "dumb and dumber"

Several recent occurrences have reminded me of the issues with the rather odd system we have of recognizing bridge success, which we in ACBL land call masterpoints. I last wrote about this subject three years ago in Points, schmoints.

The latest and perhaps most trivial silliness is the recent announcement that platinum points, albeit fractional, will be awarded at an event restricted to players with fewer than 10,000 masterpoints. On the one hand this seems like more "dumbing down" by the ACBL and a new thin-end-of-the-wedge, similar to the devaluing of gold points. On the other hand, it's ludicrous given that the event will exclude all of 553 players (one third of one percent of all ACBL members) from participating. Are they serious?

Then there's Adam Parrish's contribution to Bridge Winners Give the 27-54s some love! This article makes the very good point that the ACBL is doing nothing to encourage the middle-aged players. Surely these are the future of the game every bit as much as the juniors and youths? Many of the points of discussion relate to basic questions like Why do people play bridge? What motivates them to play in particular events? etc. I think I have mentioned this before in my blog but we know from the types of articles that are these days missing from the Bulletin (in particular Partnership Bridge) that the editors are deliberately dumbing down its content.

But perhaps the most significant recent event is the effort by officials of my district (25) to discover why the B flight members are not coming to tournaments as much as they should. Apparently, the C flight is coming in droves because of the "Gold Rush" events (yes, I've noticed this of course). The A flight comes because they love to play bridge and win points. I don't know if the absolute numbers of B players is down but it seems that C players who have been amassing gobs of masterpoints in Gold Rush events eventually get "promoted" to the B flight and whoa! it's not so easy to win any more. So they stay home.

Could it possibly be that we gave them a false expectation of their ability to win points? Could it be that we made them think that winning points was all bridge is about? Could it be that after life master, there is no meaningful rank left to attain, other than the very remote (for most of us) Grand Life Master?

Tweaking masterpoint awards, event schedules, dividing the field into brackets, and the like are all very well to increase membership and table counts. But I think they are a short-term solution.

Here's my proposal:

Divide the field into three tranches, possibly four. Beginners, "relaxed," and open. A possible fourth tranche might be NABC+ (a special kind of open). Any player may play in any tranche. No restrictions, although club directors would be able to exclude players from the beginners group at their discretion. There might not even be such beginner events at tournaments, but if so there would probably have to be some upper limit to keep it sane. Clubs would not normally hold open events, except perhaps for club championships, charity games, and that sort of thing. On such occasions, if the club is big enough, it might hold two sections, one competitive, one relaxed.

Each tranche would have a different type of masterpoints. Let's call them white, pink and blue, but I really don't care: perhaps we could name them after quarks: charm, up and down, etc. The different types of points would not be interchangeable. If you just want to play bridge and don't particularly enjoy playing against experts, you play in the relaxed game. You will never reach so many points that you can no longer play in this game. If you are a competitor, you try to play in open games when you can.

Simple, right? Players would still see their point totals going up month by month. Milestones would be different for each tranche. There would be no such thing as a "life master." Open/NABC milestones would be more meaningful: a certain number of points, a certain type of win (single-session tournament, two-session, KO, etc.)

In many ways, this would be a reversion to the "old days," before flighting and pigmented points. Except that in those days, there were no beginner games and no relaxed games. When you joined the ACBL and started playing you were swimming with the sharks, like it or not. Earning even a fraction of a point was an achievement!

We would eliminate "senior" events altogether. Given that most players in the ACBL are already in the 55+ group, it hardly constitutes a meaningful demographic division. Older players who wanted a little less seriousness in the game would play in the relaxed events.

I'll add one more observation. In the Boston area (specifically the "Route 128" corridor), we have three clubs which offer a Saturday afternoon game. For those of us who live on the West side of the city, there are two games within reach. One game is a very competitive club game (Westwood). The other is a so-called "Goodtimers" game (but open to anyone who wants to have a good time) at Dean Panagopoulos' Bridge Spot. Players are to a large extent already voting with their feet (well, their wheels) as to which game they prefer. And why not? Give people the type of game they enjoy. Isn't that ultimately what will bring people back to play more bridge?

This subject is one of the most controversial of all bridge topics so I expect some comments!

What makes a good penalty double?

Back in April, I wrote about different types of penalty double – the second installment was Penalty Doubles (part 2). There, I observed, that the traditional penalty double was an endangered species because in practice it doesn't come up very often. Note that I am excluding what I call "equity-preserving doubles" which cover such things as doubling sacrifices. By the "traditional" penalty double, I mean the type where you double a contract that the opponents have bid willingly (and it appears that the hand "belongs" to them). Such doubles typically occur in an auction that begins competitively and, frequently, they arise after partner of doubler has opened the bidding. And note also that I am talking here about doubles that are strictly penalty in meaning, not cooperative doubles that are converted by passing.

What makes a good penalty double? I think there are several factors:

1. lack of a fit for partner, otherwise a relatively balanced hand – in particular you must not hold a long suit (six-plus cards) of your own;
2. trump quality and position – your tricks are sure tricks and there's no danger of tipping off declarer as to the correct line of play – but the position of your honors in the other suits must appear to be favorable to you too;
3. an expectation of setting the contract at least two tricks – or, at match points, your judgment that the contract is normal (four or five of a minor is generally not normal at MPs) and that your peers are likely to consider doubling (if the contract isn't normal – perhaps they've clearly gone off the rails – you are almost certainly getting a good board if they go down even without a double);
4. no place for the opponents to run.

Let's look at these in turn, although we will go in reverse, starting with point four. Several years ago in a world-wide simultaneous pairs event, I was the happy holder of ♠AK on lead against 6NT. Clearly, this pair had gone off the rails and I was likely to get a very good board simply by "staying with happiness". But the temptation for that world-wide top overcame me. I doubled, even though I wasn't sure that they didn't have a place to run. They ran to 7♣ and naturally I doubled that too. It made, of course, and instead of getting the world-wide top I was hoping for, I got a well-deserved world-wide bottom!

Point three: even though our hand might look fairly normal the other hands at the table might be goulash hands, with long suits and voids. Having a safety margin is definitely worth-while. Furthermore, the penalties really don't get interesting until the second trick (again, we're not talking about equity-preserving doubles). Let's say we are playing IMPs and the contract is 4♥ (vulnerable) going down one at both tables. The opponents double at the other table but we don't. We lose 3 IMPs. Not such a big deal. Now, let's say it goes down two at both tables. If we don't double and they do, we are losing 7 IMPs. Now, that's getting more serious.

Point two: it's fairly obvious that we need trump quality because otherwise declarer will simply draw our trumps and run his winners. And, equally we need to be sitting over the trump length lest our honors be finessible. Well-placed trump tricks are tricks that can't disappear. Note that if trumps appear to be 5-5 (or even 4-4) we won't always be able to tell where our honors are in relation to declarer's honors.

Point one: perhaps the best indicator of the success of a penalty double is our fit for partner (assuming that partner has bid which is typically the case). Obviously, a void is the best, but a singleton is pretty good. Why should that be? Well, whatever the number of total tricks is on the hand (and the fewer the better from the point of view of the penalty doubler), each card that we have in our hand in partner's suit is likely to increase the total tricks by one. This presupposes that partner has a real suit (one of at least five cards in length). A good fit for partner means that we might even be better off playing our own contract than defending their contract. And it increases the chance of shortness in one of the opponents' hands.

Now for some examples to help summarize what I've said. Let's take an example from a recent club game which also happened to be a world-wide simultaneous event. You hold this hand (only we are vulnerable) ♠876 ♥T843 ♦J5 ♣QT84. Partner deals and opens 1♠. RHO doubles and you pass. LHO bids 2♣ and partner rebids 3♠. RHO now raises to 4♣. Your call?

If you chose double, it means that you haven't been paying attention! Let's look at the factors one by one:

1. we have an excellent fit for partner who appears to have a good six or seven spades;
2. our trump quality is OK though nothing to write home about – but we don't even know where the trumps honors will be found – furthermore, with honors potentially on both sides we could easily be tipping declarer off to the correct line, if there is one;
3. we don't really have an expectation of beating this two – let's say partner has 16 hcp, we have 3 – that's not even half the deck – plus we have no other surprises in store for the opponents;
4. do they have a place to run? how about diamonds? Partner's hand is spades and more spades.

When I played this hand (as LHO) we got to 5♣ and I went down. There was no double and I mistimed the play. When Kim played the hand (also as LHO) the player with the cards shown above doubled 4♣. Not only did Kim make the contract, she actually made the overtrick (playing double-dummy).

As it turns out, N/S can take eight tricks in spades with their 18 hcp, although East has to underlead the ♥A to get West a ruff to avoid the overtrick. E/W can take eleven tricks in clubs. That's nineteen total tricks – two nine card fits with a club void in the long spade hand. In fact, a diamond contract doesn't do so well thus there's no good runout there, but of course none is needed. See below for the layout.

Here's another example of a bad penalty double, which came up just the other day, although this time I was the happy recipient of the gift. My opponent held this hand: ♠T98 ♥JT82 ♦54 ♣QJ83. All are vulnerable and your RHO (the author) opens with 1♦. You pass and LHO bids 1♠. Partner bids 2♥. RHO bids 3♣ and you compete to 3♥. I don't recall for sure what happens next but, if I recall correctly, the opponents end up having the auction to themselves and bid 5♣. Do you double? This would be a true penalty double because the opponents have voluntarily bid 5♣ and it is their hand.

Let's look at the various factors: we have a very good fit with partner [full contraindication]; trump quality is good and the position appears to be good, although there is a possibility that declarer might be able to come up with a winning line [perhaps half an indication]; we really don't have a solid expectation of a two-trick set but it's conceivable (one heart, two clubs perhaps and maybe partner will contribute another trick) [half an indication]; might they have a better spot than 5♣, though – diamonds for instance [half a contraindication]?

On balance, this is not a good double. Nevertheless, the holder of this hand doubled and, even though 5♣ was cold (though not six), the opponents ran to 5♦ which partner now doubled. This made easily (although RHO – moi – neglected to redouble and make the overtrick for a clear top – another pair actually bid and made 6♦).

And now my final example for this particular chamber of horrors: I recently made a very poor decision to double a competitive 4♣ call by my RHO, holding this hand: ♠QT92 ♥3 ♦QJ9876 ♣T2. All were vulnerable and partner had opened proceedings with 1♥. RHO overcalled 2♣ and I had no good call so passed. LHO bid 3♣ and partner came back in with 3♥. RHO bid 4♣. At the time, I intended it more as a "suppressant" double (a species I apparently failed to mention in my earlier discussions). This type of double is used solely to warn partner not to bid again. Yet, it is made in the expectation of a set, even though you aren't sure that partner could have made his contract (thus it is not strictly for equity preservation). Therefore, it is a penalty double and at least some of the other rules need to be followed. One of the rules I broke here, not having really thought about it as a rule before this occurred, is the long-suit rule. Just as you might conceivably pull partner's penalty double when you have a long unbid suit of your own (see George Rosenkranz' excellent Tips for Tops), so you should not make your own penalty double with an unbid long suit. Even if partner has only three cards (a suit he will not normally bid on his own), there's a 10% chance that one of your opponents is void and only a 40% chance that two rounds of the suit will stand up.

As always, I'm interested to hear comments. Have I missed some aspects of what makes a good pure penalty double? I know that I double too much in practice (although most of those are "equity preservation doubles" where the rules given above typically don't apply) so it is important for me to have some good guidelines. The long-suit exclusion is the latest enhancement to my personal checklist.

Best wishes to all of my readers for 2013.  May all your squeezes and endplays produce extra tricks.